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Article 3

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: HALF CENTURY OF
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS*
Samuel B. Horovitz* *t
Workmen's compensation has reached the half-century stage
in some of our states. Provisions for it appears today in the
statute books of every one of our fifty states and our territories.
Such acts date back to 1884 in Germany and to 1897 in England.
There is scarcely an English speaking nation without some form
of workmen's compensation. In addition, wherever there is a
factory system or wherever personal injuries at work are common, no matter what the language of the people, some form of
workmen's compensation legislation can usually be found.1
Despite its universality, the subject of workmen's compensation has rarely been dramatized. It has no appeal to the average
uninjured layman. But when someone in the family is brought
home in an ambulance or in a coffin, inquiry is then made into
workmen's compensation laws.
If, in a city of 2 million people, simultanteous factory explosions-nuclear accidents for example-would injure every human
being and cause funerals to be held for 15,000 of them, the newspapers, radio and television would flash the word to every corner
of the world. Legislatures would rush into action to prevent
*

*

Mr. Horovitz is on a world-wide speaking tour on the subject
workmen's compensation. This article covers the subject matter
his various talks, including the one to the international group
workmen's compensation administrators, known as the IAIABC,
Hawaii on November 13, 1961.
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t Because of the author's association with the NACCA LAW
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he has referred to it often as a paralled case citation when the case
appeared in the JOURNAL. The Editor.
1 Other early foreign acts include Austria, 1887; Norway, 1894; Finland,
1895; Denmark, France, and Italy, 1898; Greece, 1901; Belgium and

Russia, 1903. See FmNxEL & DAwsoN, Woaxmmxvs INsuRANc E IN
EUROPE (1910).
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future recurrences and to recompense the victims of these explosions. Yet when the same number, 15,000 annually, die as
a result of work accidents in our fifty states, one here and one
there; 100,000 are maimed for life, a few here and a few there;
and over 2 million 2 suffer temporary incapacities for varying
periods of time, few-except the injured parties and their families-can be stirred to ask what is being done about the matter.
The half-century mark in workmen's compensation is a good
time to review its progress. Many forces have shaped the path
of workmen's compensation and have helped to mold its progress.
Among them are the courts, workmen's compensation administrators, lawyers, legislators, labor unions, insurance companies,
employers, professors and writers. Of utmost importance to all
injured employees is the judiciary-the courts who interpret the
provisions of the statutes after the administrators find the facts.
The last fifty years has been a period of numerous developments
in judicial decisions.
I. CHANGES IN LEGAL CONCEPTS
The old common law, with its defenses of contributory negligence, the fellow-servant rule, and assumption of risk, and its
procedure of trials by judges and juries, failed to give injured
workers the necessary financial relief; they lost most of their
cases in court. A new system was needed. The idea of making
industry which profits from human labor pay for its human losses
appealed to the legislatures. The German scheme, as improved
in England, formed the background of our early acts.
Unquestionably, compensation laws were enacted as a humanitarian measure, to create liability without relation to fault,
actual or moral, and to put upon industry the initial cost of the
human wreckage that was related, directly or indirectly, to its
work or work-environment. 3 Workmen's compensation was a re2 U.S. BUREAU

OF LABOR

STANDARDS,

DEP'T OF LABOR,

STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 2
3

BULL.

No. 161,

(Rev. 1960).

Wilson v. Chatterton, [1946] 1 K.B. 360, 366 (to put upon employer
obligation to pay for personal injuries "incidental to his employment."
In "a sense it made his employer an insurer," and it was "realized
from the start that the risk would be re-insured"). Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d 511 (1945)
(a charge against industry, like repairs on a broken machine);
Baltimore Steel Co. v. Burch, 187 Md. 209, 213, 49 A.2d 542, 544 (1946)
("[T]o protect the public from the care and expense resulting from
human derelicts due to accidents" in industry); Ahmed's Case, 278
Mass. 180, 179 N.E. 684 (1932); Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49,
69 N.E.2d 557 (1946).
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volt from the old common law-the creation of a complete substitute and not a mere improvement. It meant to make liability
dependent on a relationship to the job, in a liberal, humane fashion, with litigation reduced to a minimum.4 It was truly "sui
generis." 5
Workmen's compensation meant to end the common-law doctrines of fault, fellow-servant, assumption of risk, scope of employment, need for control and the like, and to substitute a new
kind of liability.6 That new liability was for "personal injury
by accident arising out of and in the course of employment."
The amount payable was to depend on the extent of "disability"
or "incapacity" as a percentage of wage loss, and not on pain and
suffering and the full wage loss. It meant to give medical treatment at once, when needed, as of right, and not to await the end
of a tort trial to see if there was fault, hence liability.
II.

GROWTH

The early cases tended to be strict. Courts trained in the
common law found difficulty in thinking along new lines-of
liability based upon a relationship to the job. Judges found it
distasteful to make awards to workers morally to blame7 for their
injuries, even though these injuries were work-related. They
found it difficult to extend the benefits of the acts to the guilty,
the negligent and the awkward. It was even more difficult to
allow awards when the injuries did not occur within the commonlaw scope of employment, nor meet with the common-law concept of "cause," proximate or otherwise.
Yet to the everlasting credit of the modern courts, they have,
when pertinent, repeatedly confessed error in allowing common4

Bear, Survey of the Legal Profession-Workmen's Compensation and
the Lawyer, 51 CoLum. L. REv. 965 (1951).

5

Lipe v. Bradbury, 49 N.M. 4, 8, 154 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1945); accord,
Alabama By-Products Co. v. Landgraff, 32 Ala. App. 343, 346, 27
So. 2d 209, 212 (1946)

("The act is sui generis and superseded and

replaced many previously existing theories of personal injury damages arising out of common law and statutory actions.").
6 In overruling Harbroe's Case, 223 Mass. 139, 111 N.E. 709 (1916), the
court in Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957), stated:
"Those considerations would be proper in assessing liability in tort.
We are dealing, however, with a workmen's compensation case. The
findings of the board show that the employment brought the employee in contact with the risk of being shot by the particular bullet
which struck him." Id. at 345, 145 N.E.2d at 727.
7 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940), 15 NACCA L.J. 37 (1955). See
aggressor cases in note 101 infra.
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law concepts to creep into their decisions in disguised garb.8 A
half-century of workmen's compensation has shown that the
modern trend is to construe the acts broadly and liberally and to
protect the interests of the injured worker and his dependents.
For that reason, courts throughout the compensation-world now
refuse to follow the more narrow, older cases.9 Judges today
realize that most acts arbitrarily cut down the injured employee's
monetary opportunities for recovery by giving far smaller
amounts than currently awarded in successful common-law cases.
Even in successful compensation cases, the employee and his dependents actually suffer the greater part of the financial load.
Courts recognize that in close or borderline cases 0 it is better
to put the loss on the employer (or the insurer), and hence on
the utimate consumer of the product or services, than upon the
injured employee or his family who rarely can pay and who
must therefore pass it on to charity. Since one of the purposes
of workmen's compensation is to keep workers from becoming
8 Some recent overrulings of old cases because tort concepts misled the

earlier court:
Arizona: Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cabarga, 79 Ariz. 148, 285 P.2d
605 (1955).
Arkansas: Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 277 Ark. 147,
296 S.W.2d 436 (1956).
Calfornia: State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 38 Cal. 2d 659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952), 9 NACCA L.J. 64 (1952).
Colorado: Divelbiss v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Colo. 344 P.2d
1084 (1959).
Massachusetts:
Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726
(1957).
Michigan: Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch, 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W.
2d 97 (1957), 21 NACCA L.J. 207 (1958).
New Jersey: Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J.
127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958).
Tennessee: Ramson v. H. G. Hill Co., 205 Tenn. 377, 326 S.W.2d
659 (1959).
England: Wilson v. Chatterton, [1946] 1 K.B. 360.
See also case cited notes 54, 57, and 384 infra.
9 Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 559, 201 S.W.2d 573, 575
(1947) ("there is an ever-growing tendency to construe the acts
liberally to allow compensation."); accord, Goodyear Aircraft Corp.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d 511 (1945); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158, 196 S.W.2d 390 (1946).
10 Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 26, 170 P.2d 404, 406 (1946)
("doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation, and
not given "narrow technical construction"); accord, Simmons Nat'l
Bank v. Brown, 210 Ark. 311, 195 S.W.2d 539 (1946).
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public charges," a reasonable, liberal, practical common-sense
construction is preferable to a narrow one. 12 These acts 3 are for
the giving of compensation; they are not for its denial.'
Compensation insurance partakes of the nature of social insurance, of an enterprise liability, and not of the common-law
type of insurance. 14 It is:
...so profound in character and degree as to take away, in large
measure, the applicability of the doctrines upon which rest the
common law liability of the master for personal injuries to a
servant, leaving of necessity a field of debatable ground where
a good deal must be conceded in favor of forms of legislation,
calculated to establish new bases of liability more in harmony
with these changed conditions. 15

A study based upon fifty years of workmen's compensation
cases discloses how far the courts have conceded in favor of this
humanitarian legislation and how far they have eradicated the

new bases "more
old common-law bases of liability in favor of 1the
6

in harmony with these changed conditions.'

11 Baltimore Steel Co. v. Burch, 187 Md. 209, 213, 49 A.2d 542, 544 (1946)

12

13

14

15
16

(it was the intention "to relieve workers from the hazards of industrial employment and to protect the public from the care and expense
resulting from human derelicts due to accidents" in industry).
Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb. 1044, 1056, 26 N.W.2d 15, 22
(1947) ("liberally construed and its beneficient purposes not to be
thwarted by technical refinement or interpretation"); accord, O'Leary
v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 509 (1951) (Minton, J.,
dissenting) ("comon-sense, everyday, realistic view"); Brookhaven
Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 589, 55 So. 2d 381, 386 (1951)
("liberal and sensible interpretation"); Schechter v. State Ins. Fund,
6 N.Y.2d 506, 510, 160 N.E.2d 901, 903, 190 N.Y.S.2d 656, 660 (1959)
("common-sense viewpoint" of the average man); In re Jensen, 63
Wyo. 88, 100, 178 P.2d 897, 900 (1947) ("to be reasonably and liberally construed").
Everett, Book Review, 62 L.Q. REV. 300, 301 ("[Clertainly the higher
tribunals both in England and in America seemed to have lived up
to the dictum 'that this is an Act for the giving and not the withholding of compensation.'").
Wilson v. Chatterton, [1946] 1 K.B. 360, 366 ("The object of the legislation was essentially social . . . [A]s an item in the cost of production or of services rendered, the community at large of course has
had to carry the ultimate burden of the social reform in the price
of good or services."); Hebert v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Mich. 607, 610,
281 N.W. 374, 375 (1938) ("It should be administered substantially as
insurance of a social character."); Small, Effect of Workmen's Compensation on Tort Concepts, 12 NACCA L.J. 21 (1953).
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923).
Ibid.
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III. PERSONAL INJURY BY ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF
AND IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT
A. PERSONAL INJURY
Most of the acts failed to define the words "personal injury,"
and the early courts struggled to supply that definition. As one
court stated: "In common speech the word 'injury,' as applied
to a personal injury to the human being, includes whatever lesion
or change in any part of the system produces harm or pain or
a lessened facility of the natural use of any bodily activity or
capability." 17 Personal injury also was defined to include damage
to the body,' 8 and "any harm or damage to the health of an employee, however caused, whether by accident, disease, or otherwise."' 9
However, certain things were clear even though no one general definition ever satisfied all of the states. In general, these
words were not to be construed as establishing a system of health
insurance; 20 and conversely, these words were not to be limited
to the old, narrow accident insurance policy definition of injuries
by violent, external and accidental means, nor to require external
trauma. 2' It is definite that traumatic injuries such as broken
bones and external physical injuries-which make up the bulk
of compensation injuries-come under the definition of personal
injury.
(1)

Property Damage

Many of the early cases concerned damage to wooden legs,
false teeth, eye-glasses and clothes where there was no damage
to the human body or tissue surrounding the prosthetic appliance
or clothes. The early courts all denied liability, 22 and claims for
17 Burns' Case, 218 Mass. 8, 12, 105 N.E. 601, 603 (1914).
18 Sullivan's Case, 265 Mass. 497, 164 N.E. 457 (1929).

19 Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349, 380, 97 Atl. 345,

355 (1916)

(dissenting opinion).

20 Tweten v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 69 N.D.

369, 287 N.W. 304 (1939); Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 972
(1917).

21 Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Wade, 197 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946) (need not be externally visible); Long-Bell Lumber Co. v.
Parry, 22 Wash. 2d 309, 156 P.2d 225 (1945) (cleaning sawdust, in-

duced coronary occlusion).
22 London Guarantee & Acc. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 80 Colo. 162,
249 Pac. 642 (1926) (a wooden leg is a man's property, not a part of
his person and no compensation can be awarded for its injury);
accord, Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 215 Cal. 461, 11
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such "property damage" are now rarely made. By statute a few
states expressly compensate for them; and, in most states, if the
surrounding tissue is damaged, such items as wooden legs, artificial arms and false teeth may be obtained as part of the statutory "medical treatment." 23
(2)

Disease

The early courts thought of "personal injury" as akin to a
broken bone-some definite organic injury taking place suddenly,
and traceable to a single event.
When it was first suggested that a disease could be a personal
injury, the court looked for a lesion or cut through which some
microbe could enter and set up the disease. In short, some judges
looked for organic injury which created a portal of entry and thus
led to a compensable disease. Under this theory they were willing to compensate for such diseases as anthrax. 24 But if the
germ should enter by the ordinary passage-by normal breathing
through the nose or mouth-there was no personal injury, even
in a state not using the additional words "by accident. ' 25
Today there is practically nothing left of this doctrine. All
employment-related diseases are regarded as "harm to the body"
and hence personal injuries. Awards have been 26sustained, as
smallpox, 27
personal injuries, for such diseases as tuberculosis,
P.2d 1 (1932)

(dictum)

(wooden leg; excludes injury to clothes,

tools, etc.); Southern Elec., Inc. v. Spall, 130 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1961)

(no provision made for compensation for injuries to artificial limbs;
classed as personal property and not part of the person-award reversed).
23 U.S. BUREAu OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 78, 310
(1946) (forty-two acts required the employer "to furnish artificial
limbs and other appliances").
24 Heirs v. John A. Hull & Co., 178 App. Div. 350, 164 N.Y. Supp. 767
3d Dep't 1917) (through a scratch on the hand); Chicago Rawhide
Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill. 616, 126 N.E. 616 (1920) (pimple on the neck).
25 Smith's Case, 307 Mass. 516, 30 N.E.2d 536 (1940) (nurse inhaled tuberculosis germs; but changed by MAss. Gm. LAWS ANN. c. 152, §§ 1-7a
(1958) ). Contra, Benner v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 346,
159 P.2d 24 (1945) (nurse contracted pulmonary tuberculosis).
20 Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 570 (1939) ("grain scooper" lighted up dormant
tuberculosis); Dobbs v. Bureau of Highways, 63 Idaho 290, 120 P.2d
263 (1941) (tuberculosis precipitated by dust).
(out27 Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Jahncke, 192 Wis. 362, 212 N.W. 641 (1927)
side engineer at isolation hospital contracted small-pox-ate infected
ice cream given him by hospital janitor).
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scarlet fever,28 typhoid fever 29 and pneumonia. 30 It has been
said that all diseases are coVered except the common cold 3'-and
even that,2 in a proper work-related setting, may well be compensable.3
(3)

Neurosis

Similarly to their reaction to disease, early courts could not
get themselves to accept a nervous condition as a personal injury.33 A few granted that a neurosis produced by an organic injury (traumatic neurosis) was compensable as "functional" harm.
Today the courts have accepted the concept that "harm to
the body" includes both functional and organic harms. Hence a
personal injury embraces:
(1) A traumatic injury leading to
neurosis; 34 (2) a non-traumatic injury (psychic shock) leading
to traumatic or psychic shock which causes paralysis, 3 5 and
28

29

Gaites v. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 251
Div. 761, 295 N.Y. Supp. 594 (3d Dep't 1937) (matron at shelter
tracted scarlet fever when children vomited, coughed or took
medicine).
Broden's Case, 124 Me. 162, 126 Atl. 829 (1924) (typhoid fever
employer's water).

App.
contheir
from

30 McPhee's Case, 222 Mass. 1, 109 N.E. 633 (1915) (pneumonia from becoming wet while helping to put out employer's fire).
31 Smith's Case, 307 Mass. 516, 30 N.E.2d 536 (1940)
(dictum) (common
cold excluded); see note 25 supra.
32 Mercier's Case, 315 Mass. 238, 52 N.E.2d 380 (1943)
(award upheld for
a series of colds caused by working conditions added to overwork and
sudden changes in temperature).
See Horovitz, Current Trends in
Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation, 20 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
16 n.64 (1947).
33 Cf. Holt v. Yates & Thom., 3 B.W.C.C. 75 (1909) (brooding over injury, award denied).
34 Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ariz. 190, 349 P.2d 627 (1960) (slipped on ice, back injury led to psychoneurotic conversion hysteria);
accord, Barr v. Builders, Inc., 179 Kan. 617, 296 P.2d 1106 (1956)
(conversion hysteria, fell from window, striking back); Hunnewell's
Case, 220 Mass. 351, 107 N.E. 934 (1915) (hysterical blindness following physical injury); Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209
S.W.2d 345 (1948) (neurosis is a compensable disease).
35 Klimas v Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 758 (N.Y. 1961),
reversing 12 App. Div. 2d 551, 207 N.Y.S.2d 72 (3d Dep't 1960); (heart
attack from emotional stresses and strains as head of airline department); Miller v. Bingham County, 79 Idaho 87, 310 P.2d 1089 (1957),
20 NACCA L.J. 43 (1957) (fright during auto collision led to cerebral hemorrhage); Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E.2d 844 (1954)
(nervousness from being summoned to aid policeman forcibly to arrest three men, led to cerebral hemorrhage); Charon's Case, 321 Mass.
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(3) a non-traumatic injury (psychic shock) which leads to
psychic injury such as work-fear and mental disturbance which
results in a disabling neurosis. 36 Awards for neurosis are made
even though financial,
marital or other worries play a part in
37
causing the disorder.
The question in these cases is no longer whether they are
personal injuries, but whether they are "by accident" and "arise
out of" the employment or work-environment.
(4)

Single Event and Wear and Tear

The notion that a personal injury must originate in a single
event no longer has legal potency. Massachusetts early grasped
at the notion of "wear and tear." A cigar maker's back condition,
due to many years of bending, was held not to be a personal injury but merely wear and tear. 38 Today, however, even in that
Commonwealth, a condition caused by months of repetitive motion, or blindness due to insufficient lighting, 3 9 is a personal in694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947)

(fright from lightning near work-bench,

precipitated paralysis); Coleman v. Andrew Jergens Co., 65 N.J.
Super. 592, 168 A.2d 265 (Essex County Ct. 1961) (heart attack from
emotional strain); O'Brien v. Ramsey [1956) W.C. Rep. 86 (New
South Wales) (secretary of industrial commission-worry, anxiety,
mental overwork brought about severe hypertensive crisis).
36 Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105
(1960) (continually berated by foreman, feared lay off, suffered
emotion collapse, compensable-a mental injury is not to be treated
as different from a physical injury); Bailey v. American General
Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 435, 279 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1955), 16 NACCA
L.J. 67 (1955) (visual terror led to psychic trauma, doing functional
harm not organic damage-this constituted "harm to the physical
structure of the body"); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va.
204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941) (electric flash producing neurosis).
37 Skelly v. Sunshine Mining Co., 62 Idaho 192, 109 P.2d 622 (1941)
(background of marital troubles and alcohol, no defense); Hood v.
Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948) (even
though petitioner's unconscious desire for compensation is a contributing source of his neurosis).
38 Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 972 (1917) ("neuritis or neurosis" of nerves from faulty posture of cigar maker over many years);
accord, Reardon's Case, 275 Mass. 24, 175 N.E. 149 (1931) (Dupuytren's contracture from fifteen years work). Contra, Marathon Paper
Mills v. Huntington, 203 Wis. 17, 233 N.W. 558 (1930) (hernia from
twenty years of lifting is "industrial disease" here, though usual
hernia is compensable as "injury"); American Maize Prods. Co. v.
Nichiporchik, 108 Ind. App. 502, 29 N.E.2d 801 (1940) (riveter's helper
sustained Dupuytren's contracture, court disagrees with Rearden's

Case, supra).
39 Pell v. Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co., 325 Mass. 239, 90 N.E.2d 555

(1950).
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jury. In Massachusetts, one no longer points to fifteen years of
imperceptible changes common to ordinary activity, but lays stress
on the aggravation at the very end of the process caused by the
work or working conditions-the terminal condition is the personal injury.
Currently the overwhelming weight of authority denies the
need of a single event. 40 Repeated traumata over days, months,
or longer periods may be the basis of a personal injury. Tennis
elbow, tenosynovitis, Dupuytren's contracture, hernia and similar
conditions are regarded as personal injuries resulting from repeti41
tive trauma.

(5)

Aggravation of Pre-existing Disease or Defect

Employers take workmen "as is ' ' 42 without any warranty as
to any previous state of health, whether known or unknown.
40

Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. King, 229 Miss. 871, 92 So. 2d 196 (1957)
(cataracts due to excessive light over a substantial period-recurring
minor trauma); Macklanburg-Duncan Co. v. Edward, 311 P.2d 250
(Okla. 1957) (progressive or cumulative rubbing and burning-traumatic occupational neuritis); accord, Mill's Case, 258 Mass. 475, 155

N.E. 423 (1927) (series of strains over period of a few months, resulting in hernia); Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106
N.W.2d 105 (1960) (need not come from single event or single physical or mental injury); Webb v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 47 N.M.
279, 141 P.2d 333 (1943) (printer used soap for six months, was unusually susceptible-injury by continual traumas); Shoren v. United
States Rubber Co., 140 A.2d 768 (R.I. 1958) (gold ball "winder"
injured muscles of hand-general breakdown of part of claimant's
body due to constant use in performing work was a personal injury).
41 American Maize Prods. Co. v. Nichiporchik, 108 Ind. App. 502, 29
N.E.2d 801 (1940) (was injury, not occupational disease, though over
ten years of riveting work); accord, Pullman Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 379, 170 P.2d 10 (1946); Harrington's Case, 285
Mass. 69, 188 N.E. 499 (1933) (series of strains and twists, which had
cumulative effect not different from a single severe twist culminating in a hernia); Bondar v. Simmons Co., 23 N.J. Super. 109, 92 A.2d
642 (App. Div. 1952), 11 NACCA L.J. 73 (1953) (bursitis of shoulder
from five years of continuous pushing of lever is "continuous minimal
tramata," compensated as occupational disease); Di Maria v. Curtiss
Wright Corp., 23 N.J. Misc. 374, 44 A.2d 688 (Passaic County Ct. of
C.P. 1945) (tenosynovitis, flexor tendons of both hands from eleven
days vibration of roller sanding guns is "injury" and "by accident");
Briggs v. Hope Windows, 284 App. Div. 1077, 136 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d
Dep't 1954) (tenosynovitis); Rogan v. Charles F. Noyes, Inc., 10 App.
Div. 2d 765, 197 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dep't 1960) (Dupuytrens contracture from constant pressure on palm of hand).
42 Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 584, 83 N.W.2d 614,
616 (1957) (the employer "takes him 'as is,' [als it is sometimes
phrased." Every worker just as he "brings with him to the job some
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Hence it is no longer necessary to show that the injury was the
sole cause of the disability, or that the work was the sole cause
of the personal injury. Neither original causation nor direct
causation is essential. It is sufficient if the work precipitated,
aggravated or accelerated the condition, or if it was a contributing
factor in the personal injury or the disability.43 Thus paralysis
due in part to a blow on the head and in part to an underlying
syphilis is clearly compensable. 4 4 So, too, an aggravation, acceleration, or precipitation of Buerger's disease,45 heart disease, 40
cancer, 47 or any other disease is as compensable as if the work-

43

44

45
46

47

strength, he brings some weaknesses. None is perfect."); Marshall
v. C.F. Mueller Co., 135 N.J.L. 75, 78, 50 A.2d 158, 160 (Sup. Ct. 1946)
("The employer takes his employees with their mental, emotional,
glandular and other physical defects or disabilities"); Edwards v.
Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947) (take
employees "as is" with such strength as they then possess); accord,
Wilson v. Chatterton, [1946] 1 K.B. 360 (epileptics and sick men
known or unknown, entitled to same protection of compensation act
as healthy persons).
Gillette v Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d 200 (1960) (improperly healed chip fracture aggravated and accelerated by ordinary
walking on job as saleslady); Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208
Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961 (1945) (heat prostration hastened heart
disease and contributed to death eight months later); Czepial v.
Krohne Roofing Co., 93 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1957) (roofer inhaled fumes
and dust, accelerated tuberculosis-denial of award reversed); Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379 (1916).
Crowley's Case, 223 Mass. 288, 111 N.E. 786 (1916); Davis v. Artley
Constr. Co., 154 Fla. 481, 18 So. 2d 255 (1944), 16 NACCA L.J. 423
(1955) (employee who had syphilis suffered a cerebral hemorrhage
from overheating work).
Paull v. Preston Theatres Corp., 63 Idaho 594, 124 P.2d 562 (1942)
(Buerger's disease-predisposition or susceptibility no bar).
Mississippi Shipping Co. v. Henderson, 231 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1956)
(heart attack at work, eight months later died on personal errand on
street-connected, award affirmed); Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158
Kan. 271, 146 P.2d 657 (1944) (coronary thrombosis from ordinary
lifting); McMurray's Case, 331 Mass. 29, 116 N.E.2d 847 (1954) (registry inspector suffered fatal heart attack from emotional stress); In re
Brown, 123 Me. 424, 123 Atl. 421 (194) (shoveling snow, sudden
dilation of heart). For further cases and discussion, see Petkun,
Problems Arising in a Heart Disease Case, in NEW ENGLAND NACCA
BAR AssocIATIoN, WINTE
SEmINAR, DEcEMBER 1959, at 151 (1960).
See also note 48 infra.
Elford v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 141 Ore. 284, 17 P.2d 568 (1932)
(lifting sacks caused rupture of abdominal cancerous growth, involving spleen, liver and suprarenal glands); Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 102 Utah 26, 126 P.2d 1070 (1942) (bruise of testicle). See,
for unusual cancer case, Luczek's Case, 335 Mass. 675, 141 N.E.2d 526
(1957), 20 NACCA L.J. 65 (1957) (causal connection between com-
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injury or work-environment directly "caused" the disease. In
short, a precipitation, acceleration or aggravation of a disease is
a "personal injury." Despite attempts to distinguish heart cases
from other cases, heart diseases are almost uniformly held compensable where the work (straining or lifting) or the work stimuli
(argument or upsetting sight) plays a part4 8in precipitating, accelerating or aggravating the heart disease.
The great majority of states now have second-injury 49 or
similar funds to help disabled persons obtain jobs and to bear
part of the compensation when a workman with a congenital
defect or physical handicap sustains an injury which caused
more extended disability than to a healthy worker.
B.

By ACCIDENT

(1)

Definitions

"By accident" ordinarily connotes something sudden, unusual
or unexpected-an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event
which is not expected or designed. 50
On the basis of this general concept, some early courts, steeped
in common-law reasoning, denied awards for injuries clearly
caused by the employment, but which were not caused by a
single or specific event identifiable in time and place. Thus the
Court of Appeals in New York denied an award on the ground
of "not accidental" when a girl's finger became red, swollen and
gangrenous from the continuous dipping of the hand in a poison-

48

49

pensable hernia and death from non-industrial stomach cancer, warranted by evidence hernia operation so depleted physical reserve as
to hasten death). For further cases and discussion of cancer cases,
see Locke, Problems Arising in the Trial of a Cancer Case, in NEW
ENGLAND NACCA BAR ASSOCIATION, WINTER SEMINAR, DECEMBER 1959,
at 138 (1960).
Laclede Steele Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 296, 128 N.E.2d
718 1955) (coronary occlusion, ordinary strain); Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. Cabarga, 79 Ariz. 148, 285 P.2d 605 (1955), repudiating Pierce v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P.2d 1017 (1933); Donlan's Case,
317 Mass. 291, 58 N.E.2d 4 (1944) (coronary occlusion from moving
heavy truck); Golob v. Buckingham Hotel, 244 Minn. 301, 69 N.W.2d
636 (1955) (coronary thrombosis, moving forty to forty-five clumsy
chairs); Rathbun v. Tabor Tank Lines, 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966
(1955), 16 NACCA L.J. 81 (1955). See also note 46 supra.
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 577,
SECOND-INJuRY FUNDS 146 (1932). See Gradwohl, Nebraska Workmen's Compensation for Aggravation of Pre-existing Infirmities by
Exertion or Strain, 41 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1961).

50 Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] A.C. 443; accord, Hagger v. Wortz Biscuit
Co, 210 Ark. 318, 196 S.W.2d 1 (1946).
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ous photographic solution (500 to 800 times daily for about one
week), 5 1 but held that an infection received while embalming
a corpse was "by accident" 52 and was therefore compensable.
Decisions merely based on definitions can thus lead to injustice and error.
(2)

Assault by Design

Reasoning that injuries "by design" could not be "by accident," early employers and insurers sought to infuse in the compensation law a no-liability theory where the assailant admitted
he deliberately struck and injured the worker because of some
work-argument, or because of sudden or spontaneous anger.
But even from the earliest days, with a few exceptions, the
courts have looked at the result from the point of view of the
victim 5 3-and from his point of view, the injury was unexpected,
sudden, an unlooked for mishap, and hence was "by accident."
(3)

Unexpected Result Versus Unexpected Cause

Suppose an ordinary or usual strain produces an unusual result such as a ruptured disc, heart attack, back strain or hernia.
Is the resulting injury by accident?
The early courts fell into serious error. They reasoned that
the injury must be by "an accident;" That is, it must follow
an accidental cause such as slipping, an unusual twisting, or an
unexpected striking. 54 In short, there had to be both (1) a personal injury, and (2) "an accident" in the technical sense which
51

Jeffreys v. Charles H. Sager Co., 198 App. Div. 446, 191 N.Y. Supp.
354 (3d Dep't 1921).

Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N.Y. 83, 147 N.E. 366 (1925)
(turned "trifling scratch into a deadly wound," is injured by accident).
53 Trim Joint Dist. School v. Kelly, [1914] A.C. 667 (reform school boys
deliberately and with design ambushed and killed the disciplinarian
master with brooms-case must be decided not from the boy's viewpoint, but from that of victim-as to him, it was by accident); accord,
McLaughlin v. Thompson, Boland & Lee, Inc., 72 Ga. App. 564, 34
S.E.2d 562 (1945); Hagger v. Wortz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark. 318, 196
S.W.2d 1 (1946); Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d
78 (1946) (even though willful act of employer, accident from workmen's point of view).
54 Nichols v. Central Crate & Box Co., 340 Mich. 232, 65 N.W.2d 706
52

(1954), overruled by Shippard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577,
83 N.W.2d 614 (1957), and criticized in 15 NACCA L.J. 54 (1955);

In re Mitchell, 61 Ariz. 436, 150 P.2d 355 (1944), overruling Pierce v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P.2d 1017 (1933).
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caused the personal injury. The result was that men laboring on
hard jobs, as a direct result of which they sustained ruptured
discs, back strains and the like-the very kind of injuries most
likely to occur on the jobs-received nothing by way of compensation. Industry destroyed them and charity took over the
load.
It has been the experience of mankind that the worker who
daily lifts hundreds of loads of beef, brick or mortar, sometimes
weighing over one hundred pounds per load, may someday become the victim of a resulting back or other injury. Medical
science has demonstrated that men's backs were not intended to
be used constantly for heavy labor in the erect position. However, without proof of a slip or an unusual twist-and most injured workers truthfully admitted they were doing their usual
work in the usual way when the back or heart gave way-many
of the early administrators and courts denied all claims.
The parade away from this type of reasoning has been recent
but rapid. By the overwhelming weight of authority today, either
an unexpected cause or an unexpected result is sufficient to
establish the injury as caused "by accident." 55 This is well established even though the cause was an ordinary strain or exertion
while doing the routine or usual work. 56 "By accident" was used
55 Olson v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n. 352 P.2d 1096 (Ore. 1960)

(heart attack from usual exertion); Massey v. United States Steel
Corp., 264 Ala. 227, 86 So. 2d 375 (1955); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cabarga, 79 Ariz. 148, 285 P.2d 605 (1955); Czepial v. Krohne Roofing
Co., 93 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1957) (cumulative effect of fumes on tuberculosis as accident); General Motors Corp. v. Hall, 93 Ga. App. 181, 91
S.E.2d 57 (1956); Laclede Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d
296, 128 N.E.2d 718 (1955) (coronary occlusion from ordinary strain
and exertion); Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83
N.W.2d 614 (1957), 20 NACCA L.J. 32 (1957) (back injury pulling
at trays); Golob v. Buckingham Hotel, 244 Minn. 301, 69 N.W.2d 636

(1955) (coronary thrombosis from moving chairs); Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. King, 229 Miss. 871, 92 So. 2d 196 (1957) (cumulative
effect on welder's eyes as accident); Rathbun v. Taber Tank Lines,
129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966 (1955), 16 NACCA L.J. 81 (1955); Ciuba
v. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958)
(diseased heart, usual work a contributing cause); Teal v. Potash Co.
of America, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99 (1956); Macklanburg-Duncan

56

Co. v. Edwards, 311 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1957) (neuritis from years of
routine work-injury may be progressive or cumulative in its inception). For list of cases 1948-1955 see 19 NACCA L.J. 38 (1957) reviewing the leading case of Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White,
227 Ark. 147, 296 S.W.2d 436 (1956) (aggravated back injury from
usual loading work).
Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961 (1945)
(physical breakdown as accident); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v.
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in the popular sense, and the average worker would consider a
sudden back strain or heart attack or other injury following lifting as caused "by accident." Court after court reversed itself
without the need of legislation holding that since the restrictive
57
rule was court-made, a later court could and should broaden it.
Many courts pointed out that since these words were taken from
the English Act, English decisions were of weight; and these decisions regarded the result as caused "by accident" in the popular
58
sense of those words.
In a few states59 the legislature omitted or dropped the words
"by accident." Hence an injury in these states never needed an
unusual6 ° cause-the resulting injury was a "personal injury" and
therefore compensable.
C. ARisING OUT OF
Proving that an employee received a "personal injury" and
that it was "by accident" does not settle the question. The worker
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 29 Cal. 2d 492, 175 P.2d 823 (1946) (usual
strain causing collapse sufficient); Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing
Co., 227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947) (ruptured disc from ordinary
twist-excellent review of entire question); Walter v. Hagianis, 97
N.H. 314, 87 A.2d 154 (1952) (waitress aggravated pelvic disease by
usual work).
57 Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 604, 83 N.W.2d 614,
626 (1957) ("But what has become of stare decisis .... Error is
thus to be quietly interred....
Wisdom, we agree, should never be
rejected merely because it comes late."); Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish
& Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 138, 141 A.2d 761, 766 (1958) ("Seiken
v. Todd Dry Dock, Inc., 2 N.J. 469, 67 A.2d 131 (1949), is accordinly
overruled.").
58 Laclede Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 296, 128 N.E.2d 718
(1955), citing Hughes v. Clover, Clayton & Co., [19093 2 K.B. 798
(C.A.), af'd, [19103 A.C. 242; Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White,
227 Ark. 147, 296 S.W.2d 436 (1956) (controversy and litigation would
have been reduced if the liberal English precedents had been followed consistently, citing, among others, Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co.
[1903] A.C. 443).
59 California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island; Oregon removed words "caused by violent or external means," by amendment
in 1957. Olson v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 352 P.2d 1096 (Ore.
1960).
60 See Almquist v. Shenandoah Nurseries, 218 Iowa 724, 254 N.W. 35
(1934) (perforated ulcer from heavy exertion); Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 29 Cal. 2d 492, 175 P.2d 823
(1946) (usual strain sufficient); Dolan's Case, 317 Mass. 291, 58 N.E.2d
For a
4 (1944) (coronary occlusion from moving heavy truck).
summary of the statutory provisions of the fifty states, see Gradwohl,
Nebraska Workmen's Compensation for Aggravation of Pre-existing
Infirmities by Exertion or Strain, 41 NEs. L. REv. 101 (1961).
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must in addition prove that it "arose out of and in the course of
the employment."
Arising out of-words to bedevil the injured worker! Some
early judges gave lip-service to the doctrine that it was their duty
to construe the act liberally-to protect the rights of workers
who no longer could sue at common law and obtain a jury trialand then used their ingenuity to deny recovery. 61
As far back as 1916 Lord Wrenbury said:
The few and seemingly simple words 'arising out of and in the
course of the employment' have been the fruitful (or fruitless)
source of a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and
supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the

reader in a maze of confusion. From their number counsel can,
in most cases, cite what seems to be an authority for resolving
on whichever side he may be, the question in
in his favour,
62
dispute.

called this phrase "decepThe United States Supreme Court has
'6
tively simple and litigiously prolific. 3
(1)

Definitions

Steeped in the common law some early judges attempted to
decide cases by creating a definition and then applying the definition to the facts. The definition stated that for a personal injury to "arise out of" the employment, it had to arise out of a risk
"peculiar to the employment" and "not common to the neighborhood." 64 In 1923 the United States Supreme Court ignored this
definition and announced that "out of" could be sufficiently
proved by showing that there was a "causal connection between
the injury and the business . . . a connection substantially contributory though it need not be the sole proximate cause," and
61 See Bischoff v. American Car & Foundry Co., 190 Mich. 229, 157 N.W.
34 (1916) (hand crushed when machinery started); Robinson's Case,
292 Mass. 543, 198 N.E. 760 (1935)

(frozen while clearing debris at

four A.M.-award reversed).
62 Herbert v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1916] 1 A.C. 405, 419 (disobedience
as affecting "out of" employment).
63 Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947): "The
statutory phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment,'
which appears in most workmen's compensation laws, is deceptively
simple and litigiously prolific."
64 Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. Case, 215 Mass. 467, 102 N.E. 697
(1913).

Contra, Martin v. Plaut, 293 N.Y. 617, 59 N.E.2d 429 (1944)

(accidents said not due to risk inherent in employment, but to ordinary risks).
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that "no exact formula can be laid down which will automatically
solve every case." 65
Finally in 1940, the late, very able Judge Lummus announced
the present prevailing test in Caswell's Case: 66
The only other requirement is that the injury be one 'arising out of' his employment.

It need not arise out of the nature

of the employment. An injury arises out of the employment if
it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of
the employment.
Since that decision court after court 67 has adopted this test, and
early errors have been erased. This can be seen from the following discussion.
(2)

Street Risks

Inasmuch as injuries on the street were "common to the neighborhood" and were not "peculiar to the employment," early courts
denied liability for street accidents. 68 Thus an indoor worker
who was struck by an automobile while he was going on an errand for his employer was denied recovery.6 9 Anybody could be
hit by a car or slip on the sidewalk! It was not "peculiar to"
his employment but was "common to the neighborhood."
Today all such accidents are clearly incidents of the employment-a risk to which the work subjected the employee, whether
constantly or occasionally on the street in connection with his
work-and are compensable as "arising out of" the employment. 70
65 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1923).

66 Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1940)

67

(landmark case declaring rule of Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. Case, note
64 supra, outmoded); Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726
(1957) (reaffirmed Caswell's Case, thereby reversing old case). See
note 6 supra.
Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d
511 (1945) (adopting Caswells Case, and repudiating the narrow
language of Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. Case, notes 64 and 66
supra); Dravo Corp. v. Strosnider, 43 Del. 256, 45 A.2d 542 (1945);

Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P.2d 404 (1946). For
additional cases see Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase: "Arising out of'
Employment, 3 NACCA L.J. 15, 46 n.85 (1949).
68 Donahue v. Maryland Cas. Co., 226 Mass. 595, 116 N.E. 226 1917).
69 Colarullo's Case, 258 Mass. 521, 155 N.E. 425 (1927).
But changed by
the legislature by Mass. Stat. 1927 c. 309, § 3 (1932) (now MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. c. 152, § 26 (1958) ).
For Massachusetts history, finally
allowing recovery for street risks, see Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase:
"Arising out of" Employment, 4 NACCA L.J. 19, 41 n.238 (1949).
70 Kennedy v. Thompson Lumber Co., 223 Minn. 277, 26 N.W.2d 459
(1947) (shop steward fell crossing street to a telephone to prevent
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The fact that "others may be exposed to like risks does not change
the character of the risk to which the applicant was exposed.1 71
Street risks encompass both ordinary and unusual 72 risks or
injuries. Thus, when a taxi driver on the street, who was ordered
by a police officer to get help, became so frightened that he developed speech paralysis, he was held entitled to compensation
1' 3
as a result of a "street risk.
(3)

Acts of God, Positional and Local Risks

Hurricane, lightning, frost, unbearable heat, and other socalled "Acts of God" continue to injure workers. The early courts
normally denied recovery by stating that the injury was not pe74
culiar to the employment and was common to the neighborhood.
In short, God alone was responsible as the proximate and primary
cause; the relationship of the work to the injury was too inci7 5
dental and too remote to be the basis of liability.

Later courts sought a way out-and some found it. If there
was something about the work which attracted lightning or made
it more likely that lightning would strike this particular worker,
he collected by way of an "increased risk" exception.71 This exception also applied to other Acts of God-for example, a worker
in a deep hole, because of the nature of the work, may be sub-

a strike-excellent discussion of street risks in Minnesota); Truck
Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 27 Cal. 2d 813, 167 P.2d 705
(1946) (dangerous public intersection); Katz v. A. Kadans & Co.,

232 N.Y. 420, 134 N.E. 330 (1922); Dennis v. White & Co., 116
L.T.R. (n.s.) 774 (H.L. 1917) (immaterial whether nature of employment involves continuous or only occasional exposure to dangers of
the street).
71 Schroeder & Daly Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 169 Wis. 567, 570, 173
N.W. 328, 329 (1919).
72 Katz v. A. Kadans & Co., 232 N.Y. 420, 134 N.E. 330 (1922) (attack
by lunatic on a chauffeur in a crowded street).
73 Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E.2d 844 (1954).
74 Robinson's Case, 292 Mass. 543, 198 N.E. 760 (1935)
(worker froze
foot clearing square of debris at four A.M.); Warner v. Couchman,
[19113 1 K.B. 351 (C.A.), aff'd, [1912] A.C. 35 (journeyman baker
had right hand frostbitten while driving rounds-no recovery).
75 Kelly v. Kerry County Council, 1 B.W.C.C. 194 (1908)
(street cleaner
hit by bolt on roadway-no recovery).
76 Andrew v. Failsworth Industrial So'y, [1904] 2 K.B. 32 (C.A.) (bricklayer on a 23-foot-high scaffold hit by lightning and killed outrightincreased risk).

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION:

DEVELOPMENTS

19

77
jected to greater heat exposure than ordinary citizens receive,
78
or a worker at the waterfront may be subjected to greater cold.

If an Act of God combined with an act of the employer 79 to injure
the employee--"joint tortfeasors" so-to-speak-an exception occurred and there was liability! Hence where a hurricane collapsed a roof and the employer's bricks broke the worker's hip,
joint liability existed; but the only party amenable to process
was the insurer who was held liable for workmen's compensation.8 0
However, old errors die hard. Most courts still make awards
by way of "exceptions" such as taking judicial notice s ' of "increased risks" due to the employment, many of which in fact are
hardly increased. A growing and influential minority of the
courts have had the courage to make awards simply on the ground
that the Act of God injury arose out of the nature, conditions,
obligations or incidents of the employment. They have discarded
the common-to-the-public method of denying compensation and
77

Zucchi's Case, 310 Mass. 130, 37 N.E.2d 514 (1941)

(hotter in ditch or

pierfooting hole than on surface, hence more danger of sunstroke or
heatstroke); accord, Virgil Graham Constr. Co. v. Nelson, 322 P.2d

651 (Okla. 1958)

(digging ditch in 110-degree temperature-award

sustained).
78 Ferrara's Case, 269 Mass. 243, 169 N.E. 137 (1929)
(frostbite).
79 Brooker v. Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia), [1933] A.C. 669
(P.C.) (N.Z.) (wall fell on employee during earthquake). "But if he
is injured by contact physically with some part of the place where
he works, he at once associates the accident with his employment
and nothing further need be considered." Id. at 677.
80 Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940) (hurricane caused
walls to collapse on a machine worker); accord, Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Randall, 264 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1959) (carpenter on schoolhouse
job-wind of tornadic intensity blew off roof of temporary wooden
building on work site and debris struck claimant-award affirmed).
81 Bauer's Case, 314 Mass. 4, 49 N.E.2d 118 (1943) (judicial notice, without expert, of increased risk of lightning while wet and in building
on a hill); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 77 Cal. App.
2d 461, 175 P.2d 884 (2d Dist. 1946) (wet roof, common knowledge
that danger increased, requires no supporting expert testimony);
Faulkner v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 Kan. 667, 359 P.2d 833

(1961)

(tornado, more hazardous to wait in filling station); Taber

v. Tole, 181 Kan. 616, 313 P.2d 290 (1957) (heatstroke from trimming
trees for two days in 98-degree temperature-greater danger than
if he had not been working at all); Pope v. Goodson, 249 N.C. 690,
107 S.E.2d 524 (1959) (wet clothing and nail apron increased risk
of injury by lightning); Consolidated Pipe Line Co. v. Mahon, 152
Okla. 72, 3 P.2d 844 (1931) (in dilapidated house); Stokely Foods
v. Industrial Comm'n, 264 Wis. 102, 58 N.W.2d 285 (1953) (increased
danger of lightning while in high cab of truck, with no trees or
objects around).
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substituted the actual risk test. The sole question is whether the
2
employment exposed the employee to the risk.
It should be enough that the work put the employee at the
very spot that lightning, wind, frost or heat struck him. The
work-spot turned out to be a position of risk. The positional and
local risks have been almost universally accepted for other types
of injuries-a slate blown by the wind hits a worker while bent
over;8 3 a stray arrow aimed at a tree strikes a worker in his em82

Hughes v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N.Y. 201, 202-03,
156 N.E. 665 (1927) (section boss suffered heat prostration while
working in a cemetery-"Although the risk may be common to al

who are exposed to the sun's rays on a hot day, the question is
whether the employment exposes the employee to the risk."); accord,
Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 731, 6 So. 2d
747, 751 (1942) (cyclone, cotton-seed mill collapsed-"We prefer to
place our decision on what we believe to be a sound footing, that is
-that the deceased, by reason of his employment, was required to
be in a building which fell upon him; that his death was due to the
fact that his employment necessitated that he be at the place where
the accident occurred ....

"); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc.

Comm'n, 86 Cal. App. 2d 726, 728, 195 P.2d 919, 920 (2d Dist. 1948)
(explosion on neighboring property and employer's window hit em-

ployee--"[I]n order to receive an award he needs show merely that
his work brought him within the range of danger by requiring his
presence in the precincts of his employer's premises at the time the
peril struck."-the positional risk theory). See also Harding Glass

Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961 (1945)

(heat prostra-

tion); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Colo. 233, 254
Pac. 995 (1927) (lightning); McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber

Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 54 S.E.2d 471 (1949), 4 NACCA L.J. 91 (1949)

(laborer killed by lightning in lumber yard-no proof of increased
hazard needed for lightning cases and for heat prostration-denial of
award reversed-court took judicial notice that the position of employee especially exposed him to the risk of injury and thus supplied
the causal relation); Central Lumber Co. v. Wood, 284 S.W.2d 688
(Ky. 1955) (heat exhaustion-normal heat of day); Eagle River Bldg.

& Supply Co. v. Peck, 199 Wis. 192, 196, 225 N.W. 690, 691 (1929)

83

(frozen foot by old man loading bolts into a sleigh in sub-zero
weather-"It makes no difference that the exposure was common
to all out-of-door employments in that locality in that kind of weather ....
It was a hazard of the industry:") Note that the increased
risk theory "is a relic of the common-law theory of liability based
on fault, the very theory which the compensation laws attempted to
abolish." See Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase: "Arising out of" Employment, 3 NACCA L.J. 15, 51 (1949); Nathanson, Statutory Interpretation and Mr. Justice Rutledge, 25 IND. L.J. 462, 468-73 (1950).
See also Malone, The Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act in
Prospect, 20 Miss. L.J. 137, 148 (1949). See views of author in 4
NACCA L.J. 91 (1949).
Anderson & Co. v. Adamson, 50 ScoT. L. REv. 855 (1913) (this Scotch
case gained added prominence when cited ten years later with approval in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923) ).
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ployer's yard;8 4 an employee at his machine is assaulted by a
worker suddenly going insane,8 5 or a tree rotted at the base falls
on a messenger passing on a motor-bike.8 6 All of these cases are
held compensable, with no stronger work-tie than the fact that
the work placed him in the position of danger-and the injury
took place while at that work-spot. Larson, in his comprehensive
treatise, calls these "positional and neutral risks."8' 7 Yet many
modern courts regularly affirm awards for the above "neutral"
risks, but deny awards for Acts of God-the most "neutral" of
risks-occurring at the very spot the work places the worker. It
should be noted also, that in most cases, had the employee been
at home he would not have received the injury.
Narrow common-law theories are difficult to destroy. Compensation cases are "sui generis,"88 but not when Acts of God are
involved! Once again old tort concepts return in disguised dress
to haunt injured workers.8 9 It remains for courageous courts to
reverse themselves and, following the weight of reason, to protect the victims of nature's destructive forces when the injury
occurs at a work-place.
(4)

Work-assaults and Aggressors

Even innocent victims of work-assaults were denied protection in the early days.9 0 Typically, a judge would state: men
12 NACCA L.J.
72 (1953) (foreseeability not the test-the employee would not have
been in the line of fire but for his employment) See also 1 LAxsox,
WOR MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 10.10-.13 (1952) (stray bullets).

84 Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 12 N.J. 607, 97 A.2d 593 (1953),

85 Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., 25 N.J. 72, 135 A.2d 161 (1957)
(assault by insane co-employee); Zimmerman v. Elizabeth City
Freezer Locker, 244 N.C. 628, 94 S.E.2d 813 (1956), 19 NACCA L.J.
58 (1957). See also Asaeda v. Haraguchi, 37 Hawaii 556 (1947),
1 NACCA L.J. 11 (1948) (painter at lunch assaulted by crazed
parolee-follows Thom v. Sinclair, [19171 A.C. 127).
86 Lawrence v. Matthews, [19291 1 K.B. 1 (during a gale-the position
of the cyclist at the moment supplied the causal nexus). England
affirmed the locality risk doctrine in Powell v. Great Western Ry.
[1940] 1 All E.R. 87 (C.A.) (1939) (boy shot air gun, hitting engineer
in locomotive-arose out of his employment, because he was at that
place).
87 1 LARsoN, Wonaz.N's COMPENSATiON LAW § 10 (1952).
88 See note 5 supra.

89 Just as they used to do in aggressor-assault cases. See cases in note
101 infra. For tort concepts wrongly inserted into workmen's compensation, see notes 97, 111, 126 and 384 infra.
90

Jacquemin v. Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co., 92 Conn. 382, 103 Atl. 115
(1918)

(fight over ladle by fellow employees, "engaged in their own
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were hired to work, not to batter each other! A fortiori, if the
innocent victim had no compensation protection, the aggressor 9
was even less entitled to consideration-and so the early judges
ruled.
Hindsight is better than foresight. Time has shown that
throwing men of different types or nationalities together begets
quarrels, and quarrels lead to assaults, and assaults create injuries.9 2 The later courts properly began to distinguish between
work-assaults 93 and personal-assaults 94 which had no relation to
the work. Admittedly, if the assault arose from a personal quarrel unrelated to the employment or its environment, the resulting
injury did not arise out of the employment. This is now conceded universally.
But where the assault was rooted in the work or was due to
the work-environment, whether the attacker was a co-employee,
quarrels," employer not on notice); Urak v. Morris & Co., 107 Neb.
411, 186 N.W. 345 (1922) (assault with shovel, argument as to whether claimant was a member of the union-award reversed, was a
"purely personal affair"). For a list of early denials in assault cases,
see Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REV. 311, 326-27 (1946).

91 No relief for aggressors in work-assaults: Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran
Lumber & Coal Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N.W. 509 (1916); Stillwagon v.
Callan Bros., 183 App. Div. 141, 170 N.Y. Supp. 677 (3d Dep't 1918)
(fight over unloading cars; award reversed as decedent was aggressor--"He was not employed as a fighter; his work was driving the
truck .
92

93

94

. .

."); Milne v. Sanders, 143 Tenn. 602, 228 S.W. 702 (1921).

Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 17 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940) (personal animosities are created
by working together on assembly line or in traffic); accord, Consolidated Underwriters v. Adams, 140 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940) (argument over who was going to crank truck-"Among Negro
common laborers, quarrels and fights must be expected to result in
some instances from the manner and method of performing the work
assigned them.").
Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 297 N.W. 19 (1941)
(outstanding decision-new standard is that assaults are compensable
unless the reasons for the assaults are shown to be personal-the
evidence showed that the attack was apparently for purposes of
robbery by some unknown person, in a crime-infested district);
Hegler v. Cannon Mills Co., 224 N.C. 669, 31 S.E.2d 918 (1944)
(though assault may have resulted from anger or revenge, "still it
was rooted in and grew out of the employment").
Schlener v. American News Co., 240 N.Y. 622, 148 N.E. 732 (1925)
(per curiam) (trouble arose over a private loan); Elrod v. Union
Bleachery, 204 S.C. 481, 30 S.E.2d 73 (1944) (assaulted for trying to
"date" his wife the previous night); Rothfarb v. Camp Awanee, 116
Vt. 172, 71 A.2d 569 (1950) (second bout later was personal).
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employer or stranger, the innocent9 5 victim finally obtained workmen's compensation protection. The assault "arose out of" the
employment-it was a work risk.
Later on, participants 96 who fell short of being termed "aggressors" in work-assaults were placed within the orbit of the
workmen's compensation acts.
But suppose the participant was also the aggressor in a workassault. Should the protection of workmen's compensation extend to an injury arising out of a quarrel rooted in the work if
the man injured is the one who started the quarrel?
Certain things are basic in workmen's compensation:
(1)
negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the
fellow-servant rule-all of the common-law rules-do not apply
to workmen's compensation cases, 97 and courts cannot create
defenses which the workmen's compensation legislation itself
95 Smith v. Stepney Corp., 22 B.W.C.C. 451 (1929) (subway lavatory
attendant assaulted by stranger, a drunken sailor); Correia v. McCormick, 51 R.I. 301, 154 Atl. 276 (1931) (claimant refused to punch
driver's card and was assaulted--co-employee); Heskett v. Fisher
Laundry & Cleaners Co., 217 Ark. 350, 230 S.W.2d 28 (1950), 6
NACCA L.J. 168 (1950) (employer-but in such case employee can

elect to sue in tort); accord, Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231
N.W. 233 (1930) (if a mere tool or agent is liable in an action for
damages, the principal should be likewise); Stewart v. McLellan's
Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940), and Lavin v. Goldberg
Bulding Material Corp., 274 App. Div. 690, 87 N.Y.S.2d 90 (3d Dep't
1949), 3 NACCA L.J. 137 (1949) (even corporation liable in tort).
96 Kaiser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 65 Cal. App. 2d 218, 150 P.2d
562 (1944) (early cases out of harmony where employee intercedes
to suppress a quarrel between employees); Mutual Implement &
Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 214 Miss. 823, 59 So. 2d 547 (1952)
(malicious assault by co-employee-close contact at work as creating
risk of wilful assault-prior completed horseplay no bar-here claimant threw pebble at one who then broke claimant's skull with
shovel-liberal construction urged); Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., 155
Neb. 714, 53 N.W.2d 203 (1952) (claimant tried to run down coemployee, who grabbed meat paddle and broke claimant's arm).
97 Hanson v. Robishek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 598, 297 N.W. 19,
21 (1941) ("[Clare must be exercised lest long judicial habit in tort
cases allows judicial thought in compensation cases to be too much
influenced by a discarded or modified factor of decision."); Stark
v. State Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 103 Ore. 80, 204 Pac. 151 (1922)
(compensation acts intended to abolish common-law rules of fault,
contributory negligence, and the like).
See also list of cases in
Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation
Laws, 41 ILL. L. REV. 311, 312 n.2 (1946). See also Martin v. Snuffy's
Steak House, 46 N.J. Super. 425, 134 A.2d 789 (App. Div. 1957) (hard
to get rid of tort concepts). See also note 384 infra.
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does not create. 98 No compensation act creates the defense of
"aggressor" or "no compensation for assault." 99 The only defenses
usually found in the acts are serious and wilful misconduct, intoxication and deliberate self-inflicted injuries. 00 To twist the
calling of names which is followed by flying fists into serious
and willful misconduct is without legal foundation. To say that
he who strikes the first blow can never collect in a workmen's
compensation case is to bring back the rules of the common law
in disguised garb.
Hence modern courts now almost universally hold that injuries resulting from work-assaults, even to an aggressor, 10 1 are
compensable as "arising out of" the employment. The argument
that the aggressor steps aside' 0 2 from his employment in such a
Newell v. Moreau, 94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947); Dillon's Case, 324
Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949).
99 Newell v. Moreau, supra note 98, and cases in note 101 infra.
100 Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., 155 Neb. 714, 53 N.W.2d 203 (1952) (not
wilful negligence here); Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d
545 (1954) (aggressor struck on head by fellow worker wielding
pick-denial of award reversed, citing list of recent cases). See 15
NACCA L.J. 29 (1955) for a review of this case and the subject.
See also cases in note 101 infra.
101 Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House, 46 N.J. Super. 425, 134 A.2d 789
(App. Div. 1957), 21 NACCA L.J. 164 (1958).
See Kable v. United
States, 169 F.2d 90, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1948) (dictum); Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545 (1954); State Compensation Ins.
Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 38 Cal. 2d 659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952),
9 NACCA L.J. 64 (1952) (reversing old cases); Blanchard's Case, 335
Mass. 175, 138 N.E.2d 762 (1956) (fighting with tools as weapons
following a quarrel over possession of employer's spreader-who
struck first blow held immaterial); Dillon's Case, 324 Mass. 102, 85
N.E.2d 69 (1949); Stewart v. Chrysler Corp., 350 Mich. 596, 87 N.W.
2d 117 (1957) (affirmed by equally divided court) (who is aggressor is question of fact); Petro v. Martin Baking Co., 239 Minn. 307,
58 N.W.2d 731 (1953); Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214
Miss. 569, 55 So. 2d 381 (1951) (dictum) (citing Dillon's Case, supra);
Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., 155 Neb. 714, 53 N.W.2d 203 (1952)
(dictum); Newell v. Moreau, 94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947), 2
NACCA L.J. 26 (1948); Commissioner of Taxation & Fin. v. Bronx
Hospital, 276 App. Div. 708, 97 N.Y.S.2d 120, (3d Dep't 1950); Rothfarb v. Camp Awanee, 116 Vt. 172, 71 A.2d 569 (1950) (dictum);
Moreu v. Industrial Comm'n of Puerto Rico, 73 P.R.A. 14 (1952) (dictum), 15 NACCA L.J. 41 (1955); Landry v. Gilger Drilling Co., 92
So. 2d 482 (La. App. 1957) ("aggressor doctrine" no bar); accord,
Velotta v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 132 So. 2d 51 (La. 1961). For a
review of the subject see 15 NACCA L.J. 29 (1955). See also Small,
Effect of Workmen's Compensation on Tort Concepts, 11 NACCA
L.J. 19, 26-30 (1953); Note, 32 NEB. L. REv. 128 (1953).
102 Vollmer v. City of Milwaukee, 254 Wis. 162, 35 N.W.2d 304 (1948)
(Dean Roscoe Pound to the contrary:
aggressor short of wilful
98
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quarrel adds a new defense not found in workmen's compensation
acts; it is judicial fiat, and has no proper place in assaults arising
out of the work or work environment. Fortunately that defense
is rapidly disappearing.
(5)

Horseplay and Larking

The early courts could see no possible relation between horseplay (larking in England) and work. Even the innocent victim
got no relief. 10 3 It remained for the late Mr. Justice Cardozo,
while on the highest court in New York, to make the first exception-the innocent victim. 10 4 He rationalized that, because work
brings men together and leads to fun and frolic, injuries received
during such horseplay-at least to the innocent victim who is at
work minding his own business-are a risk of and hence "arise
out of" the employment. It took California's highest court thirty
years to reverse itself on this issue.10 5
The case for the innocent victim 0 6 needs no further justification. Courts grant relief.
The case for the non-instigating participant 10 7 has also obtained acceptance. Where the injured party is a participant but
misconduct "ought not to bar an injured workman," 14 NACCA L.J.
47, 64 (1954) ); cf. Armour & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 397 I. 433,
74 N.E.2d 704 (1947) (claimant stepped entirely out of scope of employment when he took foreman's part in argument with fellow
employee and was injured-aggressor). Contra, cases note 101 supra,
refusing to create the new defense of "steps aside," also borrowed
from tort law, and unknown to workmen's compensation statutes.
103 Armitage v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., [1902] 2 K.B. 178 (two boys
larking, third innocent boy hit in eye by piece of iron-no recovery).
See list of cases in Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REV. 311, 315-17 nn.6-12 (1946).
104 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711 (1920);
Allsep v. Daniel Constr. Co., 216 S.C. 268, 57 S.E.2d 427 (1950), 5
NACCA L.J. 71 (1950) (great weight compensates innocent victim).
105 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 286,
158 P.2d 9 (1945) (waitress lost eye when struck by hard roll thrown
by waiter).
106 American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Benford, 77 Ga. App. 93, 47 S.E.2d
673 (1948); Tabor v. Midland Flour Milling Co., 237 Mo. App. 392,
168 S.W.2d 458 (1943). See also list of cases in Horovitz, The Liti-

gious Phrase: "Arising out of" Employment, 3 NACCA L.J. 15, 57
107

n.126 (1949). See also notes 104 and 105 supra.
Crilly v Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W.2d 493 (1958), 22 NACCA L.J.
175 (1958) (both participants and non-participants in horseplay are
covered-throwing shingle nails, hurt own eyes); Joe N. Miles &
Sons v. Myatt, 215 Miss. 589, 61 So. 2d 390 (1952), 11 NACCA L.J. 79
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did not start the horseplay, whether that type of horseplay is
known' 0 8 or unknown' 0 9 to the employer, most courts will uphold a finding that the horseplay and resulting injury arose out
of the employment.
The case of the aggressor, the instigating participant who
started the unfortunate horseplay, is now treated in the same
manner as the aggressor in the malicious assault cases."10 The
same rules apply to sportive assaults (horseplay or larking) as
apply to malicious assaults. Yet some courts cannot forget their
dislike for the man with "moral" fault even though fault plays
no part in workmen's compensation cases."'
(1953)

108

109

110

111

(non-aggressive participant collects); Maltais v. Equitable

Life Assur., 93 N.H. 237, 40 A.2d 837 (1944) (used air hose, fatal
injury-participant protected-if considered instigator, contributory
fault no bar in workmen's compensation case-not serious and wilful
misconduct here); Burns v. Merritt Eng'r Co., 302 N.Y. 131, 96 N.E.2d
739 (1951), 7 NACCA L.J. 56 (1951) (participated in the prank, though
not instigator).
Industrial Comm'n v. McCarthy, 295 N.Y. 443, 68 N.E.2d 434 (1946)
(employer acquiescense); Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co., 298 N.Y.
85, 80 N.E.2d 749 (1948) (custom of the employment); Johnson v.
Loew's, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 795, 180 N.Y.S.2d 826 (3d Dep't 1958)
(messenger during enforced idleness struck in eye by paper clip he
was attempting to shoot out of window with rubber band. Note,
however, that even in New York, horseplay is now covered even
though the prank was not usual or foreseeable.)
See Burns v.
Merritt Eng'r Co., 302 N. Y. 131, 96 N.E.2d 739 (1951), 7 NACCA L.J.
56 (1951) (drank poison put in bottle labelled "gin"-participant
though not instigator).
Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W.2d 493 (1958), 22 NACCA L.J.
175 (1958) (knowledge of the employer or existence of a custom of
fooling as pegs on which to hang compensation are improper criteria
and are rejected); Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 117 A.2d
12 (1955), 17 NACCA L.J. 85 (1956).
Newell v. Moreu, 94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947) (aggressors-instigators-in sportive assaults belong in same category as aggressors in
malicious assaults); accord, Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W.2d
493 (1958); Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 117 A.2d 12
(1955); Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House, 46 N.J. Super. 425, 134 A.2d
789 (App. Div. 1957). Cunning v City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306,
103 N.W.2d 876 (1960) (The analysis applied to the "aggressor assault" case is applicable to the "horseplay participant," so long as
not wilful misconduct or wilful intent to injure); Burns v. Merritt
Eng'r Co., 302 N.Y. 131, 96 N.E.2d 739 (1951), 7 NACCA L.J. 56 (1951)
(drank poison, offered as gin); Commissioner of Taxation & Fin. v.
Bronx Hosp., 276 App. Div. 708, 97 N.Y.S.2d 120 (3d Dep't 1950).
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 16 n.17 (D.C.
Cir. 1940) ("Natural repulsion toward rewarding intentional misconduct ...

[malicious

assaults are the basic reason for

denying

award to aggressors, but it] ignores the fact that one purpose of
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Nevertheless, the current weight of authority and reason
places work-assaults and work-environmental horseplay in the
same category and allows aggressors in both to recover. 112 After
all, horseplay is a "sportive" or "mischievous" assault of a playful
nature and deserves no different or certainly no harsher treatment
than malicious assaults. Employees take with them their natural
bent for larking, whether alone 1 3 or in groups, 114 and their playthe statute is sustenance of the misbehaving employee's family during his disability and their dependence is not the less because the
misconduct is his rather than another's"); see note 92 supra. Cunning
v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876 (1960) (playful
fault revives fellow-servant rule which has no place in compensation
statutes-flipped raincoat over roof of truck's cab and caused sharp
turn-instigator fell off-will not read in defenses-misconduct here
not serious enough to be a bar); Eagle-Picher Co. v. McGuire, 307
P.2d 145 (Okla. 1957) (not abandonment of employment); Ransom
v. H. G. Hill Co., 205 Tenn. 377, 326 S.W.2d 659 (1959) (the argument that horseplay is a deviation from work was rejected when
the horseplay took place during a lull or non-work period, as there
was "nothing from which employee could deviate"); Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House, 46 N.J. Super. 425, 134 A.2d 789 (App. Div. 1957)
(courts have difficult time eliminating tort concepts).
112 Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876 (1960);
Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W.2d 493 (1958) (boys threw
shingles at each other, despite employer's warnings); McKenzie v.
Brixite Mfg. Co., 34 N.J. 1, 166 A.2d 753 (1961) ("aggressor" caused
fellow-employee to turn suddenly, hit by hot asphault scraps);
Eagle-Picher Co. v. McGuire, 307 P.2d 145 (Okla. 1957) (instigator
injured-impulsive act not an abandonment of employment, merely
an incident of the day's work involuntary in character); Stark v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 103 Ore. 80, 204 Pac. 151 (1922) (air hose
in rectum, causing peritonitis and death-compensable); Ransom v.
H. G. Hill Co., 205 Tenn. 377, 326 S.W.2d 659 (1959) (truck driver
playfully grabbed another employee by the britches, fell to ground,
while killing time on the job-horseplay stemmed from work-connected idleness, nothing from which he could deviate-two older
cases contra not followed, as current trend to be liberal, and workmen's compensation law "was made for benefit of injured workman"); Williams v. Navy Dep't, 1 U.S. Employees' App. Bd. Dec. 80
(1948), 1 NACCA L.J. 9, 105 (1948), 15 NACCA L.J. 39 (1955)
(waiting in line to get pay, initiated horseplay). See also Tilly v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash. 2d 148, 324 P.2d 432 1958)
(made remark, face involuntarily held and washed, precipitating
breaking of aorta-compensable); Hall v. Carnegie Institute of Technology, 170 Pa. Super. 459, 87 A.2d 87 (1952) (horseplay not a substanital deviation from employment). See also cases cited in notes
110 and 111 supra, and notes 113-15 infra.
113 Boyd v. Florida Mattress Factory, Inc., 128 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla.
1961) (without rhyme or reason, threw a firecracker under dock,
blinded eye-such "'insignificant antics,' not to be magnified into
a constructive abandonment of the employment"-deniel of award
reversed); Hayes Freight Lines v. Burns, 290 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1956)
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ful nature overflows in myriad fashions; but so long as what they
do falls short of wilful misconduct or deliberate self-destruction,
courts are not justified in creating a new defense labelled "instigator" or "aggressor." In short, horseplay is a risk incidental
to employment;" 5 who is to blame for the risk, while important
in tort cases, has no relevancy in workmen's compensation cases.
(6)

Incidents of Work

No one denies that an injury which results from the main
work for which the employee is hired is compensable. But suppose the injury "arises out of" something secondary or incidental
to his work, such as going to the toilet, eating, or getting fresh air.
These acts of personal ministration" 6 are universally recognized as compensable incidents of the employment. Getting fresh
air," 7 smoking," s resting," 9 eating food or ice cream, 1 20 quench(horseplay with firecracker, participant lost eye; question of fact
whether horseplay part and parcel of employment); Shapaka v.
State Comp. Comm'r, 119 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1961) (on way to water

cooler, attempted spontaneous full somersault-landed on back-injured).
114 See notes 110-12 supra.
115 Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876 (1960)

(character and nature of the incident arose out of employment).
See cases in notes 112-13 supra. Riesenfeld, Trends in Workmen's
Compensation, 42 CALiF. L. REV. 531, 551 (1954) "The reversal of
the previously adamant attitude is especially noticeable in the so-

called 'horseplay' and 'assault' cases. The courts have become increasingly inclined to consider horseplay as a risk incidental to the

See
even where he was the participant ......
employment ...
Note, 28 NEB. L. REV. 130 1949).
116 See list of cases in Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase: "Arising out of"
Employment, 3 NACCA L.J. 15, 60-63 (1949).
117 Von Ette's Case, 223 Mass. 56, 111 N.E. 696 (1916); Moschinger v.
Henry Heide, Inc., 256 App. Div. 1019, 10 N.Y.S.2d 406 (3d Dep't
1939).
118 Natco Corp. v. Mallory, 262 Ala. 595, 80 So. 2d 274 (1955) (retrieving package of cigarettes, arm caught in revolving gear, slight deviation no bar); Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 201 S.W.2d
573 (1947) (purchasing smoking tobacco); Puffin v. General Elec.
Co., 132 Conn. 279, 43 A.2d 746 (1945) (includes setting one's self
accidentally on fire-sweater ignited by spark, in smoking room);
Columbia Cas. Co. v. Parham, 69 Ga. App. 258, 25 S.E.2d 147 (1943)
(includes injury attempting to throw away cigarette while on elevator); Dzikowsky v. Superior Steel Co., 259 Pa. 578, 103 Atl. 351
(1918) (oil-soaked apron caught fire); Mack v. Branch No. 12, Etc.,
207 S.C. 258, 35 S.E.2d 838 (1945); McLaughlan v. Anderson, 4
B.W.C.C. 376 (1911) (fell under wagon wheels trying to recover
pipe).
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ing thirst, whether by water, soft drinks, coffee, beer or wine,121
taking a bath or shower away from home, whether or not provided by the employer,12

2

using a telephone

23

or a toilet 124 and

1 25

and have been upheld
washing and pressing working clothes
as compensable "incidents" of the employment.
Similarly, the employer can make other things "incidents"
119 Sullivan's Case, 241 Mass. 9, 134 N.E. 406 (1922)

(fell through glass

window in rest room); Kubera's Case, 320 Mass. 419, 69 N.E.2d 673

120

(1946) (resting on door step of laundry when injured); Spencer v.
Chesapeake Paperboard Co., 186 Md. 522, 47 A.2d 385 (1946) (sleeping as part of resting).
DeStefano v. Alpha Lunch Co., 308 Mass. 38, 30 N.E.2d 827 (1941)

(food); Sebek v. Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., 148 Ohio 693, 76

121

122

123

124

125

N.E.2d 892 (1947) (ptomaine poisoning from food in plant cafeteria);
Vilter Mfg. Co. v. Jahncke, 192 Wis. 362, 212 N.W. 641 (1927) ("eating ice cream" like "drink of water").
Osterbrink's Case, 229 Mass. 407, 118 N.E. 657 (1918) (mistook poison
for water); Wells v. Morris, 33 Ala. App. 497, 35 So. 2d 54 (1948),
3 NACCA L.J. 102 (1949) (making coffee, explosion-injuries compensable); Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz.
398, 158 P.2d 511 (1945) (bottle of cola burst); Elliott v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 21 Cal. 2d 281, 131 P.2d 521 (1942) (poison mistaken
for wine needed for indisposition); St. Alexandre v. Texas Co., 28
So. 2d 385 (La. App. 1946) (cut hand on cola bottle); Martin v.
J. Lovibond & Sons, [1914] 2 K.B. 227 (draymen in streets all day,
knocked down after getting beer in public house-no definite interval for meals); Davidson v. Mould, 69 Commw. L.R. 96 (Austl.
1944) (opened cola bottle on employer's advice, blinded eye).
Miller v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 3 N.Y.2d 654, 148 N.E.2d
296, 171 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1958) (conference on tree surgery ended, felt
"pretty grubby" after digging moss-returned to hotel, slipped in
bathtub taking shower-compensable). Divelbiss v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Colo. 452, 344 P.2d 1084 (1959) (showering after workfacilities furnished by employer-compensable), overruling Industrial Comm'n v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., 107 Colo. 226, 110 P.2d
654 (1941) (as "out of harmony with the present trend of cases");
cases discussed in Note, 32 RocKy MT. L. REV. 257 (1960).
Cox's Case, 225 Mass. 220, 114 N.E. 281 (1916) (went to answer telephone); Holland-St. Louis Sugar Co. v. Shraluka, 64 Ind. App. 545,
116 N.E. 330 (1917) (answering telephone of unknown location,
slipped on stairway).
Haskin's Case, 261 Mass. 436, 158 N.E. 845 (1927) (used bridge over
river as toilet, drowned-no toilets in vicinity); Sachleben v. Gjellefald Constr. Co., 228 Iowa 152, 290 N.W. 48 (1940) (sudden need for
moving bowels, hid between trains which then moved-compensable); Zabriskie v. Erie R.R., 86 N.J.L. 266, 92 Atl. 385 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1914) (crossing street to employer's building containing the
toilets).
Sylvia's Case, 298 Mass. 27, 9 N.E.2d 412 (1937).
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of employment by contract, custom or otherwise. 126 Hence supplying transportation, 127 providing recreation such as allowing
sports to be played on the premises 1 28 or subsidizing soft ball,
bowling, or other teams to compete with rivals, 129 whether day
or night, may be considered "incidents" of the employment; and
injuries during such transportation or play have been held to
"arise out of" the employment and thus are compensable.
Any reasonable incident of the employment, properly proved,
may be the basis of compensation liability; it is not limited to
126

127

128

129

Donovan's Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 N.E. 431 (1914) (transportation is
contractual incident); Stony-Brady, Inc. v. Heim, 152 Fla. 710, 12
So. 2d 888 (1943) ("or otherwise"-restaurant manager volunteered
to remove "crick" in waitress's neck, injured her spinal columnarose out of employment); DeSautel v. North Dakota Workmen's
Comp. Bureau, 75 N.D. 405, 28 N.W.2d 378 (1947) (custom, conduct of
parties, may create new incidents); Portee v. South Carolina State
Hosp., 234 S.C. 50, 106 S.E.2d 670 (1959), 23 NACCA L.J. 167 (1959)
(co-worker at hospital administers penicillin to hospital attendantdies of shock-incident of employment, despite negligence and disobedience of rules).
See note 126 supra. For discussion of exceptions to going and coming rule, see notes 204-10 infra.
University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953),
12 NACCA L.J. 79 (1953) (spring football practice held incident of
strudent's employment); Geary v. Anaconda Mining Co., 120 Mont.
485, 188 P.2d 185 (1947) (handball during lunch); Tocci v. Tessler
& Weiss, Inc., 28 N.J. 582, 147 A.2d 783 (1959), 23 NACCA L.J. 147
(1959) (hurt during customary lunch-hour softball game); Brown
v. United Servs. for Air, 273 App. Div. 932, 78 N.Y.S.2d 37 (3d
Dep't 1948), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 901, 84 N.E.2d 810 (1949) (volleyball on
premises during lunch hour); Clancy v. Department of Pub. Health,
[1959] W.C.R. 49 (New South Wales) (compensation awarded to a
male nurse at a mental hospital injured in after-hours soccer games
on the hospital field-patients were encouraged to watch); Schneider, Compensability of Injuries During Employer-Sponsored Recreation, 2 NACCA L.J. 62 (1948).
Turner v. Willard, 154 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (bowling
league captain injured on trip to see bowling league president during working hours-no deviation or abandonment of employmentworkmen's compensation not confined by common-law concepts of
employment); Jewell Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 304,
128 N.E.2d 699 (1955) (intra-company baseball league, injured sliding into third base-esprit de corp among employees as benefit to
employer); Complitano v. Steel & Alloy Tank Co., 34 N.J. 300, 168
A.2d 809 (1961) (softball after hours, employer paid for uniforms,
denial of compensation reversed); Tedesco v. General Elec. Co., 305
N.Y. 544, 114 N.E.2d 33 (1953), 13 NACCA L.J. 65 (1954) (despite
incorporation of team, ball game subsidized by employer-denial of
compensation reversed); Ott v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 Ohio App. 13,
82 N.E.2d 137 (1948) (heart attack during baseball game sponsored
by employer-compensable).

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION:

DEVELOPMENTS

31

personnel administrations or employee games. Christmas parties
and outings,'3 0 and the use of hotel rooms' 3 ' have been held to
be compensable incidents of the employment. But the link to
the work must be established by evidence and not by surmise.
(7)

Slight Deviation and Curiosity as Incidents of Work

At common law the defenses of deviation and curiosity may
have had some validity. Using narrow common-law reasoning,
many early courts denied workers compensation recovery on mere
proof that the minor deviation' 3 2 play some part in the injury,
or that curiosity 133 was one of the factors causing the injury.

Modern courts no longer follow these rules. Slight deviation
is not a defense under most decisions.' 34 Thus a slight deviation
130 Wiseman v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 46 Cal. 570, 297 P.2d 649 (1956)
(commercial traveler at hotel, asphyxiated in fire-immaterial that
he had overnight guest (female) for an immoral or unlawful purpose-shelter was an incident of his employment); Noble v. Zimmerman, 237 Ind. 556, 146 N.E.2d 828 (1957), 21 NACCA L.J. 176 (1958)
(recreational outing to encourage attendance at business meeting,
racing-dive in lake near employer's cottage, fractured cervical vertebra without contacting anything-compensable); Moore's Case, 330
Mass. 1, 110 N.E.2d 764 (1953), 12 NACCA L.J. 77 (1953) (dancing
at annual Christmas party-fractured coccyx "jitterbugging"blanket denial of compensation reversed, remanded); Graves v.
Central Elec. Power Co-op, 306 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1957), 21 NACCA
L.J. 177 (1958) (employee drowned in attempt to rescue own son at
company-sponsored picnic-stand-by duty concurrently-compensable); Torres v. Triangle Handbag Mfg. Co., 13 App. Div. 559, 211
N.Y.S.2d 992 (3d Dep't 1961) (drinking at boss's Christmas party,
jealous, stabbed co-employee-compensable).
13 Wiseman v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 570, 297 P.2d 649
(1956). See also cases cited note 221 infra.
132 Horton's Case, 275' Mass. 572, 176 N.E. 648 (1931)
(deviated from
toilet route to pick up a newspaper) (This early case would probably not be followed today in Massachusetts-author).
Contra,
Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 201 S.W.2d 573 (1947)
(refusing to follow early Massachusetts and Indiana "slight deviation" cases, as they were against the modern trend).
'33 Maronofsky's Case, 234 Mass. 343, 125 N.E. 565 (1920); Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. Parker, 64 F. Supp. 615 (D. Md. 1946) (refused to
follow Maronofsky's Case, supra).
'34 Natco Corp. v. Mallory, 262 Ala. 595, 80 So. 2d 274 (1955)
(retrieving package of cigarettes, arm caught in revolving gear, slight
deviation no bar); Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 201
S.W.2d 573 (1947); Western Pipe & Steel Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 49 Cal. App. 2d 108, 121 P.2d 35 (1st Div. 1942); Bernier
v. Greenville Mills, 93 N.H., 165, 37 A.2d 5 (1944); Secor v. Penn
Serv. Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 117 A.2d 12 (1955), affirming 35 N.J.
Super. 59, 113 A.2d 177 (Super. Ct. 1955) (garage attendant mo-
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to get a chew of tobacco, 135 or to ask a fellow worker the time' 36
or to throw away or retrieve cigarettes 3 7 is harmless; and awards
are upheld when the injury occurred during the deviation.
Deviations for traveling employees have caused judicial upheavals. l 38 Most courts will award compensation where the deviation is cured by a return to the main or permissible route, 139 or
where the employee, after the personal trip is over but before
the main business route is regained, is proceeding in the direction
of his business destination. 140 Minor or insubstantial route devimentarily and impulsively deviated from work to stroke match,
perhaps in mock bravado-gasoline-soaked clothes ignited-akin to
curiosity and horseplay cases-compensable); Miller v. C. F. Mueller
Co., 132 N.J.L. 540, 41 A.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (deviated to help
fellow worker on a machine); Frank v. Allen, 270 App. Div. 960,
61 N.Y.S.2d 728 (3d Dep't 1946); Wickham v. Glenside Woolen Mills,
252 N.Y. 11, 168 N.E. 446 (1929); Corlett v. Lancashire Ry., 11
B.W.C.C. 293, 18 N.C.C.A. 1043 (1918).
135 Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 201 S.W.2d 573 (1947)
(crossing street to purchase smoking tobacco, hit by automobile);
Western Pipe & Steel Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 49 Cal. App. 2d
108, 121 P.2d 35 (1st Div. 1942) (slight deviation to get cigarettes
during lunch hour).
136 Corlett v. Lancashire Ry., 11 B.W.C.C. 293, 18 N.C.C.A. 1043 (1918).
137 Natco Corp. v. Mallory, 262 Ala. 595, 80 So. 2d 274 (1955); Columbia

Cas. Co. v. Parham, 69 Ga. App. 258, 25 S.E.2d 147 (1943) (caught
arm in elevator while throwing away his cigarette-employment at
least "a contributing cause").
138 1 LARSON,

139

140
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§

19

(1960)

(deviations, with

multiple diagrams, to try to explain the varying court decisions).
Ohmen v. Adams Bros., 109 Conn. 378, 146 Atl. 825 (1929) (voted,
then regained main highway between his home and work); Allison
v. Brown & Horsch Insulation Co., 98 N.H. 434, 102 A.2d 493 (1954)
(cured by the return to the usually traveled route); Neville v.
Arthur Anderson Co., 284 App. Div. 994, 135 N.Y.S.2d 349 (3d Dep't
1954) (personal side trip completed).
London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Herndon, 81 Ga. App. 178, 181, 58 S.E.2d
510, 512 (1950) ("[H]e again resumed the duties of his employment."); accord, Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 94 Cal. App. 251, 270 Pac. 992 (2d Div. 1928) (personal
business over, he headed for business destination by alternate direct
route-employee had broad latitude as to hours of work); Stratton
v. Interstate Fruit Co., 47 S.D. 452, 199 N.W. 117 (1924) (though
"he may have deviated to some extent from the strict line of duty,"
--- driving employer's truck, danger of being struck by a streetcar
was "incident to such employment"). Contra, Public Serv. Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 395 Ill. 238, 69 N.E.2d 875 (1946) (killed on
railroad crossing, headed for storage garage, but after deviating to
own home-compensation denied); Warren v. Globe Indem. Co., 217
La. 142, 46 So. 2d 66 (1950) (back in business direction, but also
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ation is usually no defense. 141 A deviation by the driver of a
vehicle is not to be charged against passengers, 1 42 whether the
driver is a superior or a fellow-employee.
The subject of curiosity is closely akin to that of slight deviation, and to some extent to horseplay. A slight deviation to
get a cigarette or to take time out from work for various temporary purposes is not a bar to compensation. By the same token
a minor deviation induced 'by curiosity is no bar.
Employees are not only careless, awkward and full of frailties; but they bring with them to their jobs their prankishness,
and their bad habits as well as their good ones. They smoke,
drink sodas, chat and waste time. They also have a bent for
putting parts of their anatomy in contact with machines, openings, and temporarily closed spots. But employees are not mere
automatons and cannot be held to definite patterns like a ma-

'41

142

taking girl companion home); Luke v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co.,
140 Neb. 557, 300 N.W. 577 (1941) (Y.M.C.A. general secretary attended brother's funeral in Montana and headed for conference in
Colorado-denied, despite employer's permission to attend funeral).
The contra cases are unusually harsh-and unless proof establishes that the new road created an increased risk, in violation of
orders, the injury should be held to "arise out of' the employment
as a risk of driving, without technical discussions of serious versus
slight deviations. See Spradling v. International Shoe Co., 364 Mo.
938, 270 S.W.2d 28 (1954), 15 NACCA L.J. 77 (1955) (salesman
headed for Springfield fifteen or twenty miles outside of his territory to pick up wife-never reached her as killed in automobile
collision ten miles from Springfield. His death here was not the
result of an "added peril"-considered "slight deviation" in choice
of routes as not to affect the applicability of the Workmen's Compensation Law).
Spradling v. International Shoe Co., 364 Mo. 938, 270 S.W.2d 28
(1954), 15 NACCA L.J. 77 (1955); Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211
Ark. 554, 201 S.W.2d 573 (1947); Western Pipe Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 49 Cal. App. 2d 108, 121 P.2d 35 (1942) (running across
street to buy food, in the course of a delivery trip); Martin v. J.
Lovibond & Sons, [1914] 2 K.B. 227 (leaving delivery conveyance to
have a glass of beer at two o'clock in the afternoon).
Allison v. Brown & Horsch Insulation Co., 98 N.H. 434, 102 A.2d
493 (1954) (employees were not drivers and need not protest a
deviation by a superior; also deviation here cured by return to
usual traveled route); Soden v. Public Serv. Transp. Co., 4 N.J. Misc.
817, 134 Atl. 560 (Sup. Ct. 1926), aff'd by equally divided court, 103
N.J.L. 713, 137 Atl. 437 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927) ("passive occupants
of car," driver a fellow employee, deviated to visit scene of an
accident); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Chitwood, 199 S.W.2d 806
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (need not protest against deviation).
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chine. 43 The workmen's compensation acts were intended to
protect them for any accident reasonably related to the employment.
Hence most modern courts protect workers against their own
follies where they fall short of wilful misconduct or deliberate
self injury. The great weight of authority currently holds that
injuries received during slight deviations to satisfy curiosity are
compensable 4 4 no matter what form the curiosity may take, so
long as it is what reasonably may occur to workers on the job in
question and it is impulsive, thoughtless, or momentary. Thus
awards have been allowed where the curiosity has taken the
form of sticking one's head in an opening, 14 5 finger-testing a revolving blade 4 6 or opening a glove compartment and accidentally
exploding a bomb. 1 47 But a deliberate, extensive excursion resulting in substantial abandonment of the employee's work may
48
result in the denial of an award.
143 "Human beings, unlike machines, do not run in grooves ....

." Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase: "Arising out of" Employment, 4 NACCA
Conyers v. Krey Packing Co., 194 S.W.2d 749, 752
L.J. 19 (1949).
(Mo. Ct. App. 1946) ("An employee is not to be regarded as an
automaton .... ).
144 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Parker, 64 F. Supp. 615 (D. Md. 1946);
Bernier v. Greenville Mills, 93 N.H. 165, 37 A.2d 5 (1944); Franck
v. Allen, 270 App. Div. 960, 61 N.Y.S.2d 728 (3d Dep't 1946); Jor-

dan v. Dixie Chevrolet, Inc., 218 S.C. 73, 61 S.E.2d 654 (1950). See
also Boyd v. Florida Mattress Factory, Inc., 128 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1961)
(without rhyme or reason, threw firecracker under dock, blinded
eye-such "insignificant antics should not be magnified into a constructive abandonment of employment"-denial of award reversed).
Derby v. International Salt Co., 233 App. Div. 15, 251 N.Y. Supp. 531
(3d Dep't 1931) (out of curiosity picked up a little box on floor-dynamite cartridges). "It seems to be generally accepted today that employees are likely to explore during their spare time, and this may
be fairly regarded as a part of the daily routine of work . . . ." MALONE, ACCIDENT'S PROMOTED BY EMPLOYEE'S CURIosITY, in LOUISIANA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 217 (1951).
145 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Parker, 64 F. Supp. 615 (D. Md. 1946).
146 Bernier v. Greenville Mills, 93 N.H. 165, 37 A.2d 5 (1944).
147 Jordan v. Dixie Chevrolet, Inc., 218 S.C. 73, 61 S.E.2d 654 (1950);
accord, Franck v. Allen, 270 App. Div. 960, 61 N.Y.S.2d 728 (3d Dep't
1946) (found dynamite cap sweeping floor, picked up nail and prodded, cap exploded).
(after
148 Simon v. Standard Oil Co., 150 Neb. 799, 36 N.W.2d 102 (1949)
his own work finished, went from his wash room to the paint room,
where new exhaust fan had been installed, thirty feet away, considered serious deviation-strong dissent by Carter, J.); accord, Robertson v. Express Container Corp., 13 N.J. 342, 99 A.2d 649 (1953)
(deliberate excursion to roof ladder, fell through glass section-
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Violation of Rules or Laws

The attempt to deny compensation because the employee was
going faster than the speed limit when he was injured (violation
of law) 149 or because the employee was injured while carrying
stones by tractor after his employer had told him to use h-As hands
(violation of an order or rule)150 has failed to impress the courts.
As long as the worker is doing what he is hired to do, the
1 51
or violates some law 1 52 will
fact that he uses the wrong method

not deprive him of his compensation rights.

The only defenses

three dissents); "[Aiccount ought to be taken of the ordinary habits
and modes of conduct of workers in the intervals of inactivity in
the course and place of their daily tasks." Pound, 13 NACCA L.J.
61 (1954).
149 Day v. Gold Star Dairy, 307 Mich. 383, 12 N.W.2d 5 (1943)
(truck
driver going uphill at forty-seven miles per hour on wrong side of
road, hit by oncoming automobile-award stands, though found
guilty in criminal court).
150 Ricci v. Katz, 267 App. Div. 928, 46 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (3d Dep't 1944)
"The use of the tractor was but an incident in the principal job of
removing and carting away the stones. Claimant performed his
work in a forbidden manner, rather than performing work which
had been forbidden."
151 Blair & Co. v. Chilton, 8 B.W.C.C. 324 (1915) (told to use safe
platform and not to sit while turning wheel-workman acting within
sphere of employment, though doing work in wrong way); Dravo
Corp. v. Strosnider, 43 Del. 256, 45 A.2d 542 (1945) (over 400 rules
printed, violated one about riding on truck he was pushing-dead
letter paper rule no bar); Prentice v. Twin City Wholesale Grocery,
202 Minn. 455, 278 N.W. 895 (1938) (forbidden to ride on conveyor,
yet did so to facilitate his work, injured hand-doing one's work
in wrong manner not a bar); Oklahoma Ry. v. Cannon, 198 Okla. 65,
176 P.2d 482 (1946) (violation as to manner of performing work
i.e., safety regulations, not fatal).
152

Philbrick Abulance Serv. v. Buff, 73 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1954) (ambulance driver went through red light at thirty miles per hour, in
violation of law); Wiseman v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d
570, 297 P.2d 649 (1956) (fire in hotel, female unlawfully with employee [bank official]-the risk of fire was in no way increased);
Webb v. Johnson, 195 Md. 587, 599, 74 A.2d 7, 12 (1950) (private
pilot had no license to take passengers, but did so, killed-compensable. "There appears to be nothing in the compensation statutes to bar an employee from recovery because he violates a statute."); Chaffee v. Effron, 1 App. Div. 2d 197, 149 N.Y.S.2d 115 (3d
Dep't 1956) (drove employer's car around curve at illegal speed,

over center line, killed in collision with a truck-compensable);
M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132
(a leading case-father was killed when unlicensed son
(1948)
[violation of law] drove truck-no bar, went only to the manner
of doing the work); Fliteways v. Industrial Comm'n, 249 Wis. 496,
24 N.W.2d 900 (1946) (illegal "buzzing").
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given by most acts are "serious and wilful misconduct," deliberate self injury and "intoxication"; short of these, the court will
not read "violation of rules" and "violation of laws" into the
acts. 153 In fact, most of these violations result from mere negli-

gence' 5 4 or thoughtlessness, 155 neither of which are defenses.
(9)

Suicide

Originally the cases required the dependents of a suicide to
prove that the suicide was due to (1) an uncontrollable impulse,
or alternatively, (2) a delirium so strong that the deceased did
not realize that he was ending his life. 156 His insane "choice" to
die was regarded as voluntary and wilful, and breaking the
chain of causation. 157 This requirement was erroneously imported
from tort law 158 and read into workmen's compensation statutes
in the days when courts brought back fault in disguised garb.' 59
The Massachusetts rule, based on the tort law, was finally changed
153 Vaz's Case, 174 N.E.2d 360 (Mass. 1961) (employee, stuck in elevator,
climbed out of window and was hurt-rule against using elevator
was not enforced-not quasi criminal, so not serious and wilful misconduct); Carey v. Bryan & Rollins, 49 Del. 387, 117 A.2d 240 (1955)
(sixty-five mile speed and lighting cigarette, ran into pole-not
even "wilful failure" to perform a duty required by statute), 17
NACCA L.J. 63 (1956); Newell v. Moreau, 94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476
(1947).
154 Corrina v. De Barbier, 247 N.Y. 357, 160 N.E. 397 (1928) (fell asleep
on wagon on ferry in disobedience of orders; mere negligence and
no bar to recovery); Shute's Case, 290 Mass. 393, 195 N.E. 354 (1935)
(distributing circulars in seventeen degrees below zero weatherfailed to wear mittens, froze hands-mere negligence, no bar);
Chaffee v. Effron, 1 App. Div. 2d 197, 149 N.Y.S.2d 115 (3d Dep't
1956) (excessive speed around curve-mere negligence).
155 Thompson v. State Compensation Comm'r, 133 W. Va. 95, 54 S.E.2d
13 (1949) (act done impulsively and spontaneously).
156 Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915) (molten lead in
eye, uncontrollable impulse, jumped through window, did not realize
the nature of his act).
157 Ruschetti's Case, 299 Mass. 425, 13 N.E.2d 34 (1938) (chain of causation is broken by the voluntary though insane choice of the injured
person to die-the employee's arm was amputated, very painful,
hanged self); Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 466, 6
N.W.2d 199, 202 (1942) (Fowler, J. dissenting) (no break in the
causal chain, refused to accept "any species of fine-spun reasoning").
158 Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 530, 108 N.E. 466, 467 (1915) expressly stated: "This decision rests upon the rule established in
Danials v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424
(1903)." (a tort case).
159 See the cases cited in notes 6, 97, 111 supra and 384 infra.
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by statute. 60 The current weight of authority has now dropped
the second requirement-that the deceased be unaware that he
is ending his life.161 But the slight weight of authority, but not
of reason, still requires some proof, albeit weak, of uncontrollable
impulse.' 6 2

However, an impressive and growing minority re-

quire only that the injury lead to mental derangement or insanity,
1 63
and that the mental derangement or insanity lead to the suicide.

STAT. 1937, c. 370, § 2 (now MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 152,
§ 26A (1958) ).
161 Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 190 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1951)
(aware he was causing death, yet compensable); Whitehead v. Keene
Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949), 5 NACCA L.J. 74 (1950);
Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 289, 101 N.W.2d 435, 440
(1960), 25 NACCA L.J. 206 (1960) (psychotic depression amounting
to insanity from automobile accident at work-claimant physically
unharmed, but threw pedestrian 80 feet, finally irresistible impulse
to kill self. Compensable though "one may commit an act knowing
it was wrong and with full realization of its consequences, yet the
act may be the result of insanity rather than the individual's own
conscious act."); Pushkarowitz v. A. & M. Kramer, 275 App. Div. 875,
88 N.Y.S.2d 885 (3d Dep't 1949) (no discussion of the issue of knowing the nature of the act). See also the English cases in note 163
160 MASS.

infra.
162

Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 Atl. 644

(1927)

(librarian, overworked, became insane and committed suicide--"an
act for which she was not morally responsible, and which was due

to uncontrollable impulse"); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn.
281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960) (irresistible impulse); Lupfer v. Baldwin
Locomotive Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 Atl. 458 (1921) (suicide due to
uncontrollable impulse); Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus.,
41 Wash. 2d 301, 249 P.2d 364 (1952) (found "uncontrollable impulse"); Gatterdam v. Department of Labor & Indus., 185 Wash. 628,
56 P.2d 693 (1936) (uncontrollable impulse or delirium, all having
origin in foot injury).
163 Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 190 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1951),
8 NACCA L.J. 46 (1951) (although Deputy Commissioner below

mentioned "uncontrollable impulse," Circuit Judge Borah nowhere

in his opinion relies on that finding); Burnight v. Industrial Ace.
Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (breakdown
because of pressures of work, slashed wrists-irresistible impulse
unnecessary, the sensible and humane view granting compensation

when the mental injury deprives the deceased of normal judgment
and overwhelms him with the belief that death is his only escape);
Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949)

(the

injury directly led to the mental disturbance which in turn directly led
to the suicide); Stapleton v. Keenan, Gifford & Lunn Apartment House

Co., 265 N.Y. 528, 193 N.E. 305 (1934) (awake all night before, because of pain from infected hand; committed suicide by hanging
while temporarily insane); Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248
(injury caused brain derangement
N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431 (1928)
which led to suicide-enough-compensable); McIntosh v. E. F.
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The common-law theory that suicide, being a crime, breaks
the chain of causation, no longer appeals to the courts.. 4 The
overwhelming weight of authority holds that suicide following
mental derangement or insanity is not wilful self-destruction;
hence it is not barred by the usual compensation statute which
makes exceptions for wilful intent to injure one's self or another
person. 165
The time has now come for strong courts to declare forthrightly that tort theories no longer control workmen's compensation suicide cases; all that is required is reasonable proof that
the injury led to the mental derangement which in turn led to
(10)

Slips and Falls

From the outset courts have allowed awards where the employee slipped on the floor, whether the cause was a defective
Hauserman Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 406, 211 N.Y.S.2d 482 (3d Dep't

1961) (fractured skull, seizures, depression, shot self-"insidious
breakdown of this man's mental and physical capacities"); Pushkarowitz v. A. & M. Kramer, 275 App. Div. 875, 88 N.Y.S.2d 885 (3d
Dep't 1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 637, 90 N.E.2d 494 (1950) (eye injury,
depressive psychosis, suicide by drinking poison); Marriott v. Maltby
Colliery, 13 B.W.C.C. 353 (1920)
(miner's severly injured hand
caused insanity, and suicide, by cutting own throat); Dixon v. Sutton, etc. Colliery, 23 B.W.C.C. 135 (1930)
(miner depressed by
nystagmas, found in canal two and one-half miles from homemental derangement is as competent as insanity eo nomine to cause
death to be result of accident).
164 Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949) (fell
from roof, excrutiating pain, swallowed poison (potash and lye)suicide is intervening act but not intervening cause-compensable).
Cases in note 163 supra do not subscribe to breaking of the chain
of causation by the suicide. Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis.
462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942).
165 Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 190 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1951)
(choice to kill self not voluntary, and not within exception of wilful
intent to kill self); Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464
(Fla. 1949); Olson v. F. I. Crane Lumber Co., 107 N.W.2d 223 (Minn.

1961)

(work-connected heart attack, depressed, led to mental illness,

imagined that people were after him, committed suicide by strangulation); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435
(1960) (not intentionally self-inflicted, as irresistible or uncontrollable impulse-not wilful self-destruction); Prentiss Truck &
Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So. 2d 272 (1956) (did not
have the mental capacity to determine the consequences of his actnot voluntary or wilful-back injury, depression, suicide); Burnett
v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ohio App. 441, 93 N.E.2d 41 (1949) (jury
said involuntary act-shot himself); Karlen v. Department of Labor
& Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 301, 249 P.2d 364 (1952) (not a "deliberate
voluntary intent to take his own life").
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the suicide, without requiring proof of an uncontrollable impulse.
floor, a slippery floor or a negligent act on the part of the employee himself. 166
67
onto
Similarly, a fall from any height-as from a staging'
the level floor-has been held to "arise out of" the employment,
no matter what the cause of the fall later proved to be. Even if
the cause was a non-industrial fit of dizziness, heart attack or
any other idiopathic disease, 6 8 the courts reasoned that the injury for which compensation was claimed was one resulting both
from the fall from an elevated position and from contact with
the level floor. The claim was for the fractured skull, broken
bone, burns or whatever contact-injury occurred, and was not
for the idiopathic disease. The causal relation to the work was
found both in the increased risk of being on a height and in the
contact with the employer's floor.
Likewise, if the employee fell while standing on the level
floor but hit his head on a box' 69 or a raised object on the floor,
Caccamo's Case, 316 Mass. 358, 55 N.E.2d 614 (1944) (slipped on
water or oil, striking head on truck); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 41 Cal. 2d 676, 680, 263 P.2d 4, 7 (1953)
("The injury would be compensable whether the cause of the fall
was a slippery or defective floor, or was due to nothing more than
his innate awkwardness or even carelessness."); Morgan v. B. Colliery Co., 15 B.W.C.C. 52 (1922) (slipped on floor, with unusual
result: choked on nut he was eating).
167 Gonier v. Chase Co., 97 Conn. 46, 115 Atl. 677 (1921) (painter fell
from a staging due to idiopathic condition (fainting spell), but died
from a fractured skull-award upheld); Rockford Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 300 Ill. 87, 132 N.E. 759 (1921) (fell into pit, did
not die from the pre-existing idiopathic condition, but from the burns
he received after falling in the pit); Watson v. Grimm, 200 Md. 461,
90 A.2d 180 (1952) (idiopathic dizziness, fell from running board
of a truck, run over--compensable as "contributed" to by one factor
of the employment); Zaroian v. Aluminum Co. of America, 270 App.
Div. 966, 62 N.Y.S.2d 75 (3d Dep't 1946) (fatal fall from platform
about seven feet above ground).
168 Used in the sense of non-industrial, in no way related to the emWEBSTR's NEw
ployment-technically like a "primary disease."
166

COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

(1956).

See excellent discussion of this sub-

ject in National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 75
Cal. App. 2d 677, 171 P.2d 594 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (fell to floor, hit

sawhorse at end of bench-overwhelming weight of authority where
worker hits something on way down--"contributed to by some factor
peculiar to the employment").
169 Varao's Case, 316 Mass. 363, 55 N.E.2d 451 (1944)

(dizzy spell, fell

on iron motor box); Garcia v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 413

209 S.W.2d 333 (1948) (a leading case reviewing cases nation-widehere fall was against a post with sharp edges, considered a special
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the resulting injury "arose out of" his employment. Falling on
the employer's stairway 170 or into the employer's machinery, hot
stove or pit 17 1 has long been considered a risk of the employment
and hence compensable, even if the cause of the fall had nothing
to do with the work. Where the cause is not related to the work
-such as a heart attack, dizzy spell or epileptic seizure-it is
usually called an idiopathic or non-industrial cause.
If the cause of the fall is unknown-an unexplained fall on
the level floor or elsewhere at work-the overwhelming weight
of authority allows recovery.' 7 2 "Unexplained" falls usually lead
to a "presumption" of work-connection.
hazard); accord, citing Varao's Case, supra, Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn.
1, 236 S.W.2d 977 (1951) ("blacked out," auto ran into ditch-reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the worker-here work
was "contributory cause"-employers take employees "as is"-employment exposed him to this hazard), 7 NACCA L.J. 70 (1951).
170 Cusick's Case, 260 Mass. 421, 157 N.E. 596 (1927) (epilepsy on stairway, led to fractured skull).
171 Rockford Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 300 Ill. 87, 132 N.E. 759
(1921) (epilepsy, fell into pit and was burned to death); Stasel v.
American Radiator & Standard San. Corp., 278 S.W.2d 721 (Ky.
1955) (epilepsy, fell on hot stove causing burns on arms and handsemployment a "contributing cause"); Dow's Case, 231 Mass. 348, 121
N.E. 19 (1918) (non-industrial heart attack, fell into machine, neck
severed, compensable).
172 Upton v. Great Cent. Ry., [1924] A.C. 302 (fell on railway platform
which was not slippery or defective-cause of fall was completely
unknown). Lord Atkinson said:
"Here the accident was caused
by the performance of an act the deceased was employed to perform
-namely,

to traverse the platform ....

[H]aving

been

done in

the course of the employment of the deceased, and the accident
having been caused by the doing of it even incautiously, it must,
I think, be held that the accident arose out of the employment of
the deceased." Id. at 315; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hoage, 62
F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (unexplained fall while crossing the
street-employment placed him in the position where the accident
occurred); Burton-Shields Co. v. Steele, 119 Ind. App. 216, 83 N.E.2d
623 (1949) (fall on concrete floor, cause of fall unknown, found in
pool of blood-the "cause of the fall may be disregarded"); De Vine
v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N.C. 684, 44 S.E.2d 77 (1947) (found with fractured skull on cement platform where he had been lowering a
flag-cause of fall unknown. An inference was permissible that the
cause of the fall was industrial); Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills,
220 N.C. 246, 17 S.E.2d 20 (1941) (completely unexplained fall-as
no affirmative evidence that it arose from a cause independent of
the employment, and admittedly it was "in the course of" the employment, an award would be sustained). New York has repeatedly
upheld unexplained-fall awards. E.g., Martin v. Plaut, 293 N.Y. 617,
59 N.E.2d 429 (1944); Andrews v. L. & S. Amusement Corp., 253 N.Y.
97, 170 N.E. 506 (1930).
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However, a sizeable number of judges have distinguished the
"increased risk" and "unexplained" fall cases from those where
a standing employee, for a known or admitted non-industrial
reason, falls on a hard floor and fractures his skull. Even though
he asks compensation solely for the new injury and not for any

aggravation of the idiopathic disease, they deny recovery. 173 These
judges reason that they must stop the payment of compensation
somewhere, and the level floor seems to be that spot. And this
is so even though the particular factory is one of the very few
in the state which has an iron floor or a concrete floor-a de74
cidedly increased risk!'
Fortunately, the modern weight of reason and the current
weight of authority permits awards for injuries from falls
onto level floors, due to non-industrial disease or unexplained
causes.' 75 These courts do not distinguish between falls onto
173

Cinmino's Case, 251 Mass. 158, 146 N.E. 245 (1925)

(despite floor of

rough cement rather than of wood); accord, citing this Massachusetts
case: Riley v. Oxford Paper Co., 149 Me. 418, 103 A.2d 111 (1954);
Dustin v. Lewis, 99 N.H. 404, 112 A.2d 54 (1955). The majority in
New Jersey followed the early 1925 Massachusetts case and others
stemming therefrom: Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 16 N.J. 208, 108
A.2d 267 (1954) (epileptic fit, fell on concrete floor, cerebral concussion). See excellent dissent in court below, 30 N.J. Super. 353,
104 A.2d 720 (App. Div. 1954).
174 Even Professor Larson who prefers the theory of non-liability for
falls on ordinary level floors, is willing to concede an exception for
concrete floors: "This distinction between concrete floors and other
surfaces, while it approaches the vanishing point, is not altogether
without substance. A dish which, dropped on the kitchen linoleum,
might survive, would not have a chance on the concrete floor of a
factory." 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 12.14, at 165
(1952).
He agrees, also, that unexplained falls to level floors are
and should be compensable on the "but for" theory. "In appraising
the extent to which the courts are willing to accept this general
'but for' theory, then, it is significant to note that most courts confronted with the unexplained-fall problem have seen fit to award
compensation ....
[Tihere is surprisingly little contra authority."
Id. at § 10.31, at 97. Massachusetts used to be contra, but now changed
by statutory presumption, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 152, § 7A (1958).
175 Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 41 Cal.
2d 676, 263 P.2d 4 (1953)
(idiopathic seizure, fell on concrete
floor, head injury-compensable. Modern trend recognized); Savage
v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 189 Atl. 599 (1937) (no difference for floor falls-turns out that there was hazard from the fact
that the accident happened-painter found on floor; it would make
no difference if cause of fall was fainting spell or heart attack);
Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So. 2d 342
(1944) (fell on concrete floor due to idiopathic heart disease, fractured skull. Excellent discussion of purposes of compensation act,
and the desire to spread the cost to consumers-if deceased had
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the level floor and falls onto boxes two inches above the floor
or into machinery-all falls are compensable where the injury
1 76
results from contact with the floor or other objects.
It should be noted that it is decidedly unfair to the worker to
deny him an award when he admits the cause of his fall was nonindustrial but to give him an award when he does not know the
cause of his fall. In both instances his claim is solely for the
injury caused by the contact with the level floor.
(11)

Causal Relation and Need of Medical Testimony

One of the misunderstandings between doctors and courts
relates to causal relation 177 (hence "out of") between work or
fallen onto a piece of machinery, an award would hardly be questioned; the fact that he chanced to fall on the floor and lost his

life should not preclude an award); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v.
King, 88 Ga. App. 176, 76 S.E.2d 81 (1953) ("blacked out"-court
said no difference between falling on the floor or against machines
-even if exertion did not produce the stroke-found in puddle of
blood on floor in water-house, died of subarachnoid hemorrhage);
A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Barnhill, 249 Ky. 437, 61 S.W.2d 1
(1933) (dizzy, fell on premises near driveway, broke leg-compensable); Pollock v. Studebaker Corp., 97 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. App. 1951)
(contrary view "not favored by a majority of recent cases"-but
superceded in Pollock v. Studebaker Corp., 230 Ind. 622, 105 N.E.2d
513 (1952)-as a question of fact, as industrial board had found
against the worker-dissent said it was a question of law, and decision below was correct on law); Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v.

Dehn, 110 Ind. App. 483, 39 N.E.2d 499 (1942) (on public street on
duty-had he been sitting on a chair at home when the attack occurred he probably would not have been injured); Barlau v. Minne-

176
177

apolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 214 Minn. 564, 9 N.W.2d 6
(1943); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 300 S.W.2d 358 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957) ("blacked out" fell on hard pavement of gravel
and shell, fractured skull-fall on hard surface, was a hazard to
which he was exposed by the employment); General Ins. Corp. v.
Wickersham, 235 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Wilson v. Chatterton, [1946] 1 K.B. 360 (C.A.) (a leading case, overruling an
earlier contra case, Lander v. British United Shoe Mach. Co., 26
B.W.C.C. 411 (1933) as "bad law"); Wright & Greig, Ltd. v. M'Kendry, 11 B.W.C.C. 402 (1918) (in fit, fell on concrete floor of storenot risk common to humanity, but was specially connected with the
worker's employment, as he had to work on a hard floor).
See cases in notes 172 and 175 supra.
Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ariz. 190, 199, 349 P.2d 627, 633
(1960) ("The difference in the medical and legal concept of cause
results from the obvious differences in the basic problems and
exigencies of the two professions in relation to causation."); See

Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in

the Concept of Causation, 31

TEXAS

CuRRAN, LAW AND MEDICINE 27-118

L. REV. 630
(1960).

(1953); see also
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working conditions and diseases of obscure origin. The medical
profession takes the attitude that, if they as doctors do not know
the "cause" of a specific disease, the courts cannot uphold awards
made by workmen's compensation administrators.

The answer is two fold:

(1) The precipitation, aggravation

or acceleration 178 of a disease by an injury at work, or by the
work itself, is as compensable as original causation of the disease.
Medical etiology, or knowledge of what germ or virus was medi-

cally responsible, does not interest an appellate court.

(2) The

question before the appellate court is not whether, on the evidence below, the judges would have found causal relation, or
whether in fact the disease of obscure origin originated in the
work or work-injury. Courts do not decide the truth or falsity
of medical questions."' 9 They decide only whether, on the evidence before the administrator, it was "rationally possible" or a
"reasonable conclusion" for him to decide that there was such
80
On
causal connection, precipitation, aggravation or acceleration.
8
1
appeal, meager or slight evidence is sufficient.'
178

179

Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961
(1945) (hastened heart disease); Davis v. Bibb lVfg. Co., 75 Ga. App.
515, 43 S.E.2d 780 (1947) (aggravation, acceleration, lighting up, sufficient); Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379 (1916) (accelera-

tion of heart disease); see also cases in note 43 supra.
Murphy's Case, 328 Mass. 301, 103 N.E.2d 267 (1952) (it is not
for the court to determine whether the opinion of the doctor is
medically sound-its probative value is for the fact-finding tribunal
to decide--doctor testified industrial corornary thrombosis hastened
a non-industrial cancer-occurred before it otherwise would have);
accord, Russell v. Liberman, 71 R.L 448, 46 A.2d 858 (1946) (courts
on appeal will not consult various medical works to see if hearing
tribunal reached right medical result); Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn.
272, 246 S.W.2d 10 (1951) (cancer in neck-not expected to resolve
conflicts which the medical profession itself has been unable to
resolve).

180 Chisholm's Case, 238 Mass. 412, 131 N.E. 161 (1921)

(enough if de-

cision is rationally possible under the law); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Donovan, 125 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1954) (reasonable conclusion
that tuberculosis was contracted in area with a comparatively high
incidence rate-and tort (common law) principles for causal relationship different from workmen's compensation); Dean Pound
agrees: 15 NACCA L.J. 73 (1955).
181 Chmielowski's Case, 301 Mass. 379, 17 N.E.2d 165 (1938)

("Meagre"

evidence was enough-stands on most favorable medical testimony);
Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris, 218 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1955)
(evidence "barely sufficient," "close," yet sustained-relation of blow
to delayed paralysis; court recognized that able doctors on both
sides often biased "in favor of their employers").
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On this reasoning the modern courts properly have upheld
83
multiple sclerosis, 8 4
awards involving cancer, 8 2 heart disease,'
meningitis, 8 5 encephalitis, 86 leukemia,1 8 7 traumatic epilepsy'8 8
and arthritis. 8 9
On the same reasoning, courts have upheld the denial of
awards based on medical evidence that seemed to contradict common sense. In a case where the medical experts testified that
even breaking the ribs did not hasten the rupture of duodenal
ulcers, the court remarked that though as laymen they thought
otherwise, the blame for error if there was error, was on the
medical profession and not on the judiciary. 90
The early courts required medical evidence to support awards
which involved medical questions. Today the overwhelming ma182

Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10 (1951) (cancer, lifting
box, sharp pain in base of neck, hospitalized, cancer later found in

neck); see review in 10 NACCA L.J. 60 (1952) and list of recent
cancer cases. For cancer cases, see Locke, Problems Arising in the
Trial of a Cancer Case, in NEw ENGLAND NACCA BAR AssoCIATION,
1959, at 138 (1960).
Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379 (1916); Harding Glass Co.
v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961 (1945) (heat prostration
WINTER SEMINAR, DECEMBER
183

hastened heart disease and contributed to death eight months later);
see Petkun, Problems Arising in a Heart Disease Case, in NEW
LAND
184

185
186

187
188
189

NACCA

BAR ASSOCIATION, WINTER SEMINAR, DECEMBER

ENG-

1959, at

159 (1960).
Mechanics Universal Joint Div. v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 Ill. 2d 535,
173 N.E.2d 479 (1961) (multiple sclerosis, compensable, though there
is limited medical knowledge of this disease); Stella v. Mancuso, 7

App. Div. 2d 673, 179 N.Y.S.2d 169 (3d Dep't 1958) (multiple sclerosis precipitated by trauma).
Gilham v. Department of Labor & Indus., 14 Wash. 2d 359, 128 P.2d
645 (1942) (meningitis related to a fall).
Hazlik v. Interstate Power Co., 67 S.D. 128, 289 N.W. 589 (1940)
(encephalitis after unusual exertion, exposure and exhaustion helping to restore company's service).
In re Crowley, 130 Me. 1, 153 Atl. 184 (1931) (carbon monoxide
poisoning leading to leukemia).
White v. Louisiana W. Ry., 18 La. App. 544, 135 So. 255 (1931)
(epilepsy).
Sporcic v. Swift & Co., 149 Neb. 246, 30 N.W.2d 291 (1948) (traumatic
arthritis); Enkel v. Northwest Airlines, 221 Minn. 532, 22 N.W.2d
635 (1946) (long list of cases of aggravation or acceleration of arthritic conditions given).

190 Landry v. Phoenix Util. Co., 14 La. App. 334, 124 So. 623

(1929)

(blame for error on medical profession); Lynch v. La Rue, 198
Tenn. 101, 278 S.W.2d 85 (1955) (where trial judge dismissed, on inferences unfavorable to worker, reviewing court will not disturb
dismissal).
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jority of courts uphold awards where there is not a single shred
of medical evidence, or where the favorable medical evidence is
weak but where the sequence of events is convincing. 191 So, too,
courts affirm awards where common sense, experience or knowledge point to a relationship which justifies the administrator's
award-for example, death as the termination of serious injuries,
or aggravation of a hernia from lifting and straining. 1 92 Thus,
19' Heinzl v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 157 Pa. Super. 454, 43 A.2d
635 (1945) (even in the entire absence of medical opinion); Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Cyr, 200 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1952)
(Where three insurance doctors reported no relationship, but five
fellow employees testified to heavy work, with a collapse while
tugging on a rope and brought to hospital in extremis, award below
upheld-mere absence of favorable medical evidence not a bar);
Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957)
(death from coronary occlusion-had worked four hours unloading
beams-not obliged to establish causal relation between the accident
and resulting death by expert medical testimony-concurring opinion
emphasized "sequence of events"); Industrial Comm'n v. Corwin
Hosp., 126 Colo. 358, 250 P.2d 135 (1952) (Polio-higher incidence
among nurses as evidence, affirmed-compensation act highly remedial, liberal construction); General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d
686 (Del. 1960) (detached retina, smoke and foreign substance in
eyes, rubbing-medical testimony "one of possible causes," plus sequence of events, award affirmed); Stralovich v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
68 Idaho 524, 201 P.2d 106 (1948) (military tuberculosis and silicosis,
though the only doctor who testified said no relationship); LuzerneGraham Mining Corp. v. Tanner, 314 Ky. 875, 238 S.W.2d 842 (1951)
(multiple fractures, bled from mouth, hospitalized twenty-one daysfour months later suddenly hemorrhaged from the mouth and diedaward upheld despite a complete absence of medical evidence as to
the cause of the hemorrhaging-despite testimony of defendant's doctor that without a post-mortem he could not know the cause of the
bleeding); Walters v. Smith, 222 Md. 62, 158 A.2d 619 (1960) (industrial automobile accident, lost ability to talk, add or subtract-sequence
of events, plus proof of possible causal relation, might amount to
proof of probable relation in the absence of evidence of any other
equally probable cause); Clark v. Village of Hemingford, 147 Neb.
1044, 26 N.W.2d 15 (1947) (expert testimony not required in all cases);
Bohan v. Lord & Keenan, Inc., 98 N.H. 144, 95 A.2d 786 (1953) (Even
if the doctor's theory is novel, unpopular and iconoclastic-the weight
is for the trier of facts); Woodson v. Kendall Mills, 213 S.C. 395, 49
S.E.2d 597 (1948) (insurance doctor surmised it was due to an obscure
infection); Cline v. Department of Labor & Indus., 50 Wash. 2d 614,
313 P.2d 687 (1957) (A general practitioner and a lung expert may
be believed in preference to two insurance company specialists).
192 Miami Coal Co. v. Luce, 76 Ind. App. 245, 249, 131 N.E. 824, 826 (1921)
(Coal mine explosion, landed in hospital, skull, both ankles and legs
fractured, deep shock, vomiting, delirious, died in hospital-despite
coroner's report he died from intestinal obstruction and from causes
independent of the injuries received!-"-'Indeed, if it were not for the
saving grace of what we call common sense, justice would be defeated
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where there was a blow to a female employee's breast and the
breast was subsequently removed and neither side offered medical
evidence, the administrator concluded that there was causal relation. The "sequence of events" was convincing and the appellate court upheld the award. The court stated that although
medical evidence would have been helpful the conclusion of
causal relation was justified. 193
Even where medical evidence is offered by either side it may
be disbelieved, in whole or in part. And the majority of courts
no longer pay homage to the magic words "probable" as opposed
to "possible."'194 If reading the record as a whole leads the appellate court to feel that the conclusions reached below are rationally possible on the evidence or on the inferences from the evidence, the award will be affirmed. 195

in almost every case where opinion evidence is admitted."); Gianfriddo's Case, 319 Mass. 566, 66 N.E.2d 710 (1946) (backstrain-inference sustainable, apart from disputed medical testimony); Harrington's Case, 185 Mass. 69, 188 N.E. 499 (1933) (hernia-no medical testi-

mony needed); Schinderle v. Ford Motor Co., 316 Mich. 387, 25 N.W.2d
586 (1947) (It is common knowledge that a sudden jar or jerk may
cause great pains to an arthritic person); See also cases in note 191
supra.
193 Valente v. Bourne Mill, 77 R.I. 274, 75 A.2d 191 (1950) (see review in
6 NACCA L.J. 41-the only fair inference that rationally and natur-

ally arises from the uncontradicted testimony is that of causal connection-employee made prima facie case-medical evidence, though

highly desirable, is not always essential-sequence of events here
establishes the causal connection); Note, 18 NEB. L. BULL. 350 (1939).
194 Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 110 (1959)-jury decided tuberculosis was aggravated by fall and washing by wavescourts are not free to reweigh evidence, medical or non-medical"The matter does not turn on the use of a particular form of words
by the physicians in giving their testimony," ("could," "might possibly," "probably"). "The talismanic phrase is no longer king in
the area of medical causation." 25 NACCA L.J. 284 (1960). Hines
v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 358 P.2d 447 (Mont. 1960) (Polio-"possible"
plus lay testimony as to garbage, sewers, and so forth-award proper); Gaffney v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 129 Mont. 394, 287 P.2d 256
(1955) (Parkinson's disease, doctor repeatedly used "possibly," hesitant to express positive opinion-the short-comings of medical science should not be visited on victims of industrial accidents).
195 Duggan's Case, 315 Mass. 355, 53 N.E.2d 90 (1944) (reading testimony
as a whole, amounted to a probability, though "may" used in part);
Hiber v. City of St. Paul, 219 Minn. 87, 16 N.W.2d 878 (1944) (it is
intrinsic quality of the conclusion that matters not the label or
characterization-take "testimony as a whole"). See also cases in
notes 191-94 supra.
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Appeals and Liberal Trends

The unending stream of appeals-principally by insurers since
most employees cannot afford to appeal-on the ground that injuries do not "arise out of" the employment will never abate so
long as some courts will inject antiquated common-law rules into
a law which intended once and for all to eliminate and to reject
the narrow rules of the common law as they relate to work injuries.
A few states 19 6 omitted the use of the words "out of"; but
that did not solve the problem as their courts properly read into
the statute an equivalent requirement of some degree of "causal
relation" between the injury and the employment. Otherwise a
sick worker, dying from cancer or from injuries received when he
wak hit by an auto while away from work, could drag himself to
work and if he died in the factory, his death would occur "in
the course of" the work, although not "out of" it. To say that
"in the course of" the employment is sufficient would be to make
the employer an insurer; it would be health and accident insurance in the guise of workmen's compensation.
But where any reasonable relation to the employment exists,
or where the work or work environment is a contributing cause,
the court is justified in upholding the award as arising "out of"
the employment. 197 The acts severely limit the amounts that
employees or dependents can receive, with the intention that
recoveries be spread over a larger number of workers. The rule of
liberal and broad construction is therefore especially justified to
effectuate the humane purposes for which these acts were enacted. Hence board or administrative commission awards based
on a liberal construction of the words "out of" are upheld when98
ever rationally possible.1
196

North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington.
consin and Utah; see HoRovrrz, INJuRY AND DE ATH
MEN'S COMPENSATioN LAWS 154

Cf. also WisUwDR

Woax-

(1944), for discussion and cases in

these states. See also note 200 infra.
Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961 (1945)
(connection substantially contributory though it need not be the
sole or proximate cause); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263
U.S. 418 (1923) (contributory); Wells v. Morris, 33 Ala. App. 497,
35 So. 2d 54 (1948), 3 NACCA L.J. 102 (1949) (enough if employment a "contributing cause"); Gaffney v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 129
Mont. 394, 287 P.2d 256 (1955) (Parkinson's disease, fall rupturing
muscle and striking head as contributing cause-doubts to be resolved in employee's favor).
198 Shute's Case, 290 Mass. 393, 195 N.E. 354 (1935) (rationally possible);
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 634, 111
197
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In short, the current trend is to get away from the earlier
narrow and strict decisions and to follow the more recent liberal
views. 199
D.

IN THE COURSE OF

of both "out of" as well as "in the
Most states require proof
20 0
course of" the employment.
(1)

Definitions

No definition has yet been invented to solve all the cases
involving the words "in the course of." The early courts believed
that an injury "befalls a man 'in the course of' his employment,
P.2d 313 (1941)

(unless inferences wholly unreasonable); Industrial

Comm'n v. Corwin Hosp., 126 Colo. 358, 250 P.2d 135 (1952)

(nurse

stricken with polio, higher incidence among nurses-compensation
acts highly remedial, liberal construction); American Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Gunter, 74 Ga. App. 500, 40 S.E.2d 394 (1946) (compensation acts severely limit the recoveries, so spread recoveries to unfortunate employees to alleviate human suffering); Minnis' Case,
286 Mass. 459, 190 N.E. 843 (1934) (Evidence extremely slender, but
199

not utterly insufficient to support the finding of the board).
Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 201 S.W.2d 573, 576
(1947) ("[Wle quote these statements to show the present tendency
toward a liberal application of the term 'arising out of and in the
course of the employment.'"); accord, Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Parker, 64 F. Supp.
615 (D. Md. 1946); Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n,
62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d 511 (1945); Simmons Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 210
Ark. 311, 195 S.W.2d 539 (1946); Smith v. University of Idaho, 67
Idaho 22, 170 P.2d 404 (1946) (in borderline cases, resolve in favor
of compensation); Kubera's Case, 320 Mass. 419, 69 N.E.2d 673 (1946)
(follows the recent trend); Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348
Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957); Lipe v. Bradbury, 49 N.M. 4, 154
P.2d 1000 (1945) (sui generis). See also the assault and aggressor
cases supra note 101, especially Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House, 46
N.J. Super. 425, 134 A.2d 789 (App. Div. 1957). See also cases in
note 240 infra.
200 Dravo Corp. v. Strosnider, 43 Del. 256, 45 A.2d 542 (1945) (both
"out of" and "in the course of" must be shown to exist); Stark v.
State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 103 Ore. 80, 204 Pac. 151 (1922)
(both "out of" and "in the course of" must be proved-if either are
missing-no recovery). A few states have dropped or never used
the words "out of." "In the course of" alone is supposedly sufficient. (North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Washingtonbut each has read in the need of some nexus, or link with the employment).
See Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of
Workmen's Compensation, 20 RocKy MT. L. REV. 117, 149 n.501 (1948).
Victoria, Australia, now reads "out of" or "in the course of," with
resulting wide liberalization of its law (12 U. TORONTO L.J. 126
(1957) ). See also note 196 supra.
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if it occurs while he is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed,20 1and at
a place where he may reasonably be during that time.)
"In the course of" is sometimes referred to as "during" the
employment. Certainly if an employee worked from nine to
twelve and from one to five, these hours were "in the course of
the employment." But what about the dinner hour? What about
the man rushing to or from work and falling on the sidewalk
just outside the factory's front door?
(2)

Going and Coming Rule

The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in
the course of" and not whether they are "out of" the employment.
Street risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and
all similar questions deal with the risk of injury "out of" the
employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the element
of time and space, or "time, place and circumstances. ' 20 2 Thus,
if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before or after working
hours and within fifteen feet of the employer's premises while
on the sidewalk or public road, the question whether it was "in
the course of" the employment is raised clearly and indisputably.
The early courts, looking for a simple rule, invented the socalled "coming and going rule"--injuries received when enroute
to or from work are not compensable. 20 3 Originally, at least one
of the worker's feet had to be planted on the employer's premises
before "in the course of" took effect!
But like all narrow rules read into workmen's compensation
acts, many exceptions to the rule properly began to develop. Injuries are currently held to be compensable under the many ex(1) the employee is enroute to or from work in a
ceptions if:
201

202

203

Moore v. Manchester, [1910] A.C. 489 (fell from ladder on quay,
returning from shore leave).
Giracelli v. Franklin Cleaners & Dryers, Inc., 132 N.J.L. 590, 42 A.2d
3, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (raped by customer, "The time when, the place
where the happening occurred, and the attending circumstances ...
demonstrate that the petitioner was acting in the course of her employment."). See also In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (1947).
Judson 1fg. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 181 Cal. 300, 184 Pac. 1
(1919) (the rule that there is no right to compensation when the
injured employee is merely going to and from work, was a "sweeping dictum," not applicable when compelled to cross railroad tracks
intimately associated with company's plant; but the rule is still followed in 1954-Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros., 225 S.C. 429, 82 S.E.2d 794
(1954), 14 NACCA L.J. 36 (1954)) (slipped on ice en route to storenot within any exception).
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vehicle owned, supplied, used or
whether in a company2 0 4 or private
sanctioned by the employer; 20 6 (2)
call at all hours or at the moment of
20
(4)
is traveling for the employer;

arranged by the employer
conveyance 20 5 or "car pool"
the employee is subject to
injury; 20 7 (3) the employee
20 9
the employer pays in part

204

Owens v. Southeast Ark. Transp. Co., 216 Ark. 950, 228 S.W.2d 646
(1950) (free transportation on own buses, injured trying to catch
bus); Radermacher v. St. Paul City Ry., 214 Minn. 427, 8 N.W.2d
466 (1943) (pass on street railway is transportation, and includes
waiting as passenger at stop when hit by runaway automobile);
Micieli v. Erie R.R., 131 N.J.L. 427, 37 A.2d 123 (Ct. Err. & App.
1944) (transportation on pass, despite provisions thereon).

205

Donovan's Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 N.E. 431 (1914); Hunter v. Summerville, 205 Ark. 463, 169 S.W.2d 579 (1943) (subcontractor's trucks);
Povia Bros. Farms v. Velez, 74 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1954) (run over while
crossing to board employer's truck); Bailey v. Santee River Hardwood Co., 205 S.C. 433, 32 S.E.2d 365 (1944).
Carpools covered: Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469
(1947) (employer allowed fifteen minutes pay, as part of wages, to
take care of travel time-so carpool transportation partly paid for
by employer); Puett v. Bahnson, 231 N.C. 711, 58 S.E.2d 633 (1950)
(carpool, employer paid fixed amount for living expenses, plus
traveling expenses); Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. Gabbard, 333 P.2d
964 (Okla. 1959) (five member carpool-also hauling water container
for employer); Livingston v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 200 Ore.
468, 266 P.2d 684 (1954), reviewed in 13 NACCA L.J. 27 (1954)two workers in private car, ran off road, one drowned-exception
for paid travel time, compensable-a leading case; Texas Employer's
Ins. Ass'n v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948) (seven cents
per mile paid by employer on a carpool basis-carpool, employer
paid fixed amount for living expenses, plus traveling expenses).
Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944) (traveling boat
repair man subject to call, burned to death while sleeping in a public
boarding house); Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 37 Cal. App. 2d 567, 99 P.2d 1089 (1st Dist. 1940) (cook,
subject to call, fell from stool while fixing hem of dress; different
from employees "who work set hours"); Bowen v. Keen, 154 Fla.
161, 17 So. 2d 706 (1944) (subject to call).

200

207

208

Railway Express Agency v. Shuttleworth, 61 Ga. App. 644, 7 S.E.2d
195 (1940) (traveling salesman incurs risk, by reason of his employment, necessary and incident to the requirements of such employment) (protected in hotel fire); Olson Drilling Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 386 Ill. 402, 54 N.E.2d 452 (1944) (enroute by automobile to office with report); Locke v. Steele County, 223 Minn. 464,
27 N.W.2d 285 (1947) (includes short daily walk to get the mail).

209

Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Livingston v.
State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 200 Ore. 468, 266 P.2d 684 (1954)
(employer paid for fifteen minutes of the travel time).
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or in whole2 1 0 for the employee's time involved in going to and
(5) the employee is on a special mission for the
from home;
employer; 211 (6) the employee is on the way home to do further
work at home, even though he is on a fixed salary; 212 or (7) the
employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. 213 At least a dozen more exceptions have
been recognized by the courts. In fact the exceptions are so
numerous that they have swallowed the rule.2 14 Modern courts
rule and properly judging each case
are ignoring this court-made 215
on its own facts and merits.
Western Pipe & Steel Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 49 Cal. App.
2d 108, 121 P.2d 35 (1st Dist. 1942) (exception where the employee's
compensation covers the time involved in going to and from his
work) (getting cigarettes during a paid lunch hour).
(killed on
211 Thurston Chem. Co. v. Casteel, 285 P.2d 403 (Okla. 1955)
railway crossing en route to the plant on a special mission-deceased's compensation commenced when he left his home en route
to the plant); Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162 (1933)
(special duty of clearing debris on Sunday); Keely v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 157 Pa. Super. 63, 41 A.2d 420 (1945) (within exception,
special duty); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 142 Tex. 370, 178
S.W.2d 514 (1944) (trip to get materials).
212 Proctor v. Hoage, 81 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1935) (struck by auto on
way home to finish work there as ordered by employer); Cahill's
Case, 295 Mass. 538, 4 N.E.2d 332 (1936) (insurance adjuster injured in own yard coming home to do more work).
213 Davis v. Bjorenson, 229 Iowa 7, 293 N.W. 829 (1940) (auto became
an instrumentality of the business so collision on the way compensable).
210

214 1

LARSON, WoRmEN's

COMPENSATION

LAW

§

15.11

(1952)

(adds

many more exceptions, supported by decisions nationwide). "Manifestly the numerous exceptions have now swallowed the rule .... .
14 NACCA L.J. 36, 41 (1954). In discussing Pribyl v. Standard Elee.

Co., 246 Iowa 333, 67 N.W.2d 438 (1954)

(union contract provided

mileage where employee used his own car, held exception to going
and coming rule), Pound states: "If one had to classify this case

under one of the accepted exceptions to the 'going and coming rule'
it would not be difficult to do so ....

It is time the 'going and

coming rule' and the endless distinctions for getting around it,
which have grown out of it and darken counsel in plain cases, was
given up." 15 NACCA L.J. 86-87 (1955). See also 16 NACCA L.J.
112 (1955); and notes 234 and 235 infra (exceptions where assaulted
on the way home, as result of argument started on premises).
215 Brousseau v. Blackstone Mills, 100 N.H. 493, 130 A.2d 543 (1957)

(going and coming rule not necessary or particularly useful) (citing with approval the present author's attack on the rule in 14
NACCA L.J. 36 (1954), where he urges its abolition, and each case
be decided on its own merits, i.e., whether it arose out of and in
the course of the employment); accord, Ince v. Chester Westfall
Drilling Co., 346 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1959) (need not put case on special
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The rule has been a source of injustice to injured workers
for many years. It has put upon them the burden of proving an
exception to this narrow court-made rule. It should be abandoned
in favor of deciding liberally in each case whether the journey
and injury in question arose "in the course of" the employment.
The rule has been abandoned in many foreign countries, and
workers are protected while going to and from work as if they
were on paid time.2 16 Today, because of speeding automobiles,
the journey to and from work may be the most dangerous part
of the employment. The protection of workmen's compensation
should be afforded during such journeys.
(3)

Twenty-four Hour Daily Protection

Employee subject to call twenty-four hours a day are considered "in the course of" employment at all times. 217 To make
an award only when the employee is working gives him no
greater protection than the worker with set hours whose remainder of the day is his own.
Some states have recognized a kindred principle-continuity
of employment. Thus, for example, an employee living on the
premises may not actually be subject to call, but if he is burned
by fire at night,218 if he slipped while going to the bathroom on
mission exception-was "in the course of," and was beneficial to
employer); 1

LARSON,

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW

§ 15.11 (1952)

("an artificial" rule). Dean Pound states: "There is a great opportunity for some courageous judge to reconsider the going and
coming rule in view of the modes of thought of today." 14 NACCA
L.J. 400 (1954).

"The going and coming rule is a blot upon the

liberal and beneficent bent of workmen's compensation legislation."
216

Assistant Editor-in-Chief Page, 25 NACCA L.J. 211 (1960).
E.g., Israel, France, Germany, Victoria (New South Wales).

In
Israel, Justice Zvi Berinson stated: "[Alpart from certain exceptional cases, the time of the journey to and from home to the place
of work is regarded as working time." BERINSON, Social and Labor
Legislation, LAWYER'S

CONVENTION IN ISRAEL

83 (1958).

For a simi-

lar approach in other countries, see Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends
In Compensation for Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF.
L. REV. 532, 549 (1954) (France and Germany); 12 U. TORONTO L.J.
124 (1957) (Victoria) (course of employment covers "where the
worker is travelling between his place of residence and his place
of employment").
217

Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944); Doyle's Case, 256
Mass. 290, 152 N.E. 340 (1926) (injury about midnight, going to

toilet); Jefferson County Stone Co. v. Bettler, 304 Ky. 87, 199 S.W.2d
986 (1947)
218

(subject to call).

Giliotti v. Hoffman Catering Co., 246 N.Y. 279, 158 N.E. 621 (1927).
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arising in the morning 219 or if he is a traveling salesman away
from home or headquarters, 220 even though not subject to call,
he is usually given an award on the theory of "continuity" of
employment. Living on the premises usually throws a protecting mantle over the worker whenever he is properly on the
premises.
On this principle traveling workers are protected when injured by fire while asleep during the night in hotels, whether
221
the hotel is selected by themselves or by the employers.
(4)

Noon-hour Injuries

Most courts have been liberal in protecting the workers during the noon hour. Thus an employee eating his lunch on the
employer's premises, whether at lunch hour or any other reasonable time, is almost universally considered as "in the course of"
his employment. 222 But mere proof of "in the course of" is not
enough. The injury must also arise "out of" the employment.
What the worker was doing at the moment of his noon-hour injury is still an essential matter to be determined before an award
can be made. There must be a nexus or causal connection ("out
of") as well as a time and place relationship ("in the course of")
with the employment.

219
220

Underhill v. Keener, 258 N.Y. 543, 180 N.E. 325 (1931) (going to
bathroom).
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Skinner, 58 Ga. App. 859, 200 S.E.
493 (1938) (traveling salesman is in continuous employment-killed
in automobile, compensable). See also note 237 infra.

221 HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S CoVPENsATIoN LAWS

114 (1944) (cases of traveling salesmen killed in lodging fires); Souza's
Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944) (and cases cited); Standard
Oil Co. v. Witt, 283 Ky. 327, 141 S.W.2d 271 (1940) (construction foreman died in hotel fire).
222

DeStephano v. Alpha Lunch Co., 308 Mass. 38, 30 N.E.2d 827 (1941);
Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d
511 (1945); Nicholson v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Ariz. 105, 259 P.2d
547 (1953) (lunching on the premises is within the course of the
employment when customary and convenient for the employee;
though dismissed about an hour earlier, he came from a distance,
brought lunch and was killed when platform collapsed-not loitering, denial of award reversed); American Motors Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 1 Wis. 2d 261, 83 N.W.2d 714 (1957); Rowland v. Wright,
[1909] 1 K.B. 963 (teamster eating lunch in a stable was bitten by
a stable cat); Leary v. S.S. "Deptford," 28 B.W.C.C. 235 (1935)
(typhoid from food aboard ship); see Note, 31 NEB. L. REv. 500
(1952).
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Noon-hour injuries have been held compensable where the
employee was on his way out, or was taking a short nap awaiting
the resumption of his machine work. 223 Also, recovery was allowed when a manager was shot while eating lunch by a dis224
gruntled, recently fired employee.
(5)

Post-employment Injuries

Occasionally a case arises where a former employee, after
being fired, laid off or having quit, returns to the place of former
employment to receive his pay, retrieve his tools or for some
other reasonable cause or legitimate purpose and he is then injured. The weight of authority holds that he is protected during
the period that he is properly back on, or delays leaving, the
employer's premises. The theory sustaining compensation is that
the protection afforded by the phrase "in the course of" is re225
vived for this period of time.
223

224

White v. E. T. Slattery Co., 236 Mass. 28, 127 N.E. 597 (1920) (during noon hour on way out to buy personal theater tickets, injured in
elevator-compensable); Holmes' Case, 267 Mass. 307, 166 N.E. 827
(1929); American Motors Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 1 Wis. 2d 261,
83 N.W.2d 714 (1957) (customary to stretch out on top of boxes

after eating-started back to punch time clock and negligenly fell off
six foot high box-compensable, even if he may have added some
increased hazard).
Cranney's Case, 232 Mass. 149, 122 N.E. 266 (1919) (that murder re-

sulted rather than a broken bone, is immaterial).
225

Parrott v. Industrial Comm'n, 30 Ohio Op. 284, 60 N.E.2d 660 (Sup.

Ct. 1945) (came back for pay six days later-cases cited). "By the
great weight of authority, a workman, who, being unable to procure
his pay when he severed his employment, is injured when he returns
to the premises of his employer for that purpose, is acting in the
course of his employment under the workmen's compensation laws."
Id. at 286, 60 N.E.2d at 663; Riley v. William Holland & Sons, [1911]
1 K.B. 1029 (an implied term of the contract-came back for wages
two days later); Nicholson v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Ariz. 105, 259
P.2d 547 (1953), 13 NACCA L.J. 63 (1954) (workmen were dismissed
fifty minutes before noon for rest of day-while at lunch with fellowemployees twenty minutes after noon, eating with knowledge and
consent of employer; eating platform collapsed and employee killed).
Industrial Commission denied compensation on ground that relation

of employer and employee had ended. The commission was reversed
on the ground that employee has reasonable period after dismissal to

wind up his affairs.

Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D. 376, 17 N.W.2d 913 (1945);
Smith v. G. E. Crane & Sons Pty., [1952] W.C. REP. 96 (New South

Wales) (after mix-up worker got his pay at night from foreman, and
while returning home by direct route was fatally injured-was in
course of his employment).

See also 13 NACCA L.J. 13 (1954).
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Industrial Premises Rule

The early cases protected an employee from the moment he
was on and until he left the employer's premises. 226 But some
early judges refused to allow compensation if the worker was
injured within a few feet of the premises while he was on the
public sidewalk. 227 Also, relief was denied if the employee was
injured on adjacent private property even if crossing this property was the only means of access to his employer's factory several
feet away. 228 Yet nothing in the workmen's compensation acts
compelled this conclusion. None of the acts spell out when "in
the course of" begins or ends. It was judicial fiat based on the
judge's personal concept of the meaning of the words "in the
course of."
However, since these early decisions a series of cases in the
United States Supreme Court 229 advised the state courts that they
could legally (without violating the United States Constitution)
extend their compensation acts to include:
(1) a reasonable
period of time before the work-hour began, and (2) a reasonable
distance away from the work-place.
The result of the Supreme Court cases has been a nation-wide
broadening of the meaning of "in the course of" the employment
as it relates to work "premises." These words have been construed to include injuries received before or after work while:
(1) on adjacent private or public property where there was a

226

227

228

229

Latter's Case, 238 Mass. 326, 130 N.E. 637 (1921) (near elevator); Milliman's Case, 295 Mass. 451, 4 N.E.2d 331 (1936) (stray auto hit employee
waiting after work on premises).
Simpson v. Lee & Cady, 294 Mich. 460, 293 N.W. 718 (1940) (no compensation where seventy-seven year old employee on way to work
slipped on the ice as he was reaching for the door and never actually
got his body within the premises); Amento v. Bond Stores, 274 App.
Div. 863, 82 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't 1948) (within three or four steps
from the employer's door-no compensation).
Bell's Case, 238 Mass. 46, 130 N.E. 67 (1921) (crossing private railroad
tracks). In view of the recent, more liberal trend in Massachusetts,
this case is of doubtful authority. Contra, Procaccino v. E. Horton
& Sons, 95 Conn. 408, 111 Atl. 594 (1920) (earlier case) (crossing
private property when killed by train).
Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928) (adjacent private
railroad tracks-not trespasser as to employer because irregular
crossing sanctioned by superior); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore,
263 U.S. 418 (1923) (regular railroad crossing, about one hundred
feet from the plant).
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hazard such as a railroad track; 230 (2) in a parking lot;231 (3)
23 2
on a public highway between two of the employer's buildings;
(4) on adjacent public sidewalks within a short distance of the
employer's premises 233 (this result was often bolstered by the
230

231

232

233

Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 18 Cal. 2d 40,
112 P.2d 615 (1941) (adjacent railroad tracks, employer control not
needed); Jaynes v. Potlatch Forests, 75 Idaho 297, 271 P.2d 1016
(1945) (killed on railroad crossing, no difference between extended
risks on public highways and private pathways); Basinski v. Detroit
Steel Corp., 2 N.J. Super. 39, 64 A.2d 459 (App. Div. 1949) (tripped
on railroad switch before reaching the exit-employer's property
criss-crossed with many railroad tracks).
Davis v. Devil Dog Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 543, 107 S.E.2d 102 (1959)
(parking lot cases discussed); Roger's Case, 318 Mass. 308, 61 N.E.2d
341 (1945); Pickett v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Ohio App. 372, 129
N.E.2d 639 (1945) (injury during fight over parking space); Pacific
Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 329, 170 P.2d 18
(1946) (driving car halfway into a parking lot); Hughes v. American Brass Co., 141 Conn. 231, 104 A.2d 896 (1945) (slipped on snow
and ice, compensable); Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434,
312 P.2d 220 (1957) (ice on smooth black-top parking lot); E. I.
duPont de Nemours &. Co. v. Redding, 194 Okla. 52, 147 P.2d 166
(1944); Kowcun v. Bybee, 182 Ore. 271, 186 P.2d 790 (1947); Foster
v. Edwin Penfold & Co., 27 B.W.C.C. 240 (1934) (parked on stranger's wharf with employer's permission and fell into river). Contra,
Bennett v. Vanderbilt Univ., 198 Tenn. 1, 277 S.W.2d 386 (1955). The
Bennett case is criticized by Dean Pound in 16 NACCA L.J. 115
(1955). Gonter v. L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 327 Mich. 586,
42 N.W.2d 749 (1950).
But see Freiborg v. Chrysler Corp., 350
Mich. 104, 85 N.W.2d 145 (1957) (based on new amendment; distant
parking lot considered part of "premises"). See also cases note 232
infra and cases cited in Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 7 NACCA L.J. 15, 38 n.113 (1951).
Kuharski v. Bristol Brass Corp., 132 Conn. 563, 46 A.2d 11 (1946)
(building on both sides; not using the street as one of the general
public but as incident of the employment); McCrae v. Eastern Aircraft, 137 N.J.L. 244, 59 A.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (on public highway,
crossing from plant to parking lot, thrown down by rushing fellowemployees-employer had placed traffic officer in the highway);
Swanson v. General Paint Co., 361 P.2d 842 (Okla. 1961) (crossing
highway from parking lot to employer's building, hit by auto).
Bales v. Service Club No. 1, 208 Ark. 692, 187 S.W.2d 321, (1945)
(sidewalk so close to be considered part of premises-thirty-one feet
from entrance to club); Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala.
462, 143 So. 813 (1932) (includes sidewalk just outside only entrance-sidewalk was to a limited degree a part of employer's premises); Freire v. Matson Nay. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 118 P.2d 809 (1941)
(claimant, while still on public thoroughfare, was injured due to

traffic congestion related to the employer's business-compensable

as "in the course of" employment even though before work began;
entitled to reasonable interval of time for entry on premises); Flanagan v. Ward Leonard Elec. Co., 274 App. Div. 1081, 85 N.Y.S.2d 649
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fact that the employer had some duty in connection with these
sidewalks such as shoveling snow or hanging a sign over the
sidewalk) ;234 (5) at home if the employee is performing a duty
for the employer (a janitor-plumber repairing a blow torch at
home, a bookkeeper removing a gun from a couch to do her work
and an insurance company investigator preparing to type a report
at home were held to be "in the course of" their employment) ,235
and, (6) in an assault on a public street after quitting time if
it is an extension of a work quarrel which began within the
23 6
work-place.

234

(3d Dep't 1949) (front door locked, making way to back door,
slipped and fell on public sidewalk); Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 249
Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957) (teacher, while still on public walk
adjacent to school playground, struck by ball batted by pupil);
Nevada Industrial Comm'n v. Leonard, 58 Nev. 16, 68 P.2d 576 (1937)
(school teacher within fifteen feet of school land).
Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Riddle, 301 Ky. 100, 190

S.W.2d 1009 (1945)

235

236

(employer's premises are extended to include

obstacle lights on side of public road). See cases and discussion in
Horovitz, Current Trends In Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation, 20 Rocxy MT. L. Rsv. 117, 155-57 (1948).
It should be noted that if the cause of the injury begins on the
premises, the fact that the injury itself takes place on public sidewalks is no bar to compensation. Thus where a theater usher (assistant manager) ousts a disturber (patron) who as a result assaults
him on a public sidewalk after work while he is on the way home,
the injury is still in the course of the employment, as an exception
to the coming and going rule. Appleford v. Kimmel, 297 Mich. 8,
296 N.W. 861 (1941). See also cases note 236 infra.
Soares' Case, 270 Mass. 3, 169 N.E. 414 (1930) (injury in kitchen);
Joe Ready's Shell Station & Cafe v. Ready, 218 Miss. 80, 65 So. 2d
268 (1953) (doing bookkeeping at home, accidentally shot removing
gun from couch); Cahill's Case, 295 Mass. 538, 4 N.E.2d 332 (1936)
(injury in own yard).
Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 139, 156 N.E. 642
(1927) (superintendent injured on sidewalk by continuation of work
quarrel begun in mill; fell, fractured skull and died-was "in the
course of"). "The quarrel outside the mill was merely a continuation or extension of the quarrel begun within ....
Continuity of

cause has been so combined with contiguity in time and space that

the quarrel from origin to ending must be taken to be one." Id.
at 142, 156 N.E. at 643 (Cardozo, J.). Zolkover v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 13 Cal. 2d 584, 91 P.2d 106 (1939) (continuing scuffle in
street); Gardner v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 361, 166
P.2d 362 (4th Dist. 1946) (bartender attacked after quitting hour by
disgruntled customer); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Britton, 289
F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (customer ejected by cook, later ambushed
and killed cook as he left work), affirming 187 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C.
1960), citing Appleford v. Kimmel, 297 Mich. 8, 296 N.W. 861 (1941).
Contra, Collier's Case, 331 Mass. 374, 119 N.E.2d 191 (1954) (attack
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Traveling workers, away from home and headquarters, are
usually held to be in the course of employment at all hours,
whether or not they are actually subject to call; it is a fortiori
where the employer pays the traveling expenses. The "industrial
premises" are wherever the work properly takes the employee;
he is considered in continuous service. This is especially true
when the employee is abroad.

237

An early court stated: "I think it is impossible to have an
accident arising out of, which is not also in the course of the employment, but the converse of this is quite possible.

' 238

This

would appear to be the proper result although a recent, ill-advised
Massachusetts case 23 9 held to the contrary, thereby giving a jolt
to the intent of the founders of workmen's compensation acts to
give wide relief to injured workers. Nevertheless, the current
on waitress, by intoxicated customer who was previously refused
service, was fifty-eight feet from work-door and a few minutes
after work ended). The Collier case was severely criticized by Dean
Pound as "very artificial and unsatisfactory .... The difference
between 3 feet and 58 feet ... cannot be controlling .... ." 14
NACCA L.J. 73, 74-75 (1954). Noted with disapproval in 35 BOSTON
U. L. REV. 433 (1955); 16 NACCA L.J. 496 (1955) ("offensive at
least to the humane social philosophy underlying the compensation
237

statutes").
Lewis v. Knappen Tippetts Abbett Eng'r Co., 304 N.Y. 461, 108
N.E.2d 609 (1952) (accepted invitation to go sightseeing, shot and
killed by Arabs-on payroll and subject to call, away from home,

no fixed hours), affirming 279 App. Div. 1107, 112 N.Y.S.2d 79 (3d
Dep't 1952); Turner v. Willard, 154 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(injured in Okinawa while outside his construction area at employer's suggestion); Walker v. Speeder Mach. Corp., 213 Iowa 1134, 240

N.W. 725 (1932) (travelling repairman in continuous employment);
Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills, 288 N.Y. 377, 43 N.E.2d 450 (1942)

(salesman sent to South Africa died from malaria contacted after
working hours-risk of employment); Miller v. F. A. Bartlett Tree
Expert Co., 3 N.Y.2d 654, 148 N.E.2d 296, 171 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1958)

(fell in hotel bathtub while getting ready for evening of annual
conference).
238

239

M'Lauchlan v. Anderson, 48 Scot. L. R. 349, 4 B.W.C.C. 376 (1911).
See also United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Barnes, 182 Tenn. 400,
187 S.W.2d 610 (1945) (injury arising out of any employment almost necessarily occurs in the course of it); accord, Dravo Corp. v.
Strosnider, 43 Del. 256, 45 A.2d 542 (1945) (negligence, contributory
negligence, assumption of risk-not considered in workmen's compensation).
Collier's Case, 331 Mass. 374, 119 N.E.2d 191 (1954).

Contra, National

Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Britton, 289 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (cook
at lunch counter forcibly ejected querulous customer who ambushed
him as he left work and shot him dead), affirming 187 F. Supp.
359 (D.D.C. 1960). For other cases contra, see note 236 supra.
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trend continues to support a broad and liberal interpretation of
240
the phrase "in the course of" employment.

E. OF THE EMPLOYMENT
Many compensation experts were of the impression that the
words "of the employment" were used merely to complete the
sentence-that one could not say that workers were to be compensated for a "personal injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of"-of what? "Of the employment" made a good
sentence ending.
(1)

Federal Relief Workers and Local Welfare Recipients

The legislators who set up compensation acts little dreamed
that the depression of 1929, with its subsequent relief work, and
the later alphabetical federal-state projects, such as WPA and
ERA, would make the words "of the employment" a source of
prolific litigation. Is it employment for a recipient of city charity to chop wood for his grocery order? Are inmates of the Odd
Fellows Home or Salvation Army hotels employed? Is it employment or charity exercise? If a laborer on the welfare rolls
worked side by side with a regular city worker and a stone
crushed both at the same time, is one the recipient of charity
(non-compensable) and the other a wage-earner (compensable)?
If convicts are put on the road to work, are they employed or
can reasons be found to deny recovery?
In spite of the modern concept of the dignity of labor, some
240

Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. v.

Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 37 Cal.

App. 2d 567, 99 P.2d 1089 (1st Dist. 1940) ("in the course of" is to
be "construed liberally"); accord, Hunter v. Summerville, 205 Ark.
463, 169 S.W.2d 579 (1943) (liberal construction justified) (transportation case); Nicholson v. Industrial Comm'n, 205 Ariz. 463, 259 P.2d
547 (1953): "A liberal construction is not synonymous with a generous interpretation. To interpret liberally envisions an approach
with an open and broad mind not circumscribed by strictures or
predilection, whereas a generous interpretation suggests free-handedness-largess. It is not in the power of this court to 'give' but
it definitely is its duty to interpret the law to insure what the law
gives is not withheld." Id. at 466, 259 P.2d at 549; Bailey v. Mosby
Hotel Co., 160 Kan. 258, 160 P.2d 701 (1945) (to be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Glass, 302
Ky. 622, 195 S.W.2d 280 (1946) (dependents lose right to sue, and
get "extremely meagre" benefits-construe liberally in their favor);
Pelfrey v. Oconee County, 207 S.C. 433, 36 S.E.2d 297 (1945); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 144 Tex. 453, 191 S.W.2d 844
(1946); cases cited note 199 supra.
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courts have placed state, county, and city welfare recipients 241
in the same class as outright "paupers." So also, recipients of
help from private sources are receiving "charity" and therefore
not employed. An example of this is an inmate of the Odd Fellows Home 242 who occasionally worked and received small sums
for odd jobs. But a Salvation Army worker 243 or a hospital intern 244 is "employed" and not an object of charity or philanthropy.
The city or town welfare-assisted worker is either "not employed"
or is a "ward of the municipality." Some courts hold that beheld to be beyond
cause he is the object of statutory relief he is
245
the scope of workmen's compensation relief.
Fortunately the weight of authority for local welfare recipients is contra and the majority of courts recognize that the
unfortunate victim of a work-accident is an employee, even though
the state's, the county's, or the municipality's purpose in giving
him work was to aid its citizens. 246 A pauper is still a human
being with civil rights, and employable.
241

Scordis' Case, 305 Mass. 94, 25 N.E.2d 226 (1940)

(working on ash

truck per welfare order, not employment but statutory relief);
accord, Vaivida v. City of Grand Rapids, 264 Mich. 204, 249 N.W.
826 (1933) (citizen needing public aid, working at public tasks and
receiving scrip). Contra, Hendershot v. City of Lincoln, 136 Neb.
606, 286 N.W. 909

(1939)

(working on federally financed

project run by city, is employee)

sewer

(leading case); Blake v. Depart-

ment of Labor and Indus., 196 Wash. 681, 84 P.2d 365 (1938).
also note 246 infra.

See

242

Seymour v. Odd Fellow's Home, 267 N.Y. 354, 196 N.E. 287 (1935)
(inmate allowed "pin money" for odd jobs, mere gratuity and not
employment).

243

Hall v. Salvation Army, 236 App. Div. 199, 258 N.Y. Supp. 269 (3d

Dep't 1932) (inmate worked receiving three dollars per week plus
room and board; covered by workmen's compensation, total wage
valued at thirteen dollars and fifty cents per week); accord, Schneider v. Salvation Army, 217 Minn. 488, 14 N.W.2d 467 (1944) (appli244
245
246

cant for help received five dollars per week plus room and board).
Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital, 236 N.Y. 268, 140 N.E. 694 (1923)
(intern without cash wages is employee).
See Scordis' Case, 305 Mass. 94, 25 N.E.2d 226 (1940).
Industrial Comm'n v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40, 193 N.E. 620
(1934) (indigent worker performing labor for municipality for wages
and groceries instead of receiving relief is an employee); Arnold v.
State, 233 Iowa 1, 6 N.W.2d 113 (1942)

(pay in groceries rather than

cash immaterial, still employee under act); Hendershot v. City of
Lincoln, 136 Neb. 606, 286 N.W. 909 (1939)

(city sewer project with

federal funds); Blake v. Department of Labor and Indus., 196 Wash.
681, 84 P.2d 365 (1938)

(city and relief agency put worker on con-

struction job; city gave room, board, and clothing, agency gave
$3.00 cash-was city employee and compensable). See also Mc-
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Federal relief workers who are controlled by the state, city
or county are usually granted compensation. 247 However, employees of the WPA, ERA or similar federal relief programs
were sometimes denied benefits by the state court because they
were federal and not state employees. The issue was the right
to control the employee; thus he was referred to a federal com248
pensation act.

(2)

Convicts
Some courts have read into the acts a requirement that the
employment be voluntary, and thereby they have denied awards
to all prison inmates. 24 9 To deny an award against a private employer or state department which "borrows" the prisoner for
regular outside-prison work is to insert into our compensation

247

248

249

Laughlin v. Autrim County Rd. Comm'n, 266 Mich. 73, 253 N.W.
221 (1934) (welfare recipient took job for county at twenty-five
cents per hour-not poor relief); City of Waycross v. Hayes, 48 Ga.
App. 317, 172 S.E. 756 (1934); Clark v. Workmen's Compensation
Comm'n, 66 N.D. 17, 262 N.W. 249 (1935) (worker gave notes for
amount of relief, then worked off payment of notes); Weber CountyOgden City Relief Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 85, 71
P.2d 177 (1937). Contra, McBurney v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 220
Cal. 124, 30 P.2d 414 (1934) (receiving aid from public funds for
"made work" on drainage); Oswalt v. Lucas County, 222 Iowa 1099,
270 N.W. 847 (1937) (indigent put to work on county roads, not
employee under the facts); Jackson v. North Carolina Emergency
Relief Administration, 206 N.C. 274, 173 S.E. 580 (1934); State ex
rel. State Bd. of Charities and Pub. Welfare v. Nevada Industrial
Comm'n, 55 Nev. 343, 34 P.2d 408 (1934). See also Horovitz, Modern
Trends in Workmen's Compensation, 21 IND. L.J. 473, 565-67 (1946).
Doyle v. Commonwealth, 153 Pa. Super. 611, 34 A.2d 812 (1943)
(claimant working on WPA job remained employee of highway department); Gates' Case, 297 Mass. 178, 8 N.E.2d 12 (1937) (evidence
that city retained right to control); Commissioner of Taxation and
Fin. v. School Dist. No. 16, 252 App. Div. 714, 298 N.Y. Supp. 793
3d Dep't 1937) (teamster on project started by CWA and continued
under TERA and school board, compensated under act).
Donnelly's Case, 304 Mass. 514, 24 N.E.2d 327 (1939) (evidence that
claimant was under control of federal administrator and entitled to
claim under federal statutes rather than state statutes). See Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation, 20 RocKy MT. L. REV. 117, 172-73 n.605 (1947) (criticism of
"informal" federal act "trials"); Note, 19 NEB. L. BULL. 130 (1949).
Greene's Case, 280 Mass. 506, 182 N.E. 857 (1932) (case since fortified
by statute:
Ass. GEN. LAws ANN. c. 152, § 74 (1958) ); Lawson
v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 37 Ga. App. 85, 139 S.E. 96 (1927) (see cases
cited); Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 77 Idaho 292, 291 P.2d
870 (1955) (see suggestions, concurring opinion Smith, J.).
Cf.
Moats v. State, 215 Md. 49, 136 A.2d 757 (1957) (inmate of state
training school not compensable).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 41, 1961
acts the intolerable continental law of civil death for all temporary convicts. There is no adequate reason for not insisting
that outside employers insure convicts under the local workmen's
compensation act. Even assuming that the convict cannot make
a "contract" 250 with the prison authorities, contracting the prisoner out to a private or public employer raises a quite different
question. Thus California properly permitted an award of compensation against its highway department which borrowed prisoners for work, even though the employment was not strictly
voluntary. 251 And North Carolina, Maryland and Wisconsin252by
statute permit compensation for certain injuries to convicts.
Reading in the word "voluntary" before the word "employment" in statutes using only the word "employment" is unjustifiable fiat. It is not read in for (1) taxpayers working out their
road taxes against their wil 2 5 3 or for (2) persons impressed into
service by policemen or sheriffs254 brandishing a revolver under
250

Some states do not require a "contract" of employment, e.g., a policeman is under the act in South Carolina as are all municipal
employees except those elected: Green v. City of Bennetsville, 197
S.C. 313, 15 S.E.2d 334 (1940). See other cases of non-contracted
employees, especially where only "appointment" is needed, in HoRoVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

93 (1944).

LAWS 190-

See also cases of implied contracts, id. at 208 n.92.

also Pruitt v. Harker, 328 Mo. 1200, 43 S.W.2d 769 (1931)

See

(unneces-

sary to show an express contract between a father and his minor

son).
251

California Highway Comm'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 200 Cal. 44,

251 Pac. 808 (1926)

(convict receiving seventy-five cents per day
But see, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352
(expressly excluding convict labor on state roads) (enacted in 1927).
North Carolina passed a statute to make sure certain convicts have
on road gang was an employee).

252

compensation rights. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13 (1958); also Maryland:
vID. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 35 (1957); and Wisconsin: Wis.
STAT. § 56.21 (1959) (benefits available on parole as well as on dis-

charge).
253 Town of Germantown v. Industrial Comm'n, 178 Wis. 642, 190 N.W.
449 (1922) ("[H]is election to pay in labor implied a contract of
service."). But see, Board of Trustees v. State Industrial Comm'n,
149 Okla. 23, 299 Pac. 155 (1931) (male citizen or his substitute not
employee when performing statutory road duty).
254 Mitchell v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Ohio App. 319, 13 N.E.2d 736
(1936) (claimant ordered to assist sheriff in arrest, killed in accident
after arrest-was deputized employee of county). Tennis v. City
of Sturgis, 75 S.D. 17, 58 N.W.2d 301 (1953) (citizen asked by fire
chief to help was employee); cf. Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250
N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928) ("cabby" impressed into service by policeman; taxi company, not police department liable for compensation);
Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E.2d 844 (1954) (similar taxi driver
case, but injury not direct).
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the citizen's nose-not really contractual free choice. However,
such employment is properly considered as done under an "implied contract" when the impressed worker is injured.
(3)

Illegal Employment of Adults and Minors

A business which is prohibited completely, such as a house of
prostitution or a speakeasy during prohibition, 25 5 taints the work
connected with its operation. Where the employment is illegal
per se, the workers in that employment normally have no remedy.
But where the general employment is legal, the fact that the
employee may violate a law in obtaining or performing the employment is not a bar to compensation, especially where the injury has no direct relationship to the illegality. Hence, a street
car conductor who lied in writing (a local criminal offense) about
his former discharge elsewhere was not denied compensation
when injured by an electric shock due to his employer's defective
overhead trolley.2 56 Nor was compensation denied to a waitress
injured in a fire although she illegally received a percentage of
257
the price of the liquor sold to customers.
The business itself being legal, the illegal employment of
minors does not deprive the minor or his dependents of their
workmen's compensation rights. The fact that the law forbade
the minor to do the work is not a defense to the employer or his
2 58
insurer.

By decision in some states, the minor can collect workmen's
compensation and the parent may also sue in tort if negligence
is present.2 59 As to the minor, his workmen's compensation rights
255

Herbold v. Neff, 200 App. Div. 244, 193 N.Y. Supp. 244 (3d Dep't
1922) (bartender during prohibition cut self on bottle; business illegal, no compensation); accord, Swihura v. Horowitz, 242 N.Y. 523,
152 N.E. 411 (1926) (beer deliveryman injured in illegal employ-

256

257

258

259

ment, claim dismissed).
See Kenny v. Union Ry., 166 App. Div. 497, 152 N.Y. Supp. 117 (3d
Dep't 1915) (false statements did not contribute to cause of death);
accord, Long v. Big Horn Const. Co., 75 Wyo. 276, 295 P.2d 750
(1956) (seventy year old man lied about age, board refused award
on grounds younger man could avoid injury-reversed and award
ordered, contract voidable, not void).
Massacusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 19 Cal.
App. 2d 583, 65 P.2d 1349 (Ist Dist. 1937) (night club hostess).
Pierce's Case, 267 Mass. 208, 166 N.E. 636 (1929) (killed in fireworks
plant).
King v. Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988 (1914); Allen v.
Trester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N.W. 841 (1924) (contrary provision in
sta ute is unconstitutional); Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Cope, 132
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are often held to be exclusive. 260 By statute in many states double
employer are allowed for the
and triple damages against the
26 1
illegal employment of minors.

(4)

Spouses

Although most compensation acts are silent as to the employment of spouses, some deny compensation to a wife employed
directly by the husband. Although physically "in the employment" and actually drawing wages, a few courts, reasoning along
old common-law lines, deny awards even if the insurer accepts
premiums on her wages. 262 They argue that a wife cannot make

260

Okla. 152, 269 Pac. 1084 (1928) (parent's rights not taken away by
implication). Contra, Wall v. Studebaker Corp., 219 Mich. 434, 189
N.W. 58 (1922); Novack v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 158 Minn. 505,
198 N.W. 294 (1924) (statute puts minor in adult class). See discussion in HoRovrrz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENNote, 3 NEB. L. BULL. 297 (1925).
SATION LAWS 323-28 (1944).
Slavinsky v. National Bottling Torah Co., 267 Mass. 319, 166 N.E. 821
(1929); Allen v. Trester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N.W. 841 (1924); Noreen
v. Vogel & Bros., 213 N.Y. 317, 132 N.E. 102 (1927) (minor under

sixteen gave wrong age, guardian sued for negligence, must take

261

262

By statute some states give the minor
workmen's compensation).
Ky. REV. STAT.
the option to claim compensation or damages:
§ 342.170 (1960); ILL. REV. STAT. C. 148, § 143 (Smith-Hurd 1950);
and N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:15-10 (1959). In Kansas, by decisions, the
employee probably has his choice and common-law suit lies: Lee
v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 137 Kan. 759, 22 P.2d 942 (1933)
(minor worked on dairy truck at night in violation of law). Dressler
v. Dressler, 167 Kan. 749, 208 P.2d 271 (1949) (minor son lived at
home, employed by parents without work permit-employer's failure
to comply cannot be used as shield against minor).
Damage suits permitted, though compensation denied: Widdoes
v. Laub, 33 Del. 4, 129 Atl. 344 (1925) (minor illegally employed
has no rights under workmen's compensation act); Knoxville News
Co. v. Spitzer, 152 Tenn. 617, 279 S.W. 1043 (1925) (even though
minor lied about his age); Wlock v. Fort Dummer Mills, 98 Vt. 449,
129 Atl. 311 (1925) (contributory negligence is no defense in tort
suit, workmen's compensation inapplicable). For further cases involving rights of minors employed illegally see HoRovrrz, INJURY
AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 181, 315-16 (1944).
West's Case, 313 Mass. 146, 46 N.E.2d 760
Double compensation:
(1943) (by statute double compensation is provided for illegally employed minors-employer's ignorance of age is no defense). Treble
damages: Bloomer Brewery, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 239 Wis.
605, 2 N.W.2d 226 (1942) (though minor gave wrong age-so as not
to emasculate one of the purposes of the child labor law).
Humphrey's Case, 227 Mass. 166, 116 N.E. 412 (1917); reaffirmed
Flaherty's Case, 324 Mass. 755, 85 N.E.2d 331 (1949); accord, Bendler
v. Bendler, 3 N.J. 161, 69 A.2d 302 (1949) (strong dissent). Contra,
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her husband; husband and wife are one and
a "contract" with
2 63
he is the one.
However, the better reasoned cases point out that while marriage may prohibit a valid contract between spouses for household work, it does not give the husband the right to compel his
wife to work for him in his factory or shop; and when she does
such work and he pays her wages, she is an employee by contract, either express or implied.
In an age where married women's statutes give women equality with men, it is a blot on the humanitarian purposes of workmen's compensation to allow insurers to escape liability-especially when the wife's wages are figured in the premiums. Hence
the majority of the states which have passed on this question and
on related questions, have recognized the realities of modern
compensation
business and marital relations and have awarded
26 4
where one spouse in fact works for the other.

263
264

Wilhelm v. Industrial Comm'n, 399 Ill. 80, 77 N.E.2d 174 (1948).
This case is based on an Illinois statute which reads: "Neither
husband or wife shall be entitled to recover any compensation for
any labor performed or services rendered to the other, whether in
the management of property or otherwise." ILL. REv. STAT. c. 68, § 8
(Smith-Hurd 1959).
Foster v. Cooper, 197 So. 117 (Fla. 1940) (she has no legal existence,
husband and wife are one).
Nesbit v. Nesbit, 102 Pa. Super. 554, 157 Atl. 519 (1931); Reid v.
Reid, 216 Iowa 882, 249 N.W. 387 (1933) (services in husband's shop
are beyond scope of those demanded by marital relation and she
may make contract for such work).
Where premiums were accepted, insurer is liable on estoppel:
McLain v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 28 So. 2d 680 (La. 1946) (husband
working for wife collects). Where the wife was one of two partners,
her spouse recovers: Klemmens v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 54 N.D. 496, 209 N.W. 972 (1926). Michigan by statute
in 1953 includes spouses who are regularly employed on a full-time
basis of pay and hours, unless specifically excluded from the policy
of compensation insurance. In Michigan even working partners may
insure themselves. See Galie v. Detroit Auto Accessory Co., 224
Mich. 703, 195 N.W. 667 (1923) (constitutional for statute to include
working members of a partnership when receiving "wages"). California permits husband-wife labor contracts: CAL. Civ. CODE § 158.
It has been pointed out that there are probably five or six
million married women gainfully employed in the United States,
and hundreds of thousands who are business proprietors and executives. "Of these, many work for or employ their husbands.
It is anachronistic indeed to deprive the spouse of compensation
protection when in every other respect the status is one of employment, merely on the strength of an obsolete rule left over from
a time when the only services that could be affected by such a
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And regardless of the weight of authority, the weight of reason today favors compensation. Antiquated common-law principles have already done sufficient damage by appearing in disguised garb 2 6 5 elsewhere in workmen's compensation cases-they
rule were domestic services which the spouse was bound in any
case to perform by the obligations of the marriage relation.
"This general attitude disfavoring technical husband-wife contract disability appears to have widespread acceptance, and most
courts will get around the disability if there is any possible legal
ground on which to do so." 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW 691 (1952).

Hence the use of estoppel and partnership entity is different
from the spouse who is one-half of the partnership entity. Even
at common law, a woman run down by her own husband can collect from his employer whose truck did the damage! Pittsley v.
David, 298 Mass. 552, 11 N.E.2d 461 (1937).

See also

HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMP-

ENSATION LAWS

201 (1944), adding: "[A] wife's compensation action

against an insurance carrier is not a suit against her husband" any
more than a suit against the husband's employer is a suit against
the husband.
Note also that in North Carolina, by statute a woman can sue
her own husband for negligence in auto cases: N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-10 (1950). In allowing damages, the court stated in King v.
Gates, 231 N.C. 537, 57 S.E.2d 765 (1950): "The legal disability of
a married woman was originally based on a common-law fiction
of the unity of husband and wife. Her legal existence during
coverture was deemed incorporated in that of her husband, and
neither could sue the other for a personal tort ....
"But the fiction of the wife's merged existence has long since
been exploded. Both by statute and by judicial interpretation her
disabilities have been removed .... Nor does any principle of
public policy in North Carolina now exempt her husband from
civil liability for the injury and death of his wife proximately
caused by his own negligence." Id. at 539-40, 57 S.E.2d at 767-68.
Even at common law, suits between husband and wife for
negligence are increasingly allowed. Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599,
See discussion of this case and others by
300 S.W.2d 15 (1957).
Prof. Lambert in 20 NACCA L.J. 329 (1957). And see Dean Pound's
comment in 15 NACCA L.J. 384 (1955): "It is gratifying to see this
remnant of the common-law disabilities of married women disappearing from the books." See also 35 CORNELL L.Q. 916-22 (1950); 50
COLUTM. L. REV. 840-46 (1950); and 6 NACCA L.J. 241, 242 (1950).

Finally, even in Massachusetts where the spousal disability has
its deepest roots, today a wife may sue her husband's employer
for negligence even where her husband is the negligent servant.
Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, 11 N.E.2d 461 (1937), previously
cited in this note.
265 Tort considerations are not applicable in workmen's compensation
cases. Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957) (hit by
bullet, old case contra based on common-law reasoning reversed).
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should not be extended to working spouses. Courts have repeatedly urged the use of common sense 266 instead of common law in
connection with this new type of humanitarian, liberal legislation;
and common sense indicates that when a woman actually works
for her husband and draws wages, she is an employee. The income tax laws and similar laws apply to her wages wherever
earned; a fortiori, workmen's compensation laws should protect
her when she is injured while working for her spouse.
(5)

Minor Children

The overwhelming weight of authority permits minor children, when actually working for their parents, to collect workmen's compensation.2 67 The technical disability sometimes applied to the husband-wife cases is not carried over to their children. The courts hold that the act of a father or mother in employing the child creates at least a partial emancipation, removing
to that extent any disability which might otherwise

exist. 26 8

"[Clare must be exercised lest long judicial habit in tort cases
allow judicial thought in compensation cases to be too much influenced by a discarded or modified factor of decision." Hanson
v Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 598, 297 N.W. 19, 21 (1941).
Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House, 46 N.J. Super. 425, 134 A.2d 789
(App. Div. 1957) (courts have a difficult time eliminating tort concepts). Negligence is no bar in a compensation case: Portee v.
South Carolina State Hosp., 234 S.C. 50, 106 S.E.2d 670 (1959)
(penicillin administered negligently-died of shock). See also note

97 supra.
266

267

268

Schechter v. State Ins. Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506, 160 N.E.2d 901 (1959)
(common-sense viewpoint of the average man). O'Leary v. BrownPacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951) (Minton, J., dissenting)
(common-sense, everyday, realistic view). See also note 12 supra.
Cheney v. Department of Labor and Indus., 175 Wash. 60, 26 P.2d
393 (1933) (minors deemed emancipated by operation of law); Van
Sweden v. Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238, 230 N.W. 191 (1930) (agreement to pay wages-special or partial emancipation); Denius v.
North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 68 N.D. 506, 281 N.W. 361
(1938) (minors expressly under the act; fact that father was employer no defense, hiring son is a special or partial emancipation
-no formality needed). But there must be a bona fide contract
of hire, and not mere occasional services and payments that might
be expected within a family: Holt County v. Mullen, 126 Neb. 102,
252 N.W. 799 (1934); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 55 So. 2d 258 (La. App.
1951).
See note 267 supra. Dressler v. Dressler, 167 Kan. 749, 208 P.2d
271 (1949) (fifteen year old son fell from ice truck-parents as
employers paid him thirty dollars weekly and paid social security
tax although son lived at home "free"-insurer did not even raise
question of child not being employee of parents).
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This is another illustration of the proper flexibility of workmen's
compensation laws in discarding or overcoming narrow commonlaw concepts in favor of those supported by common sense.
F.

INcAPAcITY OR DIsABmrrY

It is not enough for a worker to prove that he received a
"personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
the employment." If he wishes to receive his weekly compensation, he has still another hurdle-proof of incapacity or disability.
Most states, apart from "schedule" or "specific" payments,
require proof of disability of incapacity, before an award can
be made for a compensable injury. The words "incapacity" and
"disability" are usually interchangeable 269 and are used to denote
the same thing-loss of wage-earning power, whether due to (1)
actual physical disability, or (2) inability to obtain a job. The
inability must be traceable, in part or in whole, to the injury or
a combination 27 0 of physical disability and inability to obtain
work.
While in most cases incapacity for work is due purely to
physical disability, there can be incapacity in the form of a loss
of wage-earning capacity after the physical disability has ceasedfor example, after a crushing injury to the bones of the head
and to one eye, the worker is physically able to work but no one

269 Kuhnle v. Department of Labor and Indus., 12 Wash. 2d 191, 120

270

P.2d 1003 (1942) (statute used words "permanent total disability"
but the court rightfully speaks of "incapacity"); Dameron v. Spartan
Mills, 211 S.C. 217, 44 S.E.2d 465 (1947) (the court properly uses
the words "incapacity for work is total," interchangeably with "during such total disability").
Fennell's Case, 289 Mass. 89, 193 N.E. 885 (1935) (eye blinded but
worked for years until factory moved-no one would hire him for
over one year-was totally incapacitated); Sullivan's Case, 218 Mass.

141, 105 N.E. 463 (1914)

(lost arm, was unable to market his re-

maining ability to work for six months-total disability awarded);

Black Mountain Corp. v. McGill, 292 Ky. 512, 166 S.W.2d 815 (1942)
(disability does not refer solely to physical disability; refers to loss
of earning power and includes inability to secure work). In Ball
v. William Hunt & Sons, [1912] A.C. 496, Lord Atkinson stated
that the words "incapacity for work" may mean physical inability
to work so as to earn wages, or it may mean inability to obtain
employment due to the belief of employers in the unfitness of the
workman to perform work owing to the injury they perceived he
has suffered. Accord, Plumlee v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Tenn. 497,
201 S.W.2d 664 (1947).
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wants the unsightly looking worker near them.2 7 1 Hence disability awards without physical disability may be proper.
Most of the acts fail to define "disability" or "incapacity."
The methods of awarding compensation for disability, and the
types of disability benefits provided, vary from state to state.272
The conclusion seems inescapable that there is no present possibility of creating uniformity out of the various ways of compensating various disabilities. The thought of scrapping all the acts
and starting anew on this question is to indulge in useless speculation; and courts will have to do their best to determine the local
legislative meaning-a meaning which often defies disentanglement.
But there are certain principles on the subject of disability
which have a common thread throughout the compensation acts
nationally and internationally. The following discussion is based
on the decided cases over the last half-century.
(1)

Total Incapacity

All courts agree that if the disability is a physical one and
wholly prevents an employee from working, temporary total incapacity payments are due; for example, the employee is considered totally incapacitated while in the hospital undergoing
treatment or at home under the doctor's care. Thus the majority
of courts hold that weekly total incapacity payments are due
even though a liberal employer continues to give the absent employee. the amount of his wages, and deducts the wages from his
income taxes.2 7 3 If a contract is to be implied to show that the
271

272

273

Fennell's Case, 289 Mass. 89, 193 N.E. 885 (1935)

(employee testified

that after loss of eye, he did better work than before but that
employers, seeing the eye, would not hire him for about a yearwas totally incapacitated for that entire period-he might as well
have been bedridden so far as earning wages were concerned).
See U.S. BuREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BuLL. No.
161, STATE WoRivmn's COMPENSATION LAWS (Rev. 1960) (excellent tables and discussion on a nationwide basis).
Hathaway v. New Mexico State Police, 57 N.M. 747, 263 P.2d 690
(1953), 13 NACCA L.J. 51 (1954) (continued payments of salary
did not amount to a payment of compensation so as to suspend
right to sue under compensation act-salary here like a gratuity
or sentimental gesture); McGhee v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 146 Kan. 653,
73 P.2d 39 (1937) (no agreement that "wages" were in lieu of
compensation); Modern Equip. Co. v. Industrial Connm'n, 237 Wis.
517, 20 N.W.2d 121 (1945) (no compensation credit for paying full
wages-wages are pure gift, though deductible expense); Paramount
Pictures v. Snow, 213 Ark. 713, 212 S.W.2d 346 (1948); Shaw's Case,
247 Mass. 157, 141 N.E. 858 (1923) (part of wages during post-
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wages are to cover the weekly compensation plus a "gift" of the
excess, more than the mere continuance of "wages" should be
shown.
Even where the injury has healed, if because of the effects
of the injury no one will hire the employee, he continues to be
temporarily totally disabled. For example, if a waitress is badly
burned about the face, neck and arms, and the resulting scars are
so horrible that no customer will let her wait on him, she is
temporarily totally disabled. Until she can learn another trade
and can get another job, she might as well be confined to her
home even though she is physically able to work.2 7 4 So, too, the
disfiguring loss of an eye may delay the obtaining of a new job,
and during the delay total incapacity payments may de due.275
Total disability payments may be due where the disability is
partly physical and partly due to the worker's inability to market
his remaining capacity for work. The one-armed or other severely injured man may finally be ready physically to return
to work, but for a time no one will hire a cripple. During that
time payments for total incapacity may continue although the
physical disability itself may be considered as only partial. The
injury work was gift); Middleton v. City of Watertown, 70 S.D.
173, 16 N.W.2d 39 (1944).

Where an employer is a self-insurer and continues the full
wage while employee is out of work, an inference may be made
that part of it represents the weekly compensation payments due:

Mercury Aviation Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 186 Cal. 375,
Pac. 508 (1921). Where "wages" were reasonably intended to
clude "compensation" the credit is only for the part equal to
weekly compensation: Elliot v. Gooch Feed Mill Co., 147 Neb.

199
inthe
612,

24 N.W.2d 561 (1946). Creighton v. Continental Roll & Steel Foundry
Co., 155 Pa. Super. 165, 38 A.2d 337 (1944) (credit indicated if no

work done, but some work will rule out credit); Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co. v. Hay, 159 Tenn. 202, 17 S.W.2d 904 (1929)

274

(employer

gives occasional sums to the employee as needed-credit is denied,
purely a gratuity).
See Fennell's Case, 289 Mass. 89, 193 N.E. 885 (1935) (one eye blinded
but worked for years; when factory moved, no employer would
hire him-totally disabled for the sixty weeks he was unable to
get employment on account of the unsightly eye). For an excellent definition of total disability, see Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry.,
230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433

(1950):

"An employee who is so

injured that he can perform no services other than those which
are so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist, may well be classified
as totally disabled." Id. at 320, 41 N.W.2d at 436; Note, 18 NEB. L.
BULL. 101 (1939).
275

See Fennell's Case, 289 Mass. 89, 193 N.E. 885 (1935).
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criterion is loss of earning power and that is not necessarily pro276
portional to bodily function disability.

Awards of continuing temporary total disability properly and
exceptionally have been upheld for very serious injuries even
during periods when the seriously crippled worker was "paid"
high wages.2 7 7 In addition, a seriously injured worker has the
benefit of the odd-lot or nondescript theory in many states. If
a worker is so maimed, crippled or injured as to make it obvious
276

277

J. A. Foust Coal Co. v. Messer, 195 Va. 762, 80 S.E.2d 533 (1954),
14 NACCA L.J. 132 (1955) (total wage loss by reason of partial
physical incapacity-thirty-three and one-half per cent physical
disability translated into one hundred per cent wage loss; total compensation due when unable to market his remaining capacity for
work). Schnatzmeyer v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 Ariz. 266, 270 P.2d
794 (1954); Czeplicki v. Fatnir Bearing Co., 137 Conn. 454, 78 A.2d
339 (1951Y; Sullivan's Case, 218 Mass. 141, 105 N.E. 463 (1914) (one
armed man); Castle v. City of Stillwater, 235 Minn. 502, 51 N.W.2d
370 (1952), 10 NACCA L.J. 109 (1952) (permanent total disability
though doctors testified to only thirty per cent permanent loss of
bodily function in a sixty-nine year old chief of police); Rodriguez
v. Micheal A. Scatuorchio, 42 N.J.Super. 341, 126 A.2d 378 (App.
Div. 1956) (arm injury, coupled with meager education and inability to speak English-disability total and permanent); Jordan
v. Decorative Co., 230 N.Y. 522, 130 N.E. 634 (1921) (hernia, but
cannot refuse a job without giving a reason and expect compensation); Roller v. Warren, 98 Vt. 514, 129 Atl. 168 (1925) (inability
to do or secure work because of injury creates disability); see discussion of Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co., 127 Mont. 211,
259 P.2d 340 (1953) in 12 NACCA L.J. 55 (1953); see also cases in
note 270 supra.
National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950)
(paraplegic, due to spinal cord injury, took courses and worked
sporadically but made $5,500 in eleven years; total temporary then
permanent continued). Insurance carrier may not ". . . take advantage of the fact that this most unfortunate young man, who,
perservaring to the utmost, had at times, and under unusual circumstances, been able to obtain some employment, and work his undoing in the matter of compensation vouchsafed by statutory enactment." Id. at 226, 214 P.2d at 787. Taber v. Tole, 188 Kan. 312,
362 P.2d 17 (1961) (became teacher, but no physical change in back;
permanent and total payments ordered despite earning $3,900 a
year). Increased wages is not the test, for he was still unable to
perform the same work after the injury. New skills are no defense
to permanent total award, though statute permitted review of awards.
Cornett-Lewis Coal Co. v. Day, 312 Ky. 221, 226 S.W.2d 951
(1950) (crooked leg, knee infected-given temporary total though
part of period he actually worked in the mine); Texas Indem. Ins.
Co. v. Bonner, 228 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (disc injury;
did some work, getting old pay at regular job-total disability up-

held); accord, Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Segal, 229 F.2d 845 (5th
Cir. 1956); see also additional cases in notes 302 and 317 infra.
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that he will not be employed in any well-known branch of the
labor market because the capacities for work left to him fit him
only for special uses, he may be considered an "odd-lot" or "nondescript" in the labor market. 278 If, then, the employer cannot
show that a customer can be found who will take him-thus
workman is
shifting the burden of proof to the employer-the
279
entitled to total incapacity payments.
It should be noted that the word "incapacity" came2 0from the
English act, and English cases are of weight thereon.
PartialIncapacity
When the employee can do light work, and such work is
available even though it is not his usual calling most courts hold
that the administrator has the power to reduce the compensation
from total to partial compensation. 28 1 And this is true even
though the worker fails to take such work. In some states, when
the employee is able to do light work, the administrator of his
own knowledge 2 2 can find the amount he believes the worker
(2)

278

Cardiff Corp. v. Hall [1911] 1 K.B. 1009; Eastern S.S. Lines v. Monahan, 21 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. Me. 1937); Hood v. Wyandotte Oil
& Fat Co., 272 Mich. 190, 261 N.W. 295 (1935) ("odd-lot doctrine"

applies to a temporary total disability as well as to permanent total

disability); Jordan v. Decorative Co., 230 N.Y. 522, 130 N.E. 634
(1921) ("odd-lot doctrine" applied to a common laborer sustainin a hernia); Kuhnle v. Department of Labor and Indus., 12 Wash.
2d 191, 120 P.2d 1003 (1942) (a great many courts have adopted
the "odd-lot doctrine"); Kirby v. Howley Park Coal Co., 13 B.W.C.C.

168 (1920); see Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d
279

433 (1950) (absence of reasonably stable market for injured worker's
services as total disability-sporadic employment no bar).
See note 278 supra.

280

Sullivan's Case, 218 Mass. 141, 105 N.E. 463 (1914).

281

Percival's Case, 268 Mass. 50, 167 N.E. 352 (1929); O'Reilly's Case,
265 Mass. 456, 164 N.E. 440 (1929): "But in the absence of testimony as to the earning capacity of the employee, the members of
the board are entitled to use their own judgment and knowledge
in determining that question." Id. at 456, 164 N.E. at 440. See
HoRovrrz, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE MASS. WORK. COMP.
ACT 46-48 (1930).
See cases cited note 281 supra; Kacavisti v. Sprague Elec. Co., 102
Claimant's right thumb was subN.H. 266, 155 A.2d 183 (1959).
jected to repeated trauma, and while cleaning wires it blistered.
The superior court said there was no evidence upon which to determine earning capacity for a ten per cent permanently incapacitated bruised thumb except "by speculation" and remanded the
case. The court should use its "judicial discretion" in determining
the loss. This should be measured by the effect upon her ability
to earn and not by the percentage of her permanent disability.

282
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would be able to earn in the open labor market, and set that
amount as the earning capacity. The difference between his old
former wage and the new earning capacity would determine the
amount of partial compensation due.
Conversely, the fact that the injured worker has earned his
old wage for a time does not saddle him forever with a postinjury earning capacity equal to that old wage. If he is laid off,
or quits for reasonable cause or is compelled to retire, and the
effects of the original injury have not ceased, an award of partial
283
compensation will be upheld.
(3)

Effect of Economic Rises and Fals in Wage Levels

Most acts show an intent that disability payments reflect the
true wage loss-the drop in earning ability or capacity due to the
injury. If there were no economic rises or falls in wages, there
would exist very little trouble in assessing this loss. If seventyfive dollars was the average original wage, and after losing three
fingers the worker could at best get a fifty dollar job, his wageearning capacity would be reduced one-third, or twenty-five dollars. And even if he refused for insufficient reasons of his own
to take the fifty dollar job, the administrator could still set his
earning capacity at that figure.
However, suppose that after the injury, economic conditions
were so poor that the seventy-five dollar job dropped to a sixty
283

Williams v. Metropolitan Coal Co., 76 Commw.L.R. 431 (Austl.
1948) (compelled to retire-pneumoconiosis); McKeon's Case, 326
Mass. 202, 93 N.E.2d 534 (1950) (able to work at full wages until
factory closed despite silicosis-can perform other work of a less
remunerative kind but cannot continue his old work); Donnelly's
Case, 243 Mass. 371, 137 N.E. 696 (1923) (factory moved-watch-

man worked as doorkeeper with hernia); accord, Percival's Case,
268 Mass. 50, 167 N.E. 352 (1929) (refused to move forty milesloss of leg, reasonable to refuse to move family); Baidek's Case,
321 Mass. 325, 73 N.E.2d 253 (1947) (injured three fingers badly,
took less dexterous job at same wages-left job for less pay when
he heard men were about to be laid off and he had no sufficient
seniority-award of partial upheld); Manley's Case, 282 Mass. 38,
184 N.E. 372 (1933), and Morrell's Case, 278 Mass. 485, 180 N.E. 223
(1932) (generally out of work because loss of fingers, arms-without more, this supports award of disability during non-working
periods-furnishes some evidence of incapacity); Dragon's Case, 264
Mass. 7, 161 N.E. 816 (1928) (temporary layoff-loss of two fingers,
awarded twenty-five per cent partial; could not do things he did
before the accident which cut down his chances of getting work
during layoff); Birch Bros. v. Brown, [1931J A.C. 605 (subsequent
blindness, refused offer of work-error to reduce total to partial
compensation even though insurer offered bona fide job as cleaner
in their own office, but worker could not do it as practically blind).
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dollar job and the fifty dollar job dropped to a thirty-five dollar
job.
Nearly all statutes provide that the original wage remain
fixed in computing the amount of compensation later due. But
they also provide that partial compensation shall not be determined by the "actual" wage earned after the injury but by the
"average weekly wage he is able to earn thereafter.

'2 4

Under such wording the amount to be considered is his ability
to earn, and not his actual wage. 28 5 And his ability to earn is to
be measured under the market conditions that existed at the time
of his original injury. 28 6 Economic changes, up or down, cannot
be considered.28 7 In short, the seventy-five dollars is to be measured against his ability to earn fifty dollars, and the effect of the
depression in dropping his post-injury wage to thirty-five dollars
284

285

286

287

See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 152, § 35 (1958). "Under the
statute ... it is not the wages actually earned after the injury
that are the basis of deciding the earning capacity." Korozchuck's
Case, 277 Mass. 534, 536, 179 N.E. 175, 176 (1931) (but the board
can on proper evidence find that what he actually earned was what
he was able to earn); Durney's Case, 222 Mass. 461, 111 N.E. 166
(1916) (board can find he was able to earn more than he actually
earned-post injury wages disregarded because affected by depression); Smith v. Tonawanda Paper Co., 238 App. Div. 690, 266 N.Y.
Supp. 160 (3d Dep't 1933) (fractured patella, received five dollars
at newstand-board could give him an earning capacity higher than
five dollars actually received).
Lavallee's Case, 277 Mass. 538, 179 N.E. 214 (1931) ("diminished
capacity" resulting from the injury, and not actual post-injury earnings if affected by depression); accord, Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.
v. O'Keeffe, 217 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1954) (earning capacity found
to be less than actual post-injury wages-serious back injury);
Carignan v. Winthrop Spinning Co., 95 N.H. 333, 63 A.2d 241 (1949)
(the test is "earning capacity" and not actual wages); Gagne v.
New Haven Road Const. Co., 87 N.H. 163, 175 Atl. 818 (1934) (ability
to earn rather than actual earnings are measurement of his working capacity after the injury).
Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230 (1951), 7
NACCA L.J. 105 (1951); Carignan v. Winthrop Spinning Co., 95
N.H. 333, 63 A.2d 241 (1949).
Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230 (1951),
citing Durney's Case, 222 Mass. 461, 111 N.E. 166 (1916); Peak v.
Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co., 87 N.H. 350, 179 Atl. 355
(1935) (if he was for any reason, either over or underpaid after

his return to work, then his wages would not show actual earning
capacity); Industrial Comm'n of Ohio v. Royer, 122 Ohio
171 N.E. 337 (1930) (the fact of increased or decreased
has no essential relation to earning capacity), approved,
Industrial Comm'n, 50 N.E.2d 680 (Ohio App.), all'd, 140
193, 51 N.E.2d 643 (1943). See also note 286 supra.

St. 271,
earnings
State v.
Ohio St.
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is to be ignored. 288 His earning capacity has been reduced twenty-five dollars and not forty dollars.
Similarly, if a seventy-five dollar worker prefers to take and
does take a thirty-five dollar job when his earning capacity justifies a fifty dollar job, the administrator must ignore the actual
wage earned and must consider only the difference between
28 9
seventy-five and fifty dollars.

The reverse is also true. If after the original injury, the
fifty dollar post-injury job increases to sixty-five dollars because
of economic conditions, the employee's earning capacity remains
at fifty dollars; and the actual wage earned must be ignored by
the administrator. His findings should state that the actual wage
does not represent the true "earning capacity" and that he ig29 0
nored the actual wage.

In short, actual post-injury wages can be ignored whenever
they are an unreliable basis for estimating capacity.
Unreliability of post-injury wages may be due to a number of
things: increase in general wage levels since the time of accident; claimant's own greater maturity or training; longer hours
worked by the claimant after the accident; payment of wages
disproportionate to capacity out of sympathy to the claimant;
and the 291
temporary and unpredictable character of post-injury
earnings.
Larson states in his comprehensive treatise that it has been
held uniformly, "without regard to statutory variations in the
288
289

290

291

Durney's Case, 222 Mass. 461, 111 N.E. 166 (1916) (post-injury wages
not binding on board).
Durney's Case, 222 Mass. 461, 111 N.E. 166 (1916); Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230 (1951); Lavallee's Case,
277 Mass. 538, 179 N.E. 214 (1931) (may give higher earning capacity than actual wages received); Smith v. Tonawanda Paper Co.,
238 App. Div. 690, 266 N.Y. Supp. 160 (3d Dep't 1933).
Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230 (1951);
Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Norton, 96 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1938) (general
economic increases, partial despite earning full wages); Shaffer v.
Midland Empire Packing Co., 127 Mont. 211, 259 P.2d 340 (1953),
12 NACCA L.J. 55 (1953); Carignan v. Winthrop Spinning Co., 95
N.H. 333, 63 A.2d 241 (1949), 3 NACCA L.J. 177 (1949) (partial
compensation awarded although as a result of a general wage increase the employee's earnings were actually more than he received
before the accident); State v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 N.E.2d 680
(Ohio App. 1943) (error to deny continuing compensation for double
hernia merely because he continued to work at old wage-earning
capacity, not actual earnings govern; error for board to make a
rule in advance for two weeks compensation if operation is refused).
2 LARSON, WoimuvE's Co~mENSAIoN LAw § 57.21, at 5 (1952)
(citing many cases).
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phrasing of the test, that a finding of disability may stand even
when there is evidence of actual post-injury earnings
equalling
29 2
or exceeding those received before the accident."
And the recent as well as the older cases have uniformly upheld findings of weekly disability compensation, whether partial,
permanent partial or total compensation, even where the postinjury wages equalled or exceeded the original wages at the time
293
of injury.
292 2

293

LARSON,

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

LAW

§

57.21,

at

5

(1952);

Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Workmen's Compensation for
Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531 (1954):
"Accordingly, the receipt of the same or higher wages after the
injury, especially from the same employer, does not necessarily bar
the finding of disability any more than continued lack of employment is conclusive of disability." Id. at 554.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Downey, 266 Ala. 344, 96 So. 2d
278 (1957) (broken leg as permanent partial disability of the body
as a whole-fact that no substantial decrease in post-injury wages
is no bar to award); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Segal, 229 F.2d 845
(5th Cir. 1956), 18 NACCA L.J. 123 (1956) (total disability allowed
despite greater post-injury wages at lighter work given by employer); Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230
(1951) (post-injury wages not binding, whether higher or lower);
Smith v. Perry Jones, Inc., 185 Kan. 505, 345 P.2d 640 (1959) (twenty
per cent permanent partial disability, though earning old wages);
Davis v. C. F. Braun & Co., 170 Kan. 177, 223 P.2d 958 (1950), 7
NACCA L.J. 104 (1951) (award fifteen per cent permanent partial
disability despite higher post-injury wages). "An award, however,
is not necessarily prevented by the fact that the employee has received the same wages after he returned to work as he had received before he was injured." Garrigan's Case, 169 N.E.2d 870,
873 (Mass. 1960). It is sufficient if "the employee is less efficient
in his former employment" or if the injury "diminished his earning
capacity in some other employment." Id. at 873. At time of award
employee was not working, but had previously had post-injury
wages equalling his original wage. Here, after heart attack, he
had to go on reduced schedule, and his earning capacity was reduced
from $107 to eighty-five dollars weekly. Accord, Shea v. Rettie,
287 Mass. 454, 192 N.E. 44 (1934) (patrolman could not thereafter
do full duties, but received old pay). In Massachusetts and elsewhere there is no recovery for lost wages, but there is recovery
for loss of ability, even where post-injury wages at the time of the
trial or jury verdict exceed old wages. Yates v. Dann, 167 F. Supp.
174 (D. Del. 1958) (tortfeasor not entitled to reduction where through
unusual exertion post-injury wages became higher).
Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. O'Keefe, 217 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1954),
15 NACCA L.J. 148 (1955) (partial compensation awarded for entire
back period despite higher post-injury wages for over eight years);
Pillsbury v. United Eng'r Co., 187 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1951) (entitled
to compensation though earning full wages); Luckenbach S.S. Co.
v. Norton, 96 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1938) (partial compensation for hernia
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The courts properly reason that in "determining loss of earning capacity, earnings after the injury must be corrected to corin force at the time prerespond with the general wage 'level
294
injury earnings were calculated.

In a leading case, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly held
that the words "able to earn thereafter" must be construed to
refer to conditions existing immediately after the accident, not
to conditions existing many years later.2 95 Larson states: "The
Arizona court's holding is the only possible result, if 'capacity' is
to be given any rational meaning. Anyone who rejects this result
would, to be consistent, have to include economic falls in wage
levels in disability calculations as well." 296 In such economic falls
insurers have successfully insisted, and the courts have held, that
the wage level in force at the time of the original injury alone
must be considered.
although earning full wages after injury); Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co. v. Hoage, 85 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (partial compensation
award upheld for entire period although receiving higher wages"dropped wrist," worked with one hand); Betz v. Columbia Tel. Co.,
224 Mo. App. 1004, 24 S.W.2d 224 (1930) (compensation awarded,
though earning former wages); Friedt v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 345
P.2d 377 (Mont. 1959) (test is loss of ability to earn in the open market, not whether there has been a loss of income); Ludwickson v.
Central States Elec. Co., 142 Neb. 308, 6 N.W.2d 65 (1942) (total continued, eventually earning $1,500 a year as instructor-under Nebraska statute, there was no "decrease of incapacity due solely to the
injury"); Carigan v. Winthrop Spinning Co., 95 N.H. 333, 63 A.2d 241
(1949), 3 NACCA L.J. 177 (1949) (partial compensation despite general wage increase making post-injury wages higher); Weinstock v.
United Cigar Stores Co., 137 Pa. Super. 128, 8 A.2d 799 (1939) (partial compensation despite higher post-injury wages); see also Crawford v. N. P. Nielson, 78 Idaho 526, 307 P.2d 229 (1957) (lost only
good eye and became totally blind; entitled to second injury fund
payments although he remained employed at same job at same pay);
Jones v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 114 So. 2d 602 (La.
App. 1959) (despite increase in pay from one dollar to one dollar and
forty cents per hour); Peak v. Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co.,
87 N.H. 350, 179 Atl. 355 (1935); Cory Bros. v. Hughes, [1911] 2 K.B.
738; accord, Russell v. Southeastern Util. Serv. Co., 230 Miss. 272, 92
So. 2d 544 (1957) (foreman at higher wages-fifty per cent loss of
wage earning capacity was not improper). This same rule governs
millions of federal workers: See In the Matter of Willie M. Sowers
Brown & Veteran's Administrator, No. 57-41, ECAB, Sept. 23, 1957
(loss of earning capacity though still earning old wages-laundry
worker after injury could never again do old work), citing case of
Elvin H. Tietze, 2 ECAB 38, 41.
294 2 LARsoN, WoRxvrN's COMPENSATION LAW § 57.32, at 13 (1952).
295 Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230 (1951).
296 2 LARSON, WoEMMeN's COIPENSATION LAW § 57.32, at 14-15 (1952).
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Post-injury wages equalling or in excess of the original-injury
wages do not necessarily bar the finding of disability any more
than the continued lack of employment is conclusive of disability.
The trier of fact is justified in disregarding post-injury wages on
proof that they are an unreliable basis for measuring the injured
employee's working capacity. Such proof is supplied when the
fact-finder is satisfied that a post-injury wage is high or low
because of, or in part affected by, any of the following factors:
(1) economic changes in the labor market which caused wages
to rise or fall; 297 (2) differences in the number of hours worked
since the injury; 2 98
(3) post-injury training or change in age
and maturity; 299 (4) the amount paid as "wages" is dispropor-

297 Durney's Case, 222 Mass. 461, 111 N.E. 166 (1916) (economic depression); Carignan v. Winthrop Spinning Co., 95 N.H. 333, 63 A.2d 241

298

299

(1949) (general wage increases); Mikno v. Endicott Johnson Corp.,
278 App. Div. 598, 102 N.Y.S.2d 45 (3d Dep't 1951) (economic conditions reduced earnings-remitted to see how much of reduction was
due to injury).
Franklin County Coal Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 398 Ill. 528, 76
N.E.2d 457 (1947) (entitled to partial award where hourly wage has
fallen but offset by working longer hours-if not figured in original
wage, overtime should not be figured in post-injury wages); Brandfon
v. Beacon Theatre Corp., 300 N.Y. 111, 89 N.E.2d 617 (1949) (if employee held two concurrent jobs, and only one figured in average
wage, post-injury wages in other job not to be considered); DiMezzo
v. G. Levor & Co., 281 App. Div. 719, 117 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1952)
(injured tannery worker, after disabling back injury, was elected
to part time position of town supervisor at higher wages than at
tannery-these wages were properly excluded in determining his
reduced earnings); Devlin v. Iron Works Creek Constr. Corp., 164 Pa.
Super. 481, 66 A.2d 221 (1949).
Epsten v. Hancock-Epsten Co., 101 Neb. 442, 163 N.W. 767 (1917)
(change in training and education); Taber v. Tole, 188 Kan. 312, 362
P.2d 17 (1961) (total permanent disability ordered for laborer suffering heatstroke despite subsequent education and teaching position at
$3,900 a year-ability to perform work he was able to do before injury governs); Greenfield v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 133 Mont. 136, 320
P.2d 1000 (1958) (sixteen year old boy-compensation adjusted, upon
his reaching maturity, to earnings as an adult in work of the type
in which he was employed at the time of the injury); Ludwickson
v. Central States Elec. Co., 142 Neb. 308, 6 N.W.2d 65 (1942) (completed education, but physical impairment unchanged; statute allowed
changes only when decrease in incapacity was "due solely to the
injury"-should not be penalized for training himself for more remunerative employment); Bowhill Coal Co. v. Malcolm, [1910] Sess.
Cas. 447 (Scot.) (eighteen year old minor with bad hernia could not
lift heavy weights after injury-not necessarily barred from compensation because getting same wages over year later).
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tionate to earning capacity because of employer-sympathy3 0 0 or
because fellow workers helped him with his work,30 or (5) for
any other reason3 0 2 the fact-finder is satisfied that the actual
post-injury wage does not fairly represent the earning capacity
of any employee still suffering from the effects of his industrial
injury.
However, in any case where the employee has been working
regularly and has been earning wages since the injury, the trier
of fact has the power to conclude on all the evidence before him,
that the actual post-injury wage in fact represents what the
employee is "able to earn ' 3 03 -that it represents his earning capacity; but he cannot exclude or ignore evidence tending to show
that the actual post-injury earnings have been abnormal or unreliable and therefore should be disregarded in fixing the em30 4
ployee's earning capacity.
(employer sympathypart of wage really a "gift"); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Hoage,
85 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Hulo v. City of New Iberia, 153 La. 284,
95 So. 719 (1923); Donahoe v. Ford Motor Co., 295 Mich. 422, 295
N.W. 211 (1940); Sporcic v. Swift & Co., 149 Neb. 246, 30 N.W.2d 891
(1948) (assigned difficult work after injury).
301 Raffaghelle v. Russell, 103 Kan. 849, 176 Pac. 640 (1918) (permanent
partial awarded though getting former wages-no abuse of discretion in awarding the compensation in a lump-sum instead of weekly);
Norwood v. Lake Bisteneau Oil Co., 145 La. 823, 83 So. 25 (1919)
(other workmen through sympathy would start the engine for him);
Quick v. Dow Chemical Co., 293 Mich. 215, 291 N.W. 638 (1940) (delegated the harder work to a helper).
302 National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950) (paraplegic with irregular, unreliable post-injury job-entire earnings disregarded and total payments continued); Zakon v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 328 Mass. 486, 104 N.E.2d 603 (1952) (employment irregular,
but made several thousand dollars in business transactions-total
and permanent disability affirmed) (accident policy case); Lee v.
Minneapolis St. Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433 (1950) (lost eye
and arm, developed neurosis); Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Bonner, 228
S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (iceman with ruptured disc performed odd jobs-not deprived of total permanent disability). See
cases cited in note 277 supra and 317 infra.
303 Korobchuk's Case, 277 Mass. 534, 179 N.E. 175 (1931); Lavallee's Case,
277 Mass. 538, 179 N.E. 214 (1931) (demonstrated earning capacity
governs, not actual post-injury wages).
304 Miles v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ariz. 208, 240 P.2d 171 (1952) (commission in error to give seventy-five per cent earning capacity since
actual comparison of wages here is reliable); Karr v. Armstrong
Tire & Rubber Co., 216 Miss. 132, 61 So. 2d 789 (1953) (trier of
fact denied compensation because post-injury wages greater than
pre-injury wages-reversed with direction to consider factors that
might have accounted for the increase); see also cases cited in notes
297-302 supra.
300 Shaw's Case, 247 Mass. 157, 141 N.E. 858 (1923)
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Where the statute speaks of "average" weekly wages earned
thereafter, 30 5 post-injury earning capacity cannot be figured on
a sliding scale, changing week by week, but must be computed on
an "average" earning capacity over any reasonable period. 30 6
305 Many statutes follow verbatim the original English wording "able
to earn thereafter."

For cases construing such statutes see, e.g.,

Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230 (1951);
Korobchuk's Case, 277 Mass. 534, 179 N.E. 175 (1931). "[Sltatutory
variations in the phrasing of the test" have not changed the result
that "actual post-injury earnings" may be disregarded in establishing earning capacity. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
§ 57.21, at 5 (1952).
306 The "sliding-scale" method usually results in the loss of many dollars to employees drawing partial compensation weekly. Consider
the following example. The pre-injury wage was eighty dollars,
and the administrator finds a present earning capacity of sixty
dollars and awards the employee twenty dollars weekly (the full
difference is awarded by statute in Massachusetts). The employee
then gets a job with earnings which vary weekly. The administrator finds that his actual weekly earnings represent what he is
"able to earn"; therefore he goes over the payroll on a sliding scale,
week by week. Those weeks in which the worker earns less than
sixty dollars, he gets only twenty dollars weekly. Those weeks in
which he earns eighty dollars or more he gets nothing in compensation. The result is that the employee is financially worse off
than if the "average" earning capacity over the entire period is
taken as required by the typical statute-"average weekly wages
The same problem arose under
he is able to earn thereafter."
England's statute, from which the Massachusetts' and other statutes
"I am quite
are copied verbatim. As one English Court stated:
clear that the County Court Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction in
making his award on a sliding scale. We are told that the learned
Judge is in the habit of making awards in this form, and I only
desire to say now that, if this is so, I think it is time it was stopped.
Sometime ago we considered this very point in Baker v. Jewell,
[19103 2 K.B. 673. The appeal must be allowed and the case sent
back." Newhouse & Co. v. Johnson, 5 B.W.C.C. 137 (1911) (County
Judge had awarded two-thirds the weekly difference between one
pound and what he actually earned, or ten shillings, whichever was
"In estimating the average the arbitrator may take such
less).
period immediately before his award as he thinks proper for the
purpose." WILLIS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 300 (37th ed. 1945),
citing Watson v. Quinn, [1923] Sess. Cas. 6 (1922). In the Watson
case, the arbitrator in fixing partial omitted the eighteen month
period when wages were abnormally high, and used only the last
three months for the "average weekly earnings thereafter." Willis
states that if Quinn had been uninjured he probably would have
been earning double his old wage during the period of high wages.
The arbitrator properly used his own good sense to work out the
average. Sullivan's Case, 218 Mass. 141, 105 N.E. 463 (1914) (English
decisions on incapacity, because we copied the English words, are
of weight).
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Permanent Total Disability

Where the statute uses the words "permanent and total" disability it is clear that the disability need not be permanently
total, without intervals of relief, or totally permanent. It is sufficient if at the time of the award the injury is both total and
permanent.30 7 And even though the "and" is missing, the words
"permanent total" are still two adjectives modifying disability,
30 8
and the same rules apply.
The overwhelming weight of authority permits awards of
permanent total disability even though the employee is not absolutely helpless or physically broken for all purposes other than
to live. 30 9 Nor does occasional work over a long or short period,
with small remuneration, bar recovery. 310 Where the injuries are
especially serious-the employee has become a paraplegic or has
lost a leg-the weight of authority permits the trier of fact to
disregard as "earning capacity" any income derived from heroic
307
308

Vass' Case, 319 Mass. 297, 65 N.E.2d 549 (1946); McDonald v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Wis. 372, 162 N.W. 345 (1917).
See Horovitz, The Meaning of Disability Under Workmen's Com-

pensation Acts, 1 NACCA L.J. 32, 41-42 (1948).
Berg v. Sadler, 235 Minn. 214, 50 N.W.2d 266 (1951), 9 NACCA L.J.
105 (1952) (lost use of parts of both feet, no education beyond
seventh grade); Kuhnle v. Department of Labor & Indus., 12 Wash.
2d 191, 120 P.2d 1003 (1942) (broken neck, odd-lot theory applied);
In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (1941). See also Berry v.
United States, 312 U.S. 450 (1940) (one leg amputated and stump
constantly chafed-was totally and permanently disabled) (veterans
policy case). "It was not necessary that petitioner be bedridden,
wholly helpless," he was unable "to work with any reasonable degree of regularity at any substantially gainful employment." Id.
at 455.
The following formula is followed in the Social Security Acts
pamphlet. "A person must be unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity due to a medical condition which is expected to
continue for a long and indefinite time without any real improvement. This does not mean that a person must be helpless to
qualify."
310 Endicott v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 69 Idaho 450, 208 P.2d 803 (1949)
(could not secure employment, but did keep a few cows and chickens); Casger v. Fuger, 79 Idaho 56, 310 P.2d 812 (1957) (earned less

309

than $500 per year in each of two succeeding post-injury years);
Berg v. Sadler, 235 Minn. 214, 50 N.W.2d 266 (1951) (lost use of
parts of both feet-earned only $300-$400 a year for five years);

Cleland v. Verona Radio, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 588, 33 A.2d 712 (Sup. Ct.
1943) (feeding chickens); In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (1941)
(broken hip, bladder and back trouble-disabled for all practical

purposes).
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efforts of the victim to better himself, such as working in pain; 311
from post-injury education; 3 12 or from dragging himself to work
irregularly and sporadically, and by telephone or other means,
earning even substantial amounts. 3 13 Hence, to constitute an
"earning capacity" chargeable to the employee, the work must be
of a substantial character, and not of a trifling nature, 314 and reincluding age, expergard must be had to all the circumstances,
31 5
ience, capabilities and training.
In addition, the weight of authority requires that the work
be of a regular, continuous character; sporadic, irregular work is
not the type of work upon which the injured employee can rely
311

It is error to charge the jury that working despite pain prevents
a permanent disability award. "Pinched by poverty, beset by adversity, driven by necessity, one may work to keep the wolf away
from the door though not physically able to work ......

Mabry

v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.2d 497, 498 (5th Cir. 1952) (totally and
permanently disabled even though working); Texas Indem. Ins. Co.
v. Bonner, 228 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (disc injury, worked
despite pain-no bar, even though receiving old pay at regular job);
accord, Great American Indem. Co. v. Segal, 229 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.
1956).
With regard to jury trials, see 10 NACCA L.J. 111 (1952). Jury
trials in compensation cases still exist in Maryland, Ohio, Oregon,
Texas, Vermont and Washington. The finding of a jury and the
finding of an administrator are treated alike, and in most states,
the finding is final if based on evidence or reasonable inference
from the evidence.
(back injury, went
312 Tabor v. Tole, 188 Kan. 312, 362 P.2d 17 (1961)
to teacher's college, no physical change in back). In effect, this
recovery rejects the harsh contention that the injured worker should
be penalized for rehabilitating himself.
313 National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784
(1950)
(learned typing and bookkeeping, earned $5,500 in eleven years);
Zakon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 328 Mass. 486, 104 N.E.2d 603
(1952), 10 NACCA L.J. 114 (1952) (earned several thousand dollars
over a two year period by placing construction mortgages) (accident policy case, citing workmen's compensation cases). See also
Taber v. Tole, 188 Kan. 312, 362 P.2d 17 (1961) (salary as teacher
disregarded).
314 Frennier's Case, 318 Mass. 635, 63 N.E.2d 461 (1945).
315 Endicott v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 69 Idaho 450, 208 P.2d 803 (1949)
(fifty-five year old, eighth grade education, kept chickens); Frennier's Case, 318 Mass. 635, 63 N.E.2d 461 (1945); Berg v. Sadler, 235
Minn. 214, 50 N.W.2d 266 (1951) (forty-seven years old, seventh
grade education, rural background); Colvin v. E. I. duPont De
Nemours Co., 227 S.C. 465, 88 S.E.2d 581 (1955), 17 NACCA L.J. 49
(1956) (only qualified for common labor, and could not do that
because of injury-total and permanent award upheld).
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83

To rule otherwise would be to punish the

victims of industrial accidents by taking away their rights to
permanent total disability because they attempted to eke out a
317
living by sporadic work, but failed in fact to earn a livelihood.
"Earning capacity" is not actual wages earned, but is the power
or capacity to earn; and a power that is so destroyed that it prevents regular, continuous work may be disregarded as an "earning capacity" 31s by the trier of fact.
It is not the percentage of physical loss determined on a
purely medical basis that determines the loss of earning capacity;3 19 the bodily functional loss is not necessarily proportional
to the loss of earning capacity. For example, a bodily function
loss of thirty per cent may result in a one-hundred per cent loss
of earning capacity and thereby render the injured worker totally

316 Boss v. Travelers Ins. Co., 296 Mass. 18, 4 N.E.2d 468 (1936) (continuing earning capacity upon which one can rely to a substantial
degree for a livelihood) (insurance policy case, citing workmen's
compensation cases); Zakon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 328 Mass.
486, 104 N.E.2d 603 (1952) (occasional employment, although business transactions highly remunerative, does not necessarily prove
continuing and steady ability to perform) (insurance policy case,
citing workmen's compensation cases); Berg v. Sadler, 235 Minn.
214, 50 N.W.2d 266 (1951), 9 NACCA L.J. 105 (1951) (not continuous or steady employment).
317 National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 226, 214 P.2d 784, 787
(1950), 5 NACCA L.J. 103 (1950) (employment under unusual circumstances not employee's undoing in compensation granted by
statute); Endicott v. Potlatch Forest, Inc., 69 Idaho 450, 208 P.2d 803
(1949), (not penalized for obtaining trivial or unusual employmentno slamming door of hope or ambition on cripples); Taber v. Tole,
188 Kan. 312, 362 P.2d 17 (1961); Honeycutt v. Carolina Asbestos
Co., 235 N.C. 471, 70 S.E.2d 426 (1952); see also cases cited in note
277 supra and note 318 infra.
318 National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950)
(injury to spinal cord, partial paralysis of legs); Lee v. Minneapolis
St. Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433 (1950) (lost left eye, seventyfive per cent loss of use of left arm, severe post-traumatic neurosis).
"An employee who is so injured that he can perform no services
other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability, or
quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist,
may well be classified as totally disabled." Id. at 320, 41 N.W.2d
at 436. Berg v. Sadler, 235 Minn. 214, 50 N.W.2d 266 (1951), 9
NACCA L.J. 105 (1952) (lost use of parts of both feet). See also
cases in note 317 supra.
319 Castle v. City of Stillwater, 235 Minn. 502, 51 N.W.2d 370 (1952),
10 NACCA L.J. 109 (1952); Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co.,
127 Mont. 211, 259 P.2d 340 (1953).
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and permanently disabled for work.3 20 In reverse this can result
in a high physical loss creating a very small loss of earning
capacity.

3 21

In many states the total and permanent award is made subject to change if the worker's condition improves. 322 Under such
circumstances awards can alternate from time to time-from no
compensation to total compensation to partial compensation to
permanent total compensation. 323 Because a partially physically
disabled employee, unable to market his remaining capacity for
work, has totally lost his "earning capacity" during periods of
unemployment, he may be awarded total or permanent total disability payments. 324 And "total" in temporary total disability
cases is governed by exactly the same criteria as "total" in per325
manent total disability cases.

The weight of authority regards permanent as not necessarily
meaning "for life," but as covering disabilities which will continue indefinitely 326 into the future. The fact that it is conceivable or possible that a future operation may help, or that doctors
320

321

322

323

324

325

326

Castle v. City of Stillwater, 235 Minn. 502, 51 N.W.2d 370 (1952),
10 NACCA L.J. 109 (1952) (sixty-nine year old chief of police, injury to cervical spine affecting legs and right hand).
Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co., 127 Mont. 211, 259 P.2d
340 (1953), 12 NACCA L.J. 55 (1953) (failed to produce evidence
that earning capacity reduced, though physical loss high).
Casger v. Fuger, 79 Idaho 56, 310 P.2d 812 (1957) (permanent total
benefits awarded, can change award if he improves); KentuckyJellico Coal Co. v. Jones, 299 Ky. 69, 184 S.W.2d 216 (1944); Cummings v. T. H. Mastin & Co., 17 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1944) (if condition improves, employer can have new hearing) (infection, ulcers,
and pain following fracture of leg); Vass' Case, 319 Mass. 297, 65
N.E.2d 549 (1946); Cramer v. Industrial Comm'n, 144 Ohio St. 135,
57 N.E.2d 233 (1944); Evans-Wallower Zinc, Inc. v. Hunt, 195 Okla.
518, 159 P.2d 720 (1945).
Vass' Case, 319 Mass. 297, 65 N.E.2d 549 (1946); Hingle v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 30 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 1947) (change in type of compensation permitted if employee improves); Hummer's Case, 317 Mass.
617, 59 N.E.2d 295 (1945).
Gramolini's Case, 328 Mass. 86, 101 N.E.2d 750 (1951) (sought employment and was refused, earning capacity just as impaired as if
physically disabled); Fennell's Case, 289 Mass. 89, 193 N.E. 885 (1935).
Frennier's Case, 318 Mass. 635, 63 N.E.2d 461 (1945) (same rules govern); accord, Vass' Case, 319 Mass. 297, 65 N.E.2d 549 (1946); Hingle
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 30 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 1947).
Yoffa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 304 Mass. 110, 23 N.E.2d 108
(1939) ("indefinitely" is sufficient); Logsdon v. Industrial Comm'n,
143 Ohio St. 508, 57 N.E.2d 75 (1944) (indefinite period of time without present indication of termination).
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may later discover a cure, or that it is possible that claimant's
condition may improve, is not a bar to an award for permanent
total disability. 327

Otherwise claimants could be compelled to

wait for years, beyond the period when any award would help
them, before the trier of fact would decide the issue.
Permanent total disability is usually a question of fact.32 ' On
appeal, the finding below will be sustained whenever rationally
possible, whether the injury is the loss of four fingers and the
thumb of one hand,329 or some fingers on both hands,33 0 or even
for a disabling neurosis.33 1 The law does not distinguish between
functional and organic injuries, and a combination of both has
been repeatedly held to be a proper basis for awards of perma332
nent total disability.
The liberal construction applicable to other questions of workmen's compensation is also applicable to matters involving permanent and total disability payments. 33 3 This is especially true
327

Yoffa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 304 Mass. 110, 23 N.E.2d 108

(1939) (mere possibility of future recovery does not bar award)
(accident policy case); Berg v. Sadler, 235 Minn. 214, 50 N.W.2d
266 (1951) (suggestion that claimant might train self for elevator
job falls in realm of speculation and conjecture). See also Lauble's
Case, 170 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Mass. 1960): "It is no bar to a finding of the fact in such cases that there is a possibility that the
claimant's condition will improve ....
328

Gramolini's Case, 328 Mass. 86, 101 N.E.2d 750 (1951), 9 NACCA
L.J. 104 (1951) (a question of fact for the board); Sheldon Oil Co.

v. Thompson, 176 Okla. 511, 56 P.2d 1171 (1936) (merely question
of fact-three doctors said permanent and total, two doctors said
only partial); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Brasher, 234 S.W.2d
698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), 7 NACCA L.J. 101 (1950) (affirmed jury
finding of total and permanent disability-question of fact).
329 Gramolini's Case, 328 Mass. 86, 101 N.E.2d 750 (1951), 9 NACCA L.J.
103 (1951).
330 Frennier's Case, 318 Mass. 635, 63 N.E.2d 461 (1945).
331 Peavy v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 40 So. 2d 505 (La. App.
1949), 4 NACCA L.J. 191 (1949) (total and permanent for traumatic neurosis, following fall of eight feet); see neuroses cases cited
in notes 34-37 supra.
(1957) (severe neck
332 Casger v. Fuger, 79 Idaho 56, 310 P.2d 812
injury, complicated by traumatic neurosis and loss of libido-no
longer available on the labor market); Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry.,
230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433 (1950) (loss of eye, bad left arm,
severe traumatic neurosis); see also cases cited in notes 34-37 supra.
333 National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950) (liberal interpretation and application in order to fully effectuate its
purposes); Castle v. City of Stillwater, 235 Minn. 502, 51 N.W.2d
370 (1952) (workmen's compensation is type of social insurance);
see also cases cited in notes 4, 199, 240, and 309-17 supra.
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in dealing with those victims of industry who need all the help
that the workmen's compensation acts can give them-the crippled
worker who is permanently and totally disabled.
G.

SCHEDULE INJURIES

Under most acts, if an injury has left the claimant with a
permanent bodily impairment, compensation for a specified number of weeks is payable to the employee. These payments are
usually referred to as "schedule benefits," "specific benefits" or
sometimes as "permanent partial disability" payments. Whatever
the nomenclature, such payments are made without regard to
the presence or absence of wage loss during that period. 383 4
Thus, the loss of a leg or arm, by loss of use or by amputation, is
generally called a "schedule loss," and the compensation payable
is a fixed, arbitrary amount which varies from state to state. 335
In addition many states now provide scheduled amounts for
disfigurement. Some states have limited this to "serious facial"
disfigurement; others have broadened it to cover all types of disfigurements, such as "bodily" disfigurement, or disfigurement
without limitations. There is a third group of schedule injuries
which provide for the loss of bodily functions such as the loss of
eyesight, hearing or eating (loss of teeth).
Some courts and authors consider that schedule losses are
based on wage loss, not demonstrable perhaps at the time of the
injury, but representing what in the long run will be the impairment of the employee's earning capacity. This presumed loss is
converted into a conclusive presumption, and gives the hapless
industrial victim now what eventually would be his long-term
336
impairment.
334

The term "permanent partial disability" must be viewed with caution. In some states it is purely a schedule benefit, giving a specified number of weekly payments, regardless whether the injured
employee goes back to work. In other states, it is like temporary
compensation, measured by the loss in earning capacity.
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR

STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR,

BULL. No.

161, STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 29

(Rev. 1960), uses
the word "permanent partial disability" to include two classes:
(1) schedule injuries and (2) non-schedule injuries such as a disability caused by injury to the head or back. A study of tables
8 and 9, with the footnotes, indicates the hopeless confusion existing nation-wide.
335 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATE WORKMEN'S

336

STANDARDS,

COMPENSATION

DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No.
35, table 9 (Rev. 1960).

161,

LAWS

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1955) (conclusively established wage loss, no proof of wage loss needed); National
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Other courts and writers consider these schedule payments as
arbitrary amounts unrelated to any present or future loss of
earning capacity. 337 Some argue that they are substitutes for the
common-law action taken away from the employees by the exclusive features of compensation acts, nd are the result of legislative jockeying. Dean Pound33 8 suggests that these detailed
schedules of relief are reminiscent of the schedules of payments
for injuries in the codes of Hammurabi, Ethelbert and The Twelve
Tables. Financially they are clearly a poor substitute for modern
common-law damages. One is inclined to agree with the venerable Dean when one tries to figure out why a great toe is worth
fifteen weeks of payments in one state, and sixty weeks in another; a first finger eighteen weeks of payments in one state and
fifty-five weeks in another; and an arm at the shoulder fifty-four
dollars a week for 500 weeks in state A and only thirty-nine
dollars a week for 175 weeks in state B. Similar discrepancies appear in the schedules for loss of hands, thumbs, second fingers,
third fingers, legs, feet, other toes, eyesight and hearing in one
or both ears.38 9 Surely the cost of living does not vary that much
from state to state.
Unfortunately most of the payments provided are so low as
eventually to pauperize the seriously injured victims of industry.
Nevertheless, the statutes being what they are, the courts have
no recourse but to construe them as best they can.

337

Distillers Prod. Co. v. Jones, 309 Ky. 394, 217 S.W.2d 813 (1948)
(award not in nature of insurance or damages for permanent impairment of power to earn money).
See 2 LARSON, WORKmrEN'S
ComPENsATIoN LAW § 58.32, at 51 (1952).
Swift & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 302 IM. 38, 134 N.E. 9 (1922) (is
an arbitrary amount); Cooper v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 137 N.J.L. 181,
59 A.2d 268 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948), 2 NACCA L.J. 237 (1948) (indemnity for personal injury sustained rather than for loss of earning power); Bear & Bear, Workmen's Compensation, in 1956 ANNUAL
("... . arbitrary
SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAw 184, 191 (1957)
principle of extra compensation payments ... for the purpose of
providing an extra subsistence benefit" for widows, to alleviate
failure of compensation act to provide subsistence payments).

338

Pound, The Foundation of Law, 10 Am. U.L. REV. 124 (1961).

339

order to relieve the overcrowded dockets of our courts many are now
advocating recurrence to the method of Hammurabi, The Twelve
Tables and Ethelbert-the expedient of the Workmen's Compensation
Acts." Id. at 132.
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDs, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 161,
STATE WORMEN'S COMPENSATioN LAWS 35, table 9

(Rev. 1960).

"In
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(1)

Amputation and Loss of Use-Selecting the Greater Remedy

Most statutes provide for weekly payments for non-scheduled
disabilities-temporary total and temporary partial disability for
340
such injuries as back strains and internal injuries. A few states
try to reduce everything to schedule compensation by allowing
a fixed amount for loss of use of the body as a whole, and then
taking a per cent of that amount for every conceivable type of
injury, even for neurosis.
The great majority, however, provide specific amounts for
loss of extremities and parts of extremities. Suppose an employee loses only his hand but pain renders the arm useless, or
partially useless, so that if the worker could receive compensation
for a per cent of the arm he would get more money than for a
hand. Or suppose two amputated fingers cause complications in
the hand. Can the injured worker demand the greater sum?
Bearing in mind that the acts must be construed liberally,
the great majority of courts, give the employee the choice of
the greater amount, where the effects of the loss of the member
extend to other parts of the body and interfere with their efficiency. 341 In short, the lower schedule amount is not the exclusive remedy in these cases.
Other courts give the employee the election to select the
better remedy even where there is only partial loss of a member
340

Cooper v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 137 N.J.L. 181, 59 A.2d 268 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1948) (twenty-eight weeks of compensation affirmed for
loss of seven teeth-but for neurosis, five per cent of total held
proper); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Patterson, 204 Tenn. 673, 325 S.W.2d
259 (1959) (leg partly useless, but allowed to get greater amount by
taking percentage of "body as a whole"); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 161, STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, table 8, note 13 (Rev. 1960).
In Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming, the laws specify flat monetary amounts rather

341

than a percentage of wages. In Massachusetts, schedule compensation for everyone is at a flat twenty dollars per week, regardless
of wages; Oregon awards a certain sum for each degree of disability
in permanent partial injuries schedule.
Alm v. Morris Barick Cattle Co., 240 Iowa 1174, 38 N.W.2d 161
(1949); Miller v. Massman Constr. Co., 169 Kan. 499, 219 P.2d 429
(1950) (causalgia induced by foot injury); Zazo v. International
Paper Co., 275 App. Div. 881, 88 N.Y.S.2d 740 (3d Dep't 1949) (pain

from heel); Wilson v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 189 Ore. 114,
219 P.2d 138 (1950) (pain and nervousness accompanying loss of
vision will support disability award beyond loss of eyes); Hendricks
v. Patterson, 164 Pa. Super. 584, 67 A.2d 652 (1949) (stiffening of
a hip socket).
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with no resulting complications.3 42 Thus the loss of three and
one-half fingers was considered loss of a hand,343 and partial loss
of the use of both feet amounted to total disability, not two separate smaller losses. 344 And where a miner so injured his leg that
he was unable to perform labor, a total permanent disability
award was upheld.3 45 But until we had reached Van Dorpel v.

Haven-Busch Co. 346 and Alaska Industrial Bd. v. Chugach Elec.
Ass'n,347 few courts had allowed the worker to obtain both remedies!
(2)

Loss of Functions

Many acts have provisions for loss of eyesight, hearing, eating
(loss of teeth), or other bodily functions. These provisions vary
widely. However, where the statutes are silent on disputed issues concerning these functions the majority of courts have given
a broad and liberal interpretation of the sections of the acts.
or enucleThus loss of sight is held to include the destruction
3 48 or even of a blind eye.3 49
ation of a defective
342

343

344

345

346
347
348

Cox v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 93 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. Tenn.
1950), relying on Johnson v. Anderson, 188 Tenn. 194, 217 S.W.2d
939 (1949) (two parallel benfits covered uncomplicated loss of a leg
leading to total disability-rule of liberal construction allows claimant the more favorable remedy); Rockwell v. Lewis, 168 App. Div.
674, 154 N.Y. Supp. 893 (3d Dep't 1915); Standard Glass Co. v. Wallace, 189 Tenn. 213, 225 SW.2d 35 (1949) (seventy-five per cent loss
of use of hand for partial loss of several fingers); Fidelity & Cas. Co.
v. Patterson, 204 Tenn. 673, 325 S.W.2d 259 (1959) (schedule injuries
included injury to "the body as a whole"--serious injury to upper
thigh making the leg partly useless, but allowed the greater amount
based on a percentage of "the body as a whole").
Rice v. Public Meat Mkt., 166 Pa. Super. 328, 70 A.2d 443 (1950)
(meat cutter in a butcher shop could no longer grip tools).
Berg v. Sadler, 235 Minn. 214, 50 N.W.2d 266 (1951) (farm and road
worker, and could not do work involving walking or standing).
Department of Mines & Minerals v. Castle, 240 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.
1951). Contra, Arview v. Industrial Comm'n, 415 Ill. 522, 114 N.E.2d
698 (1953) (three scheduled awards due for loss of one arm and
two legs, but claimant compelled to take permanent total disability
award paying less).
350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W.2d 97 (1957), 21 NACCA L.J. 207 (1958).
356 U.S. 32G (1958).
Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp. v. O'Hearne, 218 F.2d 651 (4th Cir.
1955), 16 NACCA L.J. 161 (1955) (defective eye with twenty per
cent vision before injury; award for loss of useful vision); Pizzano's
Case, 331 Mass. 380, 119 N.E.2d 390 (1954) (defective eye must
start above 20/70).
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Loss of hearing, partial 3 50 or total,3 5' is compensable as an
occupational disease where it is related to continual noise at work.
Where found to be a schedule loss, the cost is usually placed upon
the last 352 employer or carrier.

Where a schedule award is al-

lowed for loss of a "member of the body," the ear is considered
353
such a member, and loss of hearing in one ear is compensable.
Loss of teeth are compensable under a statute giving a schedule payment for the serious and permanent impairment of a
physical function; and the fact that some teeth were missing before the accident is no defense, for the worker thereby "depended
more

on

those remaining.

35 4

And

where

the

statute

based

schedule payments on a percentage loss of the body as a whole,
the loss of seven teeth justified the payment of twenty-eight
weeks of compensation. 355

349

Hemphill v. Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 174 Kan. 301, 255 P.2d 624
(1953), 12 NACCA L.J. 105 (1953) (refused to read in limitation that
eye be perfect); Mosgaard v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 161 Minn. 318, 201

N.W. 545 (1924) ("loss of an eye" includes sightless eye); McKenzie
v. Gulf Hills Hotel, Inc., 221 Miss. 723, 74 So. 2d 830 (1954), 16 NACCA
L.J. 497 (1955)

350

(blind for thirty years prior to injury); Crown Wood-

working Co. v. Goodwin, 100 N.H. 431, 128 A.2d 918 (1957) (blind
from infancy; "eye lost"); Riegle v. Fordon, 273 App. Div. 213, 76
N.Y.S.2d 523 (3d Dep't) (blind eye was enucleated when scratched
by weeds; is loss of "member of the body"), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 560, 81
N.E.2d 101 (1948).
Marie v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. 1959), 23
NACCA L.J. 160 (1959) (result of work noise over long period);
Slawinski v. J. H. Williams & Co., 273 App. Div. 826, 76 N.Y.S.2d

888 (3d Dep't) (partial deafness due to tinnitus), aff'd, 298 N.Y.
546, 81 N.E.2d 93 (1948).
351 Green Bay Drop Forge Co. v. Wojcik, 265 Wis. 38, 61 N.W.2d 847
(1953) (both ears; result of exposure to the noise of drop forge
hammers).
(no ap352 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1955)
portionment; loss of hearing is a schedule loss, whether occupational
disease or injury).
353
354

355

Long v. Cappell, 216 S.C. 243, 57 S.E.2d 415 (1950), 5 NACCA L.J.
107 (1950).
Macaluso v. Schill-Wolfson, Inc., 56 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 1952), 11
NACCA L.J. 98 (1953) (similar to aggravation cases; even though
dentures help, chewing function is "seriously and permanently impaired").
Cooper v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 137 N.J.L. 181, 59 A.2d 268 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1948).
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Disfigurement

Where the statute limits payments to serious facial disfigurements or uses the word "disfigurement," 356 facial scars of all types
have been held compensable. Enucleation of an eye which results
in a noticeably artifical eye is a disfigurement.Y
Where there is no limitation as to the location of the disfigurement, or the statute specifies "bodily" disfigurement or
merely "disfigurement," the courts have again shown liberality
in interpretation. Where the defense was that clothing covered
the scars or mutilated parts of the anatomy, the court properly
pointed out that there was no such limitation in the state, and
that furthermore the parts of the body covered by clothing has
shrunk drastically in the years past.3 5 8

The overwhelming weight

of authority considers loss of teeth as a disfigurement despite
newly installed, good-looking dentures. 59
Where the statute is silent as to whether the schedule payments for loss of function or for other losses shall specifically
absorb and exclude payments for disfigurement, the majority of
courts will allow both types of awards.3 60 There is no reason
358

National Distillers Prods. Corp. v. Jones, 309 Ky. 394, 217 S.W.2d

813 (1948).
McCoy v. Easley Cotton Mills, 218 S.C. 350, 62 S.E.2d 772 (1950),
7 NACCA L.J. 63 (1951) (common knowledge that facial disfigurement is handicap in obtaining employment).
358 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Wilson, 210 Md. 568, 124 A.2d 249 (1956)
(scars below knee and on thigh; disfigurement can be anywhere on
body).
359 Betz v. Columbia Tel. Co., 224 Mo. App. 1004, 24 S.W.2d 224 (1930)
(also loss of earning power; inability to chew resulted in stomach
ailment). "The loss of 31 teeth is a serious handicap to any one.
It is a severe mutilation and permanent disfigurement. To say
otherwise is to speak contrary to nature. No one could be so devoted to the practical and artificial as to claim for 'store teeth'
equal advantage with the sound and natural incisors and molars.
If there be such a one, we apprehend that time holds for him certain
and complete disillusionment." Id. at 1013, 24 S.W.2d at 229. Grinnell Co. v. Smith, 203 Okla. 158, 218 P.2d 1043 (1950), 6 NACCA
L.J. 91 (1950) (loss of four teeth is "serious and permanent disfigurement" despite excellent denture); Cagle v. Clinton Cotton
Mills, 216 S.C. 93, 56 S.E.2d 747 (1949), 5 NACCA L.J. 106 (1950)
(loss of four front teeth is serious injury to "member or organ of
the body").
360 Case v. Pillsbury, 148 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1945); Morley's Case, 328
Mass. 652, 102 N.E.2d 493 (f951) (allowance for loss of use of hand
and for disfigurement); Boynton's Case, 328 Mass. 145, 102 N.E.2d
490 (1951) (disfigurement compensation for loss of four toes; specific
payments for the amputations); Elkins v. Lallier, 38 N.M. 316, 32
357
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why loss of use and disfigurement of the same member cannot
both be compensated. Hence, a person collecting for loss of teeth
as a loss of the function of eating may also collect for the disfigurement caused by the loss of these teeth, despite the use of
adequate false teeth as a replacement. 361 And the loss of, or loss
of use of, legs, arms, or parts of legs or arms, is considered a disfigurement; 362 and usually gives rise to payments both for ampu63
tations (or loss of use) and for disfigurement.
Disfigurement payments vary throughout the United States
and provide for a limited amount in dollars, on a discretionary
scale dependent on severity,3 64 or for a specific arbitrary amount;
and they are usually payable whether or not the employee returns to work.36 5
(4)

Heritability

The courts are hopelessly divided3 66 on whether the unpaid
balance of schedule or other payments, due on and after the day
of death, pass on death to the employee's next of kin or dependents. The great weight of authority, however, gives the estate
P.2d 759 (1934); Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N.C. 257, 22

S.E.2d 570 (1942); Jewell v. R. B. Bond Co., 198 S.C. 86, 15 S.E.2d
361

362

363
364

365

366

684 (1941).
Macaluso v. Schill-Wolfson, Inc., 56 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 1952) (loss
of teeth is loss of function); Boynton's Case, 328 Mass. 145, 102 N.E.
2d 490 (1951) (loss of function is catch-all; can only collect for
any two of: loss of use, disfigurement, or loss of bodily functions
where all three relate to the same member); see Betz v. Columbia
Tel. Co., 224 Mo. App. 1004, 24 S.W.2d 224 (1930).
Haynes v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 198 S.C. 75, 15 S.E.2d 846 (1941)
(carpenter lost first joint of thumb; condition equivalent to deformity).
See cases cited note 360 supra.
See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 152, § 36(h) (1958). Massachusetts provides up to $2500 for bodily disfigurement. The amount
is to be determined by the board, but must be "proper and equitable
compensation."
Haynes v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 198 S.C. 75, 15 S.E.2d 846 (1941)
(payments even though working).
No survivorship in favor of next of kin is illustrated by: Tennessee
Coal & Iron Div., United States Steel Corp. v. Hubbert, 268 Ala. 674,
110 So. 2d 260 (1959); United States Steel Corp. v. Baker, 266 Ala.
538, 97 So. 2d 899 (1957) (but changed by statute); Henderson's Case,
333 Mass. 491, 131 N.E.2d 925 (1955); Bartoni's Case, 225 Mass. 349,
114 N.E. 663 (1916) (changed by MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. c. 152,
§ 36A (1958) ); American Woolen Co. v. Grillini, 78 R.I. 50, 78 A.2d
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the right to accrued but unpaid installments up to the day of
deaths 6 7 The dispute is as to payments due after the death of
the employee. A reasonable argument can be made either way;
but since compensation acts are to be construed liberally, silence
on this issue should favor the next of kin or dependents. 3 8
Recent statutory amendments have been in the direction of
compelling employers or insurers to pay any balance of the schedule award to the dependents.3 69
(5)

Use of Charts and Predetermined Administrative Policies

Many boards are given statutory power to make rules but
these rules are usually required to be consistent with the com795 (1951); Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
118 Utah 46, 218 P.2d 970 (1950); Dowe v. Specialty Brass Co., 219
Wis. 192, 262 N.W. 605 (1935).

367

368

369

Allowance of survivorship in favor of next of kin is illustrated
by: Parker v. Walgreen Drug Co., 63 Ariz. 374, 162 P.2d 427 (1945);
Morganelli's Estate v. City of Derby, 105 Conn. 545, 135 Atl. 911
(1927); Mahoney v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 443, 133 P.2d 927
(1943) (liquidated damages go to estate); Gennari v. Norwood Hills
Corp., 322 S.W.2d 718 (-Mo. 1959); Wood Coal Co. v. State Compensation Comm'r, 119 W. Va. 581, 195 S.E. 528 (1938).
Bartoni's Case, 225 Mass. 349, 114 N.E. 663 (1916); Stetu v. Ford
Motor Co., 277 Mich. 468, 269 N.W. 236 (1936); Calkins v. Department of Labor & Indus., 10 Wash. 2d 565, 117 P.2d 640 (1941). Where
death is due to unrelated causes, compensation due to date of death
may be collected by the widow or administratrix even if the award
has not yet been rendered:
Smith v. State, 52 Cal. 2d 751, 344
P.2d 293 (1959) (due from second injury funds); Wascom v. Miller,
101 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 1958); Kozielec v. Mack M\1fg. Corp., 29
N.J. Super. 272, 102 A.2d 404 (Middlesex County Ct. L. 1953) (even
if deceased failed to request schedule payment during his lifetime,
widow can file petition after his death).
In Parker v. Walgreen Drug Co., 63 Ariz. 374, 162 P.2d 427 (1945),
the court said that the schedule compensation amount was fixed
and enjoyment was merely delayed by monthly payments; thus
they should go to the estate.
For further reasons for allowing heritability see: Morganelli's
Estate v. City of Derby, 105 Conn. 545, 135 Atl. 911 (1927); Mahoney
v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 443, 133 P.2d 927 (1943); Gennari v.
Norwood Hills Corp., 322 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. 1959); Wood Coal Co. v.
State Compensation Comm'r, 119 W. Va. 581, 195 S.E. 528 (1938).
See discussion of such statutes in: Tennessee Coal & Iron Div.,
United States Steel Corp. v. Hubbert, 268 Ala. 674, 110 So. 2d 260
(1959) (statute amended to permit widow or children to receive
unpaid balance; but held not retrospective); Henderson's Case, 333

Mass. 491, 131 N.E.2d 925 (1956).
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pensation act for carrying out its provisions .' 0
This statutory power does not entitle boards to create charts
and predetermine in advance of cases the amounts due for disfigurements, loss of function, amputations or loss of use. Where
the amounts are specifically fixed by statute, no charts are necessary. Where the compensation act gives any discretion to the
trier of fact, or calls for observation of the injured part to determine the relative loss, or creates a discretionary sliding scale
of awards, each case must be decided on its own merits. 37'1 As
much as it would save time to use charts, the charts can not substitute for the requirements of the substantive provisions of the
workmen's compensation acts. And obviously the requirement
that the award be a "proper and equitable" amount cannot be predetermined in advance of trial on the basis of charts or administrative directives. "Proper and equitable" undoubtedly permits
the trier of fact to consider such factors as the nature of the
work and the age, sex, and training of the injured employee.
(6)

Obtaining Both Remedies (sceduled and non-scheduled)

Recently the question arose whether a seriously injured
worker could obtain temporary total payments following schedule
payments. Massachusetts, by statute, allows the injured employee
to collect concurrently weekly temporary compensation plus
schedule compensation; either one can follow the other, as the
statute expressly states that "specific" (or schedule)
compensa372
tion is in addition to all other compensation.
Some compensation acts specifically provide that temporary
total payments shall cease when an end result is reached and
schedule payments shall begin. For example, a worker loses his
leg at work and for a time he collects temporary total payments;
when nothing more can be done for him medically (an end re-

370

371

372

See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 152, § 5 (1958). Cf. State ex rel.
Waller v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 N.E.2d 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943)
(cannot make rule limiting certain hernia cases to two weeks of
compensation).
Cross v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 278 App. Div. 865, 104 N.Y.S.2d
228 (3d Dep't 1951), 8 NACCA L.J. 89 (1951) (predetermined board
policy allowing twenty per cent compensation in certain specific
types of cases is error).
"In case of the following specified injuries . . . [payments] shall be
paid, in addition to all other compensation ... ." MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. c. 152, § 36 (1958).
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sult), his temporary total payments end and schedule payments
3 73

begin.

In a few states it is required by statute that temporary payments be deducted from the schedule payments.3 7 4 Under these
statutes, if after the payment of schedule compensation the employee is still unable to get a job, most administrators feel that
the injured worker is without relief-that the schedule compensation was "in lieu" of all other payments, or that it excludes further
payments for disability flowing from the injuries for which the
3 75
schedule payments were made.

But suppose that the statute provides for continuing disability payments and also provides for schedule payments, but the
statute is silent whether a worker can have both; and after the
schedule payments are made the employee is still unable to work
and earn money in his old employment or elsewhere. Can he
be restored to continuing disability payments?
Michigan, in a four to four decision, answered in the affirmative. 376 It was stated that: "[A]s new interpretive issues should
373

374

375

376

BUL. No. 161,
1960). See also
Alaska Industrial Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 356 U.S. 320 (1958).
U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BuL.. No. 161,
STATE WORIMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws 35, Table 9 (Rev. 1960).
See also Alaska Industrial Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 356 U.S. 320
(1958).
This was the law as it existed under Curtis v. Hayes Wheel Co.,
211 Mich. 260, 178 N.W. 675 (1920). It was subsequently overruled
in Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W.2d 97
See also Smith v. Industrial
(1957), 21 NACCA L.J. 207 (1958).
Comm'n, 69 Ariz. 399, 214 P.2d 797 (1950); New Amsterdam Cas. Co.
v. Brown, 81 Ga. App. 790, 60 S.E.2d 245 (1950); Lappinen v. Union
Ore Co., 224 Minn. 395, 29 N.W.2d 8 (1947); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 161, STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 35, Table 9 n.1 (Rev. 1960).
Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W.2d 97 (1957),
21 NACCA L.J. 207 (1958).
Claimant received 200 weeks of payments for amputated right leg and 100 weeks for losing four fingers. At the end of the 300 week period he was still disabled and
unemployed. He sought and received further compensation under
a section providing for total disability, although the award was
limited to 750 weeks from date of injury. The court reasoned, in
overruling Curtis v. Hayes Wheel Co., 211 Mich. 260, 178 N.W. 675
(1920), that the question to be answered at the end of the schedule
payments is: can the injured employee in fact continue to work
and earn wages in his former employment? If he cannot, and if
there is competent proof to support his claim of continuing disability, the compensation should be continued. See 56 MicH. L. REv.
827 (1958), discussed in 22 NACCA L.J. 432 (1958).

U.S. BuREAu OF

LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 37 n.3 (Rev.
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arise judicially under these acts all fair and reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of upholding the basic purposes of
the legislation, in this case compensating in some measure the
broken and injured workman who cannot work. ' 377 The court
ruled that schedule compensation is first given to the worker to
tide him over at a time when his need is greatest, without inquiring into the exact length of time he will be out of work; and
then if the number of weeks stated in the statute turns out to
be inadequate because at the end of that period he is still unable
to earn wages, he can turn to the section dealing with temporary
or unscheduled payments. In short, the legislature intended:
... to consult broad industrial experience and lay down an
irreducible minimum number of weeks allowable for certain common specific losses-thus removing the issue from costly and
delaying litigation at a time when the workman was most helpless and his need the greatest-leaving the question of further
disability and compensation to be determined on proofs made
at a hearing in an orderly manner (in which the healed workman could be present and intelligently participate) in the light
of his recovery or lack of it, having due regard for the nature
and extent of his injuries, the then capacities and general condition 3of78 the workman and the kind of job he had before his
injury.

In 1958 the United States Supreme Court reached a similar
result. 37 9 Under Alaska law an employee who lost his left arm,
right leg, and four toes of his left foot received temporary compensation for thirty-eight weeks, and then was paid a bulk or
lump sum award for "permanent and total disability." By statute,
loss of two members was considered permanent total disability.
After the bulk or lump sum was paid, the employee was still disabled for work, and his left foot had not yet healed. Less than
three weeks after receiving his bulk sum check-from which the
amount of temporary compensation had been deducted-the employee asked for continuing total benefits for the non-healed left
foot. The board awarded temporary compensation for the left
foot from the date of the last amputation nearly three years
earlier, and this was upheld by the Supreme Court.
The rationale is clear: (1) although called "total and permanent disability," the lump sum award was really for a schedule
377
378
379

Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W.2d 97 (1957).
Id. at 137, 85 N.W.2d at 102.
Alaska Industrial Bd. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 356 U.S. 320 (1958)
(where "permanent and total" is, in effect, only a schedule or specific payment, and the payment was made in a lump sum, it does
not prevent an award thereafter for temporary total disability).
See 22 NACCA L.J. 215 (1958).
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loss-a legislative judgment as to the average degree of impairment-and was paid to this employee without regard to actual
wage loss; (2) despite this payment, there may be a continuing
ability to work, and as long as that ability exists, there is a factual basis for a temporary disability award; (3) this latter type
of award takes care of lost wages during the healing period and
also compensates the claimant for any remaining loss of earning
power based on wage-earning capacity. Therefore, absent an
express provision that scedule payments eliminate the right to
other types of payments found in a compensation act, the injured
worker can look to other sections for further or additional relief.
Looking behind all this reasoning that is used to reach a just
result, one gets the feeling that the justices are expressing their
inner thoughts: (1) that workmen's compensation payments are
tragically low-below subsistence levels, 380 and (2) that merely
because the legislature has failed in its duty to correct the situation is not a sufficient reason why the courts should not, by liberal
construction, give the worker the greatest measure of relief possible under existing statutes.38 ' As stated in the well-expressed
thoughts of one court:
No living man can possibly measure the amount of poverty
and pain and human indignity suffered by fichigan workmen
380 "There seems to be widespread agreement that the compensation
benefits under most laws are woefully inadequate, especially in the
cases of serious and permanent disability. In addition, the benefit
formulae are erratic and frequently overly rigid. In view of the
past experience of more than forty years it must seriously be doubted
whether the needed relief will come from the law makers on the
state level. There is urgent cause for an 'agonizing reappraisal'
whether the time has not come for the establishment of national
social insurance against industrial accidents and diseases." Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents
Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 578 (1954). It should be
noted that England has eliminated private workmen's compensation
insurance and has placed compensation under a social insurance
system. National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, 9 & 10
Geo. 6, c. 62, cited in 5 NACCA L.J. 49 (1950).
See Katz & Wirpel, Workmen's Compensation 1910-1952: Are
Present Benefits Adequate?, 4 LAB. L.J. 164 (1953), 12 NACCA L.J.
337 (1953). See also Richter & Forer, Federal Employers' Liability
Act-A Real Compensatory Law for Railroad Workers, 36 CORNELL
L.Q. 203, 214, 221-22, 229 (1951) for a severe criticism of the shortcomings of workmen's compensation.
381 The courts cannot close their eyes to what everybody knows-that
workers and widows are pauperized under workmen's compensation,
whereas the same injury under tort, railroad, admiralty or aviation
law would bring adequate common-law damages. For example, in
an Arkansas tort case $98,000 was upheld (after remittitur) to a
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and their families because of the unfortunate Curtis case. It has
lain across the jugular vein of workmen's compensation far too
long. Rather than attempt to distinguish that case-as we are
aware we might-we prefer to sweep away the last vestiges of
the Curtis case and at long last align Michigan squarely behind
the more modern and liberal decisions which refuse to limit
382
workmen's compensation benefits to the scheduled allowance.

IV.

CONCLUSION

A half-century has passed since the earliest acts received
their first judicial interpretations. The early legislatures held
the hope that payments, though small at the start, would silbsequently be made sufficient for subsistence and would keep up
with the rising cost of living. In most jurisdictions this hope has
38 3
been tragically unrealized.

thirty-eight year old widow. Strahan v. Webb, 330 S.W.2d 291
(Ark. 1959), 25 NACCA L.J. 379 (1960). Had she been under workmen's compensation she would have obtained a maximum of thirtyfive dollars per week for 450 weeks, but not exceeding a total of
$12,500. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR,. BULL.
No. 161, STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 45, Table 11 (Rev.
1960). In Maryland, $84,500 was upheld for a widow and four surviving children. Jennings v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 516 (D.
Md. 1959), 25 NACCA L.J. 381 (1960). Under workmen's compensation the maximum would have been $15,000 with a weekly maximum of forty dollars.
Still greater discrepancies occur for such injuries as the loss
of legs and arms. See the title "Damages" in the index and the
chapter on "Verdicts or Awards Exceeding $50,000" in each issue
of the NACCA LAW JOURNAL.
In 1958 employer premiums reached almost $1.8 billion. About
one-third of the amount expended was for medical and hospital
benefits. The loss ratio of private carriers amounted to only fiftysix per cent. See the estimate by Alfred M. Skolnick, Division of
382

Program Research Office of the Commission (Social Security) in
the July 1960 issue of the A.B.C. Newsletter.
Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W.2d 97, 106
(1957).

883 "Implicit in the law and explicit in the decisions is the principle
that industry should take care of its own casualties. Yet even with
the best that under the law can be done for this plaintiff, the discrepancy between what he will have gained and what he has lost
is rather shocking." Kitts v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 133 F.
Supp. 937, 941 (E.D. Tenn. 1955)

(compensation rate mere fraction

of the wage; must fight ill health and poverty the rest of his life).
In this case the employee's hospital bill was $2,369.92 to 1955. In
1960 the maximum weekly payment in Tennessee reached thirtyfour dollars, with medical compensation stopping at $1,800 and all
compensation at $12,500.

"[lit is high time that the legislatures investigate the fate of
the families in which the breadwinner has suffered a permanent disability ....
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But the history of judicial decision has been an entirely different one. The early courts construed the acts with caution and
erroneously inserted into workmen's compensation cases inapplicable common-law doctrines in disguised garb. 38 4 But step by
step these courts uncovered their own errors and righted their
decisions.38 5 They rejected the doctrine that their mistakes were
forever embalmed in the law because of the doctrine of legislative acquiescence by silence. It was aptly stated that: "We reject as both un-Christian and legally unsound the hopeless doc-

884

385

"[Tjhe law relating to the structure and level of benefits shows
the distressing signs of legislative lethargy and patching and repatching . . . ." Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the Administration
of Workmen's Compensation, 8 NACCA L.J. 21, 32-33 (1951).
As long ago as 1954 Max D. Kossoris of the U.S. Dep't of Labor
warned: "There is a need today for stronger public concern with
the inadequacies of workmen's compensation legislation and administration. In spite of the tremendous forward strides in other
social and economic areas our compensation legislation and administration on the whole lag far behind." Kossoris, Workmen's Compensation in the United States, U. S. BuRAu OF LABOR STANDARDS,
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1149 (1954).
Hawaii has made some strides forward because a courageous
administrator dared to become a politician for a time and fight
the lobbyists. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANMARDS, DFn'T OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 186, at 12 (Rev. 1959).
Ceilings and limitations on the benefits have caused "compensation payments to fall so sadly behind the rise in wages and living
costs" that it "has brought the whole system into disrepute." Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents
Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531 (1954). Accord, Pollack,
A Policy Decision for Workmen's Compensation, 372 INs. L.J. 14
(1954) (since 1940, benefits have become even less adequate, especially where the need is greatest); Somers & Somers, Workmen's
Compensation-Unfulfilled Promise, 7 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 33 (1953).
"[Clare must be exercised lest long judicial habit in tort cases
allows judicial thought in compensation cases to be too much influenced by a discarded or modified factor of decision." Hanson v.
Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 598, 297 N.W. 19, 21 (1941).
Accord, Beran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957) (compensation allowed for a stray bullet; overruling an old case); Cunning
v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876 (1960) (defense
of horseplay has no place in workmen's compensation cases).
One of the greatest changes has occurred in the reversal of
many aggressor-assault cases where common-law doctrines appeared
in disguised garb to mislead the early courts. See cases cited in
notes 8, 93, 97-102, and 111 supra.
See, e.g., State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
38 Cal. 2d 659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952), 9 NACCA L.J. 64 (1952). See
also Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 26 Cal.
2d 286, 158 P.2d 9 (1945) (a horseplay case overruling thirty year
old decision). See 22 NACCA L.J. 175 (1958).
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trine that this Court is shackled and helpless to redeem itself
from its own original sin, however or by whomever long con386
doned."
The history of judicial developments in the field of workmen's
compensation is a history of growth, of commendable imagination,
and of improvement in the administration of justice387 for the
victims of industrial accidents, 2 million of whom look annually
to the courts for understanding and help. The spirit of liberal
and broad interpretation is now engrained in the warp and woof
of workmen's compensation, as clearly shown by the above review of the words "personal injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of employment" and the additional important
word "disability."
Judicial developments have given hope to those who desire
to improve the lot of industry's casualties-the injured workers.
386

387

Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 147, 85 N.W.2d 97, 103
(1957).
Recalling Justice Cardozo's views concerning sare decisis,
the court stated: "[Wihen a rule, after it has been duly tested
by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense
of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation
in frank avowal and full abandonment." Id. at 151, 85 N.W.2d at 105.
Dean Roscoe Pound, former Editor-in-Chief of the NACCA LAW
JouRNAL, in V JURISPRUDENCE 345 (1959) concludes:
"But, on the
whole, most of the courts have increasingly come to appreciate the
purpose and spirit of the [workmen's compensation] act . . .in its
interpretation and application."
Prof. Riesenfeld in Contemporary Trends in Compensation for
Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 531, 552
(1954), states: "All in all it can be said that American courts in
a liberal spirit have steadily extended the scope of protection under
workmen's compensation."
In recent years courts have openly encouraged injured claimants
to be represented in contested cases by experts in workmen's compensation: Miner v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 88, 202 P.2d 557
(1949), 3 NACCA L.J. 188 (1949).
"From our experience in a
number of recent cases, we are convinced that applicants would
fare better in contested cases if they were timely informed by the
Commission that while it was not necessary for them to employ
counsel, such assistance in the presentation of their case might be
desirable." Id. at 92, 202 P.2d at 559. And when attorneys' fees are
chargeable to insurers, these courts have allowed reasonable and substantial fees: see Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 27 N.J. Super. 511, 99 A.2d
664 (App. Div. 1953), 13 NACCA L.J. 95 (1952) ($2,850 fee upheld
although only $296.43 compensation awarded to injured worker).
Industrial commissions also are granting substantial as well as
reasonable fees: see Anderson v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., No. 1-636,
Claim No. U-97588, Fla. Sept. 30, 1957 ($7,500 fee of claimant's attorney charged to insurer). And in a recent hard fought case which
involved a payment of over $100,000 to a paraplegic, the attorney
for the claimant was awarded $20,000. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Marshall, 108 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1958) (mem.) (author's information on
fees from claimant's attorney, by letter dated Aug. 14, 1961).

